Narrative:

After taxiing onto taxiway N3 from 10L at pdx, I switched to ground control and was given clearance to taxi to park at company a ramp. My company, X airlines, maintains several parking spots on company a ramp in the southeast corner. I have taxied this route frequently and recently, though rarely at night. The taxi lines provide 2 rtes to our parking. Neither looked easily passable because of perceived lack of clearance from other aircraft. I chose to taxi between 2 lines of parked aircraft. The conditions at the time were 1100 broken, 4 mi in fog and drizzle. The windshield was wet and not equipped with wipers. This area of the ramp was darker than the rest and the floodlights directed in my direction cause glare. In addition, the wet ramp and puddles caused further glare. Prior to this flight, I had been unable to raise the seat to my accustomed position, so I was sitting lower than normal. I had to stretch in order to see over the glare shield immediately in front of the plane. The wingtip clearance between the lines of parked aircraft was tight. I had slowed the plane to less than a brisk walk pace. I was carefully scanning from side to side. I looked forward, and my attention was diverted by an large transport parked 50 yards away, all lit up, with numerous service vehicles, lights flashing. While my attention was diverted, the plane drifted right. When I looked to see where I was going, an small aircraft appeared immediately in front of me. I closed the throttles and simultaneously braked heavily. The left propeller struck the left wingtip. At that point, I closed the mixtures and turned off the magnetos and master switch. The small transport was parked and unoccupied. I feel my preoccupation with thinking about fuel orders and a general lack of risk awareness, given the conditions, led to the incident. I should have compensated for the lack of forward visibility (seat position, WX) with increased vigilance and increase consideration of my options, ie., stopping the aircraft to survey the ramp and appraise aircraft position, possible distrs, such as the large transport and reduction in visibility due to glare. As I was coming off several days of rest and this being the first leg of the trip, I felt I was physically up to speed. This awareness may have led to complacency, thinking I'd be sharp enough to catch mistakes. In the future, I know that taxiing at night requires heightened vigilance, and that all my concentration needs to be focused on taxiing, not on fuel orders or making a schedule.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CARGO SMA TAXIING HAS PROP STRIKE PARKED ACFT.

Narrative: AFTER TAXIING ONTO TAXIWAY N3 FROM 10L AT PDX, I SWITCHED TO GND CTL AND WAS GIVEN CLRNC TO TAXI TO PARK AT COMPANY A RAMP. MY COMPANY, X AIRLINES, MAINTAINS SEVERAL PARKING SPOTS ON COMPANY A RAMP IN THE SE CORNER. I HAVE TAXIED THIS RTE FREQUENTLY AND RECENTLY, THOUGH RARELY AT NIGHT. THE TAXI LINES PROVIDE 2 RTES TO OUR PARKING. NEITHER LOOKED EASILY PASSABLE BECAUSE OF PERCEIVED LACK OF CLRNC FROM OTHER ACFT. I CHOSE TO TAXI BTWN 2 LINES OF PARKED ACFT. THE CONDITIONS AT THE TIME WERE 1100 BROKEN, 4 MI IN FOG AND DRIZZLE. THE WINDSHIELD WAS WET AND NOT EQUIPPED WITH WIPERS. THIS AREA OF THE RAMP WAS DARKER THAN THE REST AND THE FLOODLIGHTS DIRECTED IN MY DIRECTION CAUSE GLARE. IN ADDITION, THE WET RAMP AND PUDDLES CAUSED FURTHER GLARE. PRIOR TO THIS FLT, I HAD BEEN UNABLE TO RAISE THE SEAT TO MY ACCUSTOMED POS, SO I WAS SITTING LOWER THAN NORMAL. I HAD TO STRETCH IN ORDER TO SEE OVER THE GLARE SHIELD IMMEDIATELY IN FRONT OF THE PLANE. THE WINGTIP CLRNC BTWN THE LINES OF PARKED ACFT WAS TIGHT. I HAD SLOWED THE PLANE TO LESS THAN A BRISK WALK PACE. I WAS CAREFULLY SCANNING FROM SIDE TO SIDE. I LOOKED FORWARD, AND MY ATTN WAS DIVERTED BY AN LGT PARKED 50 YARDS AWAY, ALL LIT UP, WITH NUMEROUS SVC VEHICLES, LIGHTS FLASHING. WHILE MY ATTN WAS DIVERTED, THE PLANE DRIFTED R. WHEN I LOOKED TO SEE WHERE I WAS GOING, AN SMA APPEARED IMMEDIATELY IN FRONT OF ME. I CLOSED THE THROTTLES AND SIMULTANEOUSLY BRAKED HEAVILY. THE L PROP STRUCK THE L WINGTIP. AT THAT POINT, I CLOSED THE MIXTURES AND TURNED OFF THE MAGNETOS AND MASTER SWITCH. THE SMT WAS PARKED AND UNOCCUPIED. I FEEL MY PREOCCUPATION WITH THINKING ABOUT FUEL ORDERS AND A GENERAL LACK OF RISK AWARENESS, GIVEN THE CONDITIONS, LED TO THE INCIDENT. I SHOULD HAVE COMPENSATED FOR THE LACK OF FORWARD VISIBILITY (SEAT POS, WX) WITH INCREASED VIGILANCE AND INCREASE CONSIDERATION OF MY OPTIONS, IE., STOPPING THE ACFT TO SURVEY THE RAMP AND APPRAISE ACFT POS, POSSIBLE DISTRS, SUCH AS THE LGT AND REDUCTION IN VISIBILITY DUE TO GLARE. AS I WAS COMING OFF SEVERAL DAYS OF REST AND THIS BEING THE FIRST LEG OF THE TRIP, I FELT I WAS PHYSICALLY UP TO SPD. THIS AWARENESS MAY HAVE LED TO COMPLACENCY, THINKING I'D BE SHARP ENOUGH TO CATCH MISTAKES. IN THE FUTURE, I KNOW THAT TAXIING AT NIGHT REQUIRES HEIGHTENED VIGILANCE, AND THAT ALL MY CONCENTRATION NEEDS TO BE FOCUSED ON TAXIING, NOT ON FUEL ORDERS OR MAKING A SCHEDULE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.