Narrative:

During takeoff roll runway 28R, several loud detonations occurred. Aircraft yawed noticeable to left and tower reported fire/fireballs emanating from 1 of left side engines. As airspeed during these cues was well below calculated V1 speed, abort was commenced at 144 KTS on calculated 154 KTS V1 speed. Small brake fire extinguished by crash crew. 2200 ft of runway remained on this 11870 ft runway. WX conditions were ideal. SOP, pre-takeoff briefings and annual simulated practice made this a textbook example of a potential life-threatening event. Though fully pre-briefed, there was some delay (seconds) in announcing abort to tower and announcement to passenger/crew to prevent evacuate/evacuation due to priorities and stress. Braking was less than expected following fast, heavy highspd abort. This was due to super overheated brakes, one of which caught fire and was quickly extinguished by crash crew. Abort was 10 KTS under V1. Policy is not to abort when 5 KTS less than V1. This is a good policy. If we had used dry runway V speeds and WX had been a factor, i.e., xwinds, heavy rain and slippery runway, the outcome from my perspective would be doubtful that we would have stayed on the runway if cut had been 1 second later. In this case, our optional slippery runway V1 speeds would have given the same safety margin we luckily experienced. We were prepared, well briefed and programmed to react to this unusual event. Air carrier training. SOP and a clear plan allowed this emergency to have a successful outcome.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR WDB TKOF ABORTED AFTER EXPERIENCING SEVERAL COMPRESSOR STALLS PRIOR TO V1.

Narrative: DURING TKOF ROLL RWY 28R, SEVERAL LOUD DETONATIONS OCCURRED. ACFT YAWED NOTICEABLE TO L AND TWR RPTED FIRE/FIREBALLS EMANATING FROM 1 OF L SIDE ENGS. AS AIRSPD DURING THESE CUES WAS WELL BELOW CALCULATED V1 SPD, ABORT WAS COMMENCED AT 144 KTS ON CALCULATED 154 KTS V1 SPD. SMALL BRAKE FIRE EXTINGUISHED BY CRASH CREW. 2200 FT OF RWY REMAINED ON THIS 11870 FT RWY. WX CONDITIONS WERE IDEAL. SOP, PRE-TKOF BRIEFINGS AND ANNUAL SIMULATED PRACTICE MADE THIS A TEXTBOOK EXAMPLE OF A POTENTIAL LIFE-THREATENING EVENT. THOUGH FULLY PRE-BRIEFED, THERE WAS SOME DELAY (SECONDS) IN ANNOUNCING ABORT TO TWR AND ANNOUNCEMENT TO PAX/CREW TO PREVENT EVAC DUE TO PRIORITIES AND STRESS. BRAKING WAS LESS THAN EXPECTED FOLLOWING FAST, HVY HIGHSPD ABORT. THIS WAS DUE TO SUPER OVERHEATED BRAKES, ONE OF WHICH CAUGHT FIRE AND WAS QUICKLY EXTINGUISHED BY CRASH CREW. ABORT WAS 10 KTS UNDER V1. POLICY IS NOT TO ABORT WHEN 5 KTS LESS THAN V1. THIS IS A GOOD POLICY. IF WE HAD USED DRY RWY V SPDS AND WX HAD BEEN A FACTOR, I.E., XWINDS, HVY RAIN AND SLIPPERY RWY, THE OUTCOME FROM MY PERSPECTIVE WOULD BE DOUBTFUL THAT WE WOULD HAVE STAYED ON THE RWY IF CUT HAD BEEN 1 SECOND LATER. IN THIS CASE, OUR OPTIONAL SLIPPERY RWY V1 SPDS WOULD HAVE GIVEN THE SAME SAFETY MARGIN WE LUCKILY EXPERIENCED. WE WERE PREPARED, WELL BRIEFED AND PROGRAMMED TO REACT TO THIS UNUSUAL EVENT. ACR TRAINING. SOP AND A CLR PLAN ALLOWED THIS EMER TO HAVE A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.