Narrative:

Air carrier X was cleared by slc ground control to taxi to runway 34L. We were #2 for takeoff behind an medium large transport. The medium large transport was cleared for takeoff and reported digesting a bird into one of its engines immediately after takeoff and needed to return and land. Tower asked if we could accept runway 34R for takeoff. We checked our takeoff data and replied that yes, we could. The tower then gave us instructions to cross without delay and to taxi to runway 34R. After crossing runway 34L, the tower cleared us for takeoff. The final items on the before takeoff checklist were completed, I turned the aircraft to the left onto the lighted runway and called for alternate power to be set. We had previously computed that, with our existing operation weight, alternate power could be used on runway 34R. As we continued down the runway, I realized the amber and red runway lights located at the end of the runway were approaching too quickly for us to complete a safe takeoff. At about the same time, I remember having a feeling that something was not right! I looked at my airspeed and saw that it was smoothly advancing toward and almost V1. I advanced the power levers and rotated the aircraft at vr positively to a 15 to 17 degree deck angle. The remainder of the takeoff, including the cleanup and noise abatement procedures were normal. I believe factors contributing to the above must include the following: 1) permitting myself to become involved with the dialogue between slc and the medium large transport experiencing an emergency. 2) allowing ourselves into making a rapid decision relating to the acceptance of runway 34R for takeoff. This acceptance mandates additional briefings and the awareness of any special departure instructions relating to runway 34R. There was absolutely no indication at any time from the tower that we were not turning onto runway 34R. Possible the changeover occurring when it did precluded attention being afforded to us. 4) inadequate signage relating to the intersection of runways 32 and 34R. Supplemental information from acn 226137: we were cleared for takeoff on runway 34R and I responded that we were still a fair distance from that runway. The tower controller replied that it did not matter, and that we were cleared for takeoff. At no time during our taxi to runway 34R do I recall seeing any signage as to which runways lay ahead. The captain advanced the throttles part way as we started the turn onto the runway. At this point, I looked down and turned on the transponder/TCASII and began to monitor the engine instruments as per SOP for the PNF during takeoff roll. As we accelerated, I continued to monitor the engine instruments, refined alternate takeoff power and watched the airspeed build. At 80 KTS, I called out, '80 KTS, power set, engine instruments checked,' and scanned the flight instruments to ensure there were no flags. Throughout this portion of the takeoff roll I had not looked outside the aircraft, as my duties do not call for that. As we approached V1, the captain increased power to approximately normal power. This was the first time that I had an indication that anything was abnormal. At this point, I looked up for an instant and saw what I thought was an intersection about 1000 ft in front of the aircraft. I looked back down to the airspeed indicator, and called out 'V1, rotate,' then 'V2' and 'positive rate' at the appropriate times. The remainder of the takeoff and climb were normal and there was no indication from the tower or ATC that anything was amiss. I subsequently learned that we had apparently taken off on runway 32 instead of runway 34R. I believe that a strong contributing factor was the inadequate signage for the intersection of runways 34R, 32, and the taxiway. I have subsequently learned that 2 other air carrier aircraft previously made the same mistake and I feel that a change in the signage at this intersection needs attention before another flight repeats this error. Supplemental information from acn 226221: causal factors: signage inadequate at already confusing joint runway takeoff area. Fatigue -- third leg after on duty for 10 1/2 hours.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR X NON ADHERENCE TO ATC CLRNC, TKOF ON WRONG RWY AT SLC. PLTDEV. RWY SIGNAGE.

