Narrative:

Upon pushback from ramp at iad, the captain requested an ice contamination check from a mechanic. The on-duty mechanic was not driving the tug and the ground crew summoned him. At the time the official temperature was 33 degrees F with drizzle and what appeared to be ice pellets on the windshield. The aircraft had been deiced at the gate just prior to push using type 1 fluid at 50/50 dilution. The mechanic's inspection revealed significant coarse accumulation of ice on the control surfaces of the aircraft. The captain taxied the aircraft off the active taxi route and the ground crew applied type 1 fluid twice before cleaning the aircraft. During this process PA's were made to the passenger and a secondary deicing using type ii fluid was requested. Iad operations informed us of the contract with other air carrier for this service and we were informed that other air carrier was not utilizing secondary deicing. Examination of hold over tables in the pom indicated a very short time frame for launch of only several mins. The mechanics inspection had, in fact, verified the accuracy of the data in the pom. We again requested iad operations to pursue availability of type ii application while checking the anticipated delay at the departure end of the runway. We were unable to speak with the dispatcher while on the ground at iad, but apparently, iad operations kept him informed. After getting a clearance from the mechanic and a contamination check personally accomplished by the captain the aircraft launched in minimum time after leaving the ramp. During the 30 min period this all occurred puddles on the ramp turned to slush and the tracks of the other air carrier aircraft were clearly visible after they taxied. Suspect other air carrier aircraft did not experience same degree of ice accumulation as this medium large transport without alternate fuel burn system. Iad ground crew did a very professional job and was in the process of obtaining approval to deice us at the de end of runway using other air carrier's type 1 truck since other air carrier was unable to provide type ii service. In my personal opinion, we should re- evaluate utilizing contract deicing at iad in view of the stated 30-60 delay for type ii. Arrival of flight in atl terminal area. At the last possible moment on the macey arrival to atl, approach control issued a holding clearance with a 30 min expect further clearance. The flight was dispatched with no altitude required and using new reserve fuel criteria. The captain spoke with dispatcher while observing the developing WX on the approach course to runway 26R. Shortly after speaking with flight control, atl approach issued a revised expect further clearance extending our holding time. Fuel calculation using the FMS indicated arrival at the now declared alternate of mgm at less than 5000 pounds total fuel. The captain requested direct to mgm with a climb to FL210 and proceeded at lrc. Minimum fuel was declared. Block in fuel at mgm was 4700 pounds. The fuel low quantity message on the oap illuminated en route to mgm. I understand that the atl airport experienced a hail storm after our divert. A popular bumper sticker in fl covers all this: 'things happen.' despite a moderate delay at mgm for fuel and clearance, the passenger appeared in good spirits on arrival at atl. I attribute this to the efforts of the flight attendant in charge. I regrettably did not notate her name. In passing, the captain's previous flight experience includes extended operations north of the arctic circle during the winter. Basics of safety of flight are being compromised in the interest of nebulous fuel savings. PIC must always exercise his command authority when necessary. Dispatcher wanted to bet another 1000 pounds of fuel in holding that airport would open up. Result could have been 3700 pounds at kmgm -- 700 above emergency status, i.e., 7 mins of flight time. Too close!!!

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A RATHER NEGATIVE ASSESSMENT IS MADE BY AN ACR PIC OF ACR'S OPERATIONAL PROCS IN DEALING WITH ADVERSE WINTER WX CONSIDERATIONS FACTORS ON THE GND AND IN THE AIR.

