Narrative:

While on an ILS 4R at bos gear handle placed down but nose gear would not extend. Gear recycled with same indications. Abnormal checklist for unsafe gear completed with no change. A low pass was flown and ground observer reported gear doors open but gear not extended. Captain briefed flight attendant and passenger for landing while I flew aircraft on ILS. At 800 ft captain took aircraft for touchdown. Engines were secured prior to blade impact as we had briefed. 'T' handles pulled, aircraft came to stop on centerline approximately 5000 ft from touchdown point. One problem encountered -- captain was talking to maintenance on communication 2 while I was flying aircraft and complying with approach control vectors/instructions on communication 1 while in IMC. As fuel was approaching low level, we did not have much time to discuss a lot of particulars. We covered landing confign, aircraft evacuate/evacuation, and fuel chopping engines prior to blade impact. I wanted to help more with troubleshooting but I strongly felt that one should fly the aircraft and the other should troubleshoot. I did not want to be part of another everglades accident of no one flying aircraft. Supplemental information from acn 235076: I had selected the boston operations frequency because they were in position to maintain contact with maintenance and flight control via land lines and would be able to coordinate the ground effort in the event that we did make an emergency landing. At least this was my expectation, because I wanted maintenance to be aware of where I was in the procedure at all times. Unfortunately, I believe there was much information lost in the process of relaying. Ideally, the situation would have been far better served by having a link with a flight training person who would have been familiar with the problem and the procedures. This essentially would have had the effect of adding a member to the crew who could concentrate solely on the problem without any other duties to perform. Along these lines, I think a simulator instructor would be the most effective person to fill this role. A simulator instructor is called upon to re- enact scenarios of in-flight problems such as ours on virtually a daily basis, thus developing a valuable store of experience to draw from. This is the type of input that can most help flcs in the process of dealing with in-flight problems. The technology is available to provide a support service such as this and, in my opinion, this type of support is the next most logical step in enhancing safety and reducing the level of error in the course of dealing with time-critical sits.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: EMER DECLARED LNDG WITH NOSE GEAR STILL RETRACTED ON LTT COMMUTER. NIGHT OP. GEAR UP LNDG.

Narrative: WHILE ON AN ILS 4R AT BOS GEAR HANDLE PLACED DOWN BUT NOSE GEAR WOULD NOT EXTEND. GEAR RECYCLED WITH SAME INDICATIONS. ABNORMAL CHKLIST FOR UNSAFE GEAR COMPLETED WITH NO CHANGE. A LOW PASS WAS FLOWN AND GND OBSERVER RPTED GEAR DOORS OPEN BUT GEAR NOT EXTENDED. CAPT BRIEFED FLT ATTENDANT AND PAX FOR LNDG WHILE I FLEW ACFT ON ILS. AT 800 FT CAPT TOOK ACFT FOR TOUCHDOWN. ENGS WERE SECURED PRIOR TO BLADE IMPACT AS WE HAD BRIEFED. 'T' HANDLES PULLED, ACFT CAME TO STOP ON CTRLINE APPROX 5000 FT FROM TOUCHDOWN POINT. ONE PROB ENCOUNTERED -- CAPT WAS TALKING TO MAINT ON COM 2 WHILE I WAS FLYING ACFT AND COMPLYING WITH APCH CTL VECTORS/INSTRUCTIONS ON COM 1 WHILE IN IMC. AS FUEL WAS APCHING LOW LEVEL, WE DID NOT HAVE MUCH TIME TO DISCUSS A LOT OF PARTICULARS. WE COVERED LNDG CONFIGN, ACFT EVAC, AND FUEL CHOPPING ENGS PRIOR TO BLADE IMPACT. I WANTED TO HELP MORE WITH TROUBLESHOOTING BUT I STRONGLY FELT THAT ONE SHOULD FLY THE ACFT AND THE OTHER SHOULD TROUBLESHOOT. I DID NOT WANT TO BE PART OF ANOTHER EVERGLADES ACCIDENT OF NO ONE FLYING ACFT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 235076: I HAD SELECTED THE BOSTON OPS FREQ BECAUSE THEY WERE IN POS TO MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH MAINT AND FLT CTL VIA LAND LINES AND WOULD BE ABLE TO COORDINATE THE GND EFFORT IN THE EVENT THAT WE DID MAKE AN EMER LNDG. AT LEAST THIS WAS MY EXPECTATION, BECAUSE I WANTED MAINT TO BE AWARE OF WHERE I WAS IN THE PROC AT ALL TIMES. UNFORTUNATELY, I BELIEVE THERE WAS MUCH INFO LOST IN THE PROCESS OF RELAYING. IDEALLY, THE SIT WOULD HAVE BEEN FAR BETTER SERVED BY HAVING A LINK WITH A FLT TRAINING PERSON WHO WOULD HAVE BEEN FAMILIAR WITH THE PROB AND THE PROCS. THIS ESSENTIALLY WOULD HAVE HAD THE EFFECT OF ADDING A MEMBER TO THE CREW WHO COULD CONCENTRATE SOLELY ON THE PROB WITHOUT ANY OTHER DUTIES TO PERFORM. ALONG THESE LINES, I THINK A SIMULATOR INSTRUCTOR WOULD BE THE MOST EFFECTIVE PERSON TO FILL THIS ROLE. A SIMULATOR INSTRUCTOR IS CALLED UPON TO RE- ENACT SCENARIOS OF INFLT PROBS SUCH AS OURS ON VIRTUALLY A DAILY BASIS, THUS DEVELOPING A VALUABLE STORE OF EXPERIENCE TO DRAW FROM. THIS IS THE TYPE OF INPUT THAT CAN MOST HELP FLCS IN THE PROCESS OF DEALING WITH INFLT PROBS. THE TECHNOLOGY IS AVAILABLE TO PROVIDE A SUPPORT SVC SUCH AS THIS AND, IN MY OPINION, THIS TYPE OF SUPPORT IS THE NEXT MOST LOGICAL STEP IN ENHANCING SAFETY AND REDUCING THE LEVEL OF ERROR IN THE COURSE OF DEALING WITH TIME-CRITICAL SITS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.