Narrative: ACR X WAS CLRED BY SLC GND CTL TO TAXI TO RWY 34L. WE WERE #2 FOR TKOF BEHIND AN MLG. THE MLG WAS CLRED FOR TKOF AND RPTED DIGESTING A BIRD INTO ONE OF ITS ENGINES IMMEDIATELY AFTER TKOF AND NEEDED TO RETURN AND LAND. TWR ASKED IF WE COULD ACCEPT RWY 34R FOR TKOF. WE CHKED OUR TKOF DATA AND REPLIED THAT YES, WE COULD. THE TWR THEN GAVE US INSTRUCTIONS TO CROSS WITHOUT DELAY AND TO TAXI TO RWY 34R. AFTER XING RWY 34L, THE TWR CLRED US FOR TKOF. THE FINAL ITEMS ON THE BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST WERE COMPLETED, I TURNED THE ACFT TO THE L ONTO THE LIGHTED RWY AND CALLED FOR ALTERNATE PWR TO BE SET. WE HAD PREVIOUSLY COMPUTED THAT, WITH OUR EXISTING OP WT, ALTERNATE PWR COULD BE USED ON RWY 34R. AS WE CONTINUED DOWN THE RWY, I REALIZED THE AMBER AND RED RWY LIGHTS LOCATED AT THE END OF THE RWY WERE APCHING TOO QUICKLY FOR US TO COMPLETE A SAFE TKOF. AT ABOUT THE SAME TIME, I REMEMBER HAVING A FEELING THAT SOMETHING WAS NOT RIGHT! I LOOKED AT MY AIRSPD AND SAW THAT IT WAS SMOOTHLY ADVANCING TOWARD AND ALMOST V1. I ADVANCED THE PWR LEVERS AND ROTATED THE ACFT AT VR POSITIVELY TO A 15 TO 17 DEG DECK ANGLE. THE REMAINDER OF THE TKOF, INCLUDING THE CLEANUP AND NOISE ABATEMENT PROCS WERE NORMAL. I BELIEVE FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE ABOVE MUST INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING: 1) PERMITTING MYSELF TO BECOME INVOLVED WITH THE DIALOGUE BTWN SLC AND THE MLG EXPERIENCING AN EMER. 2) ALLOWING OURSELVES INTO MAKING A RAPID DECISION RELATING TO THE ACCEPTANCE OF RWY 34R FOR TKOF. THIS ACCEPTANCE MANDATES ADDITIONAL BRIEFINGS AND THE AWARENESS OF ANY SPECIAL DEP INSTRUCTIONS RELATING TO RWY 34R. THERE WAS ABSOLUTELY NO INDICATION AT ANY TIME FROM THE TWR THAT WE WERE NOT TURNING ONTO RWY 34R. POSSIBLE THE CHANGEOVER OCCURRING WHEN IT DID PRECLUDED ATTN BEING AFFORDED TO US. 4) INADEQUATE SIGNAGE RELATING TO THE INTXN OF RWYS 32 AND 34R. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 226137: WE WERE CLRED FOR TKOF ON RWY 34R AND I RESPONDED THAT WE WERE STILL A FAIR DISTANCE FROM THAT RWY. THE TWR CTLR REPLIED THAT IT DID NOT MATTER, AND THAT WE WERE CLRED FOR TKOF. AT NO TIME DURING OUR TAXI TO RWY 34R DO I RECALL SEEING ANY SIGNAGE AS TO WHICH RWYS LAY AHEAD. THE CAPT ADVANCED THE THROTTLES PART WAY AS WE STARTED THE TURN ONTO THE RWY. AT THIS POINT, I LOOKED DOWN AND TURNED ON THE TRANSPONDER/TCASII AND BEGAN TO MONITOR THE ENG INSTS AS PER SOP FOR THE PNF DURING TKOF ROLL. AS WE ACCELERATED, I CONTINUED TO MONITOR THE ENG INSTS, REFINED ALTERNATE TKOF PWR AND WATCHED THE AIRSPEED BUILD. AT 80 KTS, I CALLED OUT, '80 KTS, PWR SET, ENG INSTS CHKED,' AND SCANNED THE FLT INSTS TO ENSURE THERE WERE NO FLAGS. THROUGHOUT THIS PORTION OF THE TKOF ROLL I HAD NOT LOOKED OUTSIDE THE ACFT, AS MY DUTIES DO NOT CALL FOR THAT. AS WE APCHED V1, THE CAPT INCREASED PWR TO APPROX NORMAL PWR. THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME THAT I HAD AN INDICATION THAT ANYTHING WAS ABNORMAL. AT THIS POINT, I LOOKED UP FOR AN INSTANT AND SAW WHAT I THOUGHT WAS AN INTXN ABOUT 1000 FT IN FRONT OF THE ACFT. I LOOKED BACK DOWN TO THE AIRSPD INDICATOR, AND CALLED OUT 'V1, ROTATE,' THEN 'V2' AND 'POSITIVE RATE' AT THE APPROPRIATE TIMES. THE REMAINDER OF THE TKOF AND CLB WERE NORMAL AND THERE WAS NO INDICATION FROM THE TWR OR ATC THAT ANYTHING WAS AMISS. I SUBSEQUENTLY LEARNED THAT WE HAD APPARENTLY TAKEN OFF ON RWY 32 INSTEAD OF RWY 34R. I BELIEVE THAT A STRONG CONTRIBUTING FACTOR WAS THE INADEQUATE SIGNAGE FOR THE INTXN OF RWYS 34R, 32, AND THE TAXIWAY. I HAVE SUBSEQUENTLY LEARNED THAT 2 OTHER ACR ACFT PREVIOUSLY MADE THE SAME MISTAKE AND I FEEL THAT A CHANGE IN THE SIGNAGE AT THIS INTXN NEEDS ATTN BEFORE ANOTHER FLT REPEATS THIS ERROR. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 226221: CAUSAL FACTORS: SIGNAGE INADEQUATE AT ALREADY CONFUSING JOINT RWY TKOF AREA. FATIGUE -- THIRD LEG AFTER ON DUTY FOR 10 1/2 HRS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.