Narrative:

First flight of the day after a subfreezing night. Cleared for takeoff. Stood the throttles up to let them stabilize. #1 engine normal EPR, N1, N2 and fuel flow indications. #2 engine idle EPR, but N1, N2 and fuel flow duplicated #1 engine readings. I determined that the problem was with the #2 EPR gauge and called for autothrottles. The first officer refused to put autothrottles on saying that he thought we had engine ice problems. Sky conditions lga clear 20, temperature 14, dewpoint 0 degrees, wind 3025 gusts 30. I told the first officer that it was a gauge problem. He was talking about the air carrier accident in dca. At this point we were accelerating through 35-40 KTS. Instead of trying to argue with the first officer during takeoff, I elected to reject the takeoff. After exiting the runway, running the appropriate checklists and contacting company maintenance, I discussed with the first officer why I should have pressed on with the takeoff. All engine parameters were normal except for the EPR gauge. Lack of training or understanding of the conditions by the first officer led to the rejected takeoff, complicated by cockpit resource management training which added to his assertiveness in refusing to do his required duties during takeoff roll.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: TKOF ABORTED ACCOUNT ACFT EQUIP PROB MALFUNCTION.

Narrative: FIRST FLT OF THE DAY AFTER A SUBFREEZING NIGHT. CLRED FOR TKOF. STOOD THE THROTTLES UP TO LET THEM STABILIZE. #1 ENG NORMAL EPR, N1, N2 AND FUEL FLOW INDICATIONS. #2 ENG IDLE EPR, BUT N1, N2 AND FUEL FLOW DUPLICATED #1 ENG READINGS. I DETERMINED THAT THE PROB WAS WITH THE #2 EPR GAUGE AND CALLED FOR AUTOTHROTTLES. THE FO REFUSED TO PUT AUTOTHROTTLES ON SAYING THAT HE THOUGHT WE HAD ENG ICE PROBS. SKY CONDITIONS LGA CLR 20, TEMP 14, DEWPOINT 0 DEGS, WIND 3025 GUSTS 30. I TOLD THE FO THAT IT WAS A GAUGE PROB. HE WAS TALKING ABOUT THE ACR ACCIDENT IN DCA. AT THIS POINT WE WERE ACCELERATING THROUGH 35-40 KTS. INSTEAD OF TRYING TO ARGUE WITH THE FO DURING TKOF, I ELECTED TO REJECT THE TKOF. AFTER EXITING THE RWY, RUNNING THE APPROPRIATE CHKLISTS AND CONTACTING COMPANY MAINT, I DISCUSSED WITH THE FO WHY I SHOULD HAVE PRESSED ON WITH THE TKOF. ALL ENG PARAMETERS WERE NORMAL EXCEPT FOR THE EPR GAUGE. LACK OF TRAINING OR UNDERSTANDING OF THE CONDITIONS BY THE FO LED TO THE RTO, COMPLICATED BY COCKPIT RESOURCE MGMNT TRAINING WHICH ADDED TO HIS ASSERTIVENESS IN REFUSING TO DO HIS REQUIRED DUTIES DURING TKOF ROLL.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.