Narrative:

During the final stages of departure, fueler came to cockpit to state he was having difficulty with fuel figures. After checking cockpit gauges he mentioned he'll work it out with maintenance. Maintenance later placarded fuel quantity #2 tank indicated inoperative, and provided fuel slip with assurances that fuel was verified by means of reading fuel level measuring sticks. After takeoff and during initial cruise, first officer noticed that fuel slip was headed widebody transport B, and requested from dispatch that fuel load be verified again with copy sent to aircraft via ACARS printer. Shortly thereafter, first officer reported that the inoperative fuel quantity gauge was decreasing exactly as fuel used indication was increasing. When fuel quantity #2 gauge reached 0 and a fuel tank pressure low light came on, xfeeds were opened and flight diverted to denver to work out discrepancy. I believe fuel load error was in part caused by misfueling by ground personnel, who were mislead by recurring problems with this type aircraft history of fuel indicating system anomalies. Why verification of fuel load using magnetic sticks was in error I will never know, except possibly unlevel ramp or defective sticks. As far as preventing a recurrence, I would empty all questionable tanks and meter fuel in and then stick tanks manually. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: a hearing was conducted. The air carrier has ascertained that the aircraft was parked on a sloping ramp which rendered the drip stick reading inaccurate. He thinks the FAA is going to pursue the issue.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: WDB DISPATCHED WITH INSUFFICIENT FUEL FOR TRIP. MAINT ERROR.

Narrative: DURING THE FINAL STAGES OF DEP, FUELER CAME TO COCKPIT TO STATE HE WAS HAVING DIFFICULTY WITH FUEL FIGURES. AFTER CHKING COCKPIT GAUGES HE MENTIONED HE'LL WORK IT OUT WITH MAINT. MAINT LATER PLACARDED FUEL QUANTITY #2 TANK INDICATED INOP, AND PROVIDED FUEL SLIP WITH ASSURANCES THAT FUEL WAS VERIFIED BY MEANS OF READING FUEL LEVEL MEASURING STICKS. AFTER TKOF AND DURING INITIAL CRUISE, FO NOTICED THAT FUEL SLIP WAS HEADED WDB B, AND REQUESTED FROM DISPATCH THAT FUEL LOAD BE VERIFIED AGAIN WITH COPY SENT TO ACFT VIA ACARS PRINTER. SHORTLY THEREAFTER, FO RPTED THAT THE INOP FUEL QUANTITY GAUGE WAS DECREASING EXACTLY AS FUEL USED INDICATION WAS INCREASING. WHEN FUEL QUANTITY #2 GAUGE REACHED 0 AND A FUEL TANK PRESSURE LOW LIGHT CAME ON, XFEEDS WERE OPENED AND FLT DIVERTED TO DENVER TO WORK OUT DISCREPANCY. I BELIEVE FUEL LOAD ERROR WAS IN PART CAUSED BY MISFUELING BY GND PERSONNEL, WHO WERE MISLEAD BY RECURRING PROBS WITH THIS TYPE ACFT HISTORY OF FUEL INDICATING SYS ANOMALIES. WHY VERIFICATION OF FUEL LOAD USING MAGNETIC STICKS WAS IN ERROR I WILL NEVER KNOW, EXCEPT POSSIBLY UNLEVEL RAMP OR DEFECTIVE STICKS. AS FAR AS PREVENTING A RECURRENCE, I WOULD EMPTY ALL QUESTIONABLE TANKS AND METER FUEL IN AND THEN STICK TANKS MANUALLY. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: A HEARING WAS CONDUCTED. THE ACR HAS ASCERTAINED THAT THE ACFT WAS PARKED ON A SLOPING RAMP WHICH RENDERED THE DRIP STICK READING INACCURATE. HE THINKS THE FAA IS GOING TO PURSUE THE ISSUE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.