Narrative: UPON PUSHBACK FROM RAMP AT IAD, THE CAPT REQUESTED AN ICE CONTAMINATION CHK FROM A MECH. THE ON-DUTY MECH WAS NOT DRIVING THE TUG AND THE GND CREW SUMMONED HIM. AT THE TIME THE OFFICIAL TEMP WAS 33 DEGS F WITH DRIZZLE AND WHAT APPEARED TO BE ICE PELLETS ON THE WINDSHIELD. THE ACFT HAD BEEN DEICED AT THE GATE JUST PRIOR TO PUSH USING TYPE 1 FLUID AT 50/50 DILUTION. THE MECH'S INSPECTION REVEALED SIGNIFICANT COARSE ACCUMULATION OF ICE ON THE CTL SURFACES OF THE ACFT. THE CAPT TAXIED THE ACFT OFF THE ACTIVE TAXI RTE AND THE GND CREW APPLIED TYPE 1 FLUID TWICE BEFORE CLEANING THE ACFT. DURING THIS PROCESS PA'S WERE MADE TO THE PAX AND A SECONDARY DEICING USING TYPE II FLUID WAS REQUESTED. IAD OPS INFORMED US OF THE CONTRACT WITH OTHER ACR FOR THIS SVC AND WE WERE INFORMED THAT OTHER ACR WAS NOT UTILIZING SECONDARY DEICING. EXAMINATION OF HOLD OVER TABLES IN THE POM INDICATED A VERY SHORT TIME FRAME FOR LAUNCH OF ONLY SEVERAL MINS. THE MECHS INSPECTION HAD, IN FACT, VERIFIED THE ACCURACY OF THE DATA IN THE POM. WE AGAIN REQUESTED IAD OPS TO PURSUE AVAILABILITY OF TYPE II APPLICATION WHILE CHKING THE ANTICIPATED DELAY AT THE DEP END OF THE RWY. WE WERE UNABLE TO SPEAK WITH THE DISPATCHER WHILE ON THE GND AT IAD, BUT APPARENTLY, IAD OPS KEPT HIM INFORMED. AFTER GETTING A CLRNC FROM THE MECH AND A CONTAMINATION CHK PERSONALLY ACCOMPLISHED BY THE CAPT THE ACFT LAUNCHED IN MINIMUM TIME AFTER LEAVING THE RAMP. DURING THE 30 MIN PERIOD THIS ALL OCCURRED PUDDLES ON THE RAMP TURNED TO SLUSH AND THE TRACKS OF THE OTHER ACR ACFT WERE CLRLY VISIBLE AFTER THEY TAXIED. SUSPECT OTHER ACR ACFT DID NOT EXPERIENCE SAME DEG OF ICE ACCUMULATION AS THIS MLG WITHOUT ALTERNATE FUEL BURN SYS. IAD GND CREW DID A VERY PROFESSIONAL JOB AND WAS IN THE PROCESS OF OBTAINING APPROVAL TO DEICE US AT THE DE END OF RWY USING OTHER ACR'S TYPE 1 TRUCK SINCE OTHER ACR WAS UNABLE TO PROVIDE TYPE II SVC. IN MY PERSONAL OPINION, WE SHOULD RE- EVALUATE UTILIZING CONTRACT DEICING AT IAD IN VIEW OF THE STATED 30-60 DELAY FOR TYPE II. ARR OF FLT IN ATL TERMINAL AREA. AT THE LAST POSSIBLE MOMENT ON THE MACEY ARR TO ATL, APCH CTL ISSUED A HOLDING CLRNC WITH A 30 MIN EXPECT FURTHER CLRNC. THE FLT WAS DISPATCHED WITH NO ALT REQUIRED AND USING NEW RESERVE FUEL CRITERIA. THE CAPT SPOKE WITH DISPATCHER WHILE OBSERVING THE DEVELOPING WX ON THE APCH COURSE TO RWY 26R. SHORTLY AFTER SPEAKING WITH FLT CTL, ATL APCH ISSUED A REVISED EXPECT FURTHER CLRNC EXTENDING OUR HOLDING TIME. FUEL CALCULATION USING THE FMS INDICATED ARR AT THE NOW DECLARED ALTERNATE OF MGM AT LESS THAN 5000 LBS TOTAL FUEL. THE CAPT REQUESTED DIRECT TO MGM WITH A CLB TO FL210 AND PROCEEDED AT LRC. MINIMUM FUEL WAS DECLARED. BLOCK IN FUEL AT MGM WAS 4700 LBS. THE FUEL LOW QUANTITY MESSAGE ON THE OAP ILLUMINATED ENRTE TO MGM. I UNDERSTAND THAT THE ATL ARPT EXPERIENCED A HAIL STORM AFTER OUR DIVERT. A POPULAR BUMPER STICKER IN FL COVERS ALL THIS: 'THINGS HAPPEN.' DESPITE A MODERATE DELAY AT MGM FOR FUEL AND CLRNC, THE PAX APPEARED IN GOOD SPIRITS ON ARR AT ATL. I ATTRIBUTE THIS TO THE EFFORTS OF THE FLT ATTENDANT IN CHARGE. I REGRETTABLY DID NOT NOTATE HER NAME. IN PASSING, THE CAPT'S PREVIOUS FLT EXPERIENCE INCLUDES EXTENDED OPS N OF THE ARCTIC CIRCLE DURING THE WINTER. BASICS OF SAFETY OF FLT ARE BEING COMPROMISED IN THE INTEREST OF NEBULOUS FUEL SAVINGS. PIC MUST ALWAYS EXERCISE HIS COMMAND AUTHORITY WHEN NECESSARY. DISPATCHER WANTED TO BET ANOTHER 1000 LBS OF FUEL IN HOLDING THAT ARPT WOULD OPEN UP. RESULT COULD HAVE BEEN 3700 LBS AT KMGM -- 700 ABOVE EMER STATUS, I.E., 7 MINS OF FLT TIME. TOO CLOSE!!!

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.