Narrative:

I was instructed to taxi 'right outer, hold short of nov,' however, I failed to hold short of nov. I realized this as I passed it and shortly after that, ground control noticed also, some backgnd information will help explain how this happened. Recently, my company has announced a mandatory program to save fuel and thereby cut costs. We are expected to taxi off the gate on 1 engine and delay second engine start, any time the following 3 conditions are met: 1) expected taxi time more than 3 mins (a ridiculous policy), 2) ambient temperature less than 85 degrees F (ridiculous) and nosewheel steering not affected by MEL/slippery surface. Several pilots have expressed concern that delaying the engine start compromises safety. Recently, I experienced that when I miscalculated the amount of time I had remaining in the takeoff line-up. I delayed second engine start longer than I should have, and subsequently the checklists were rushed. I vowed not to make that mistake again. On the flight when the taxiway incident occurred, I had made the call to ground for taxi while my first officer called company for clearance out of 'the alley.' I advised him, first officer, of the taxi route as we left the gate 'right outer hold short of nov.' as I neared nov, I was looking at the line-up at runway end which was only 3 aircraft and, to avoid repeating my previous mistake, (rushing checklists), I decided to then start the second engine while taxiing (approved procedure) so my attention was not completely on taxiing and I went right past nov. Ground control then said 'it looks like you passed nov, make a right on 'PA,' hold short of 'P' on 'pd,' which I then did, and the remainder of taxi was without incident. Other contributing factors: 1) the first officer's are not provided with charts (airport, approach, en route) 2) jfk is a relatively new airport for us and with the complex taxiway layout we don't have it 'memorized' yet so my backup (first officer) was not well-equipped. To avoid this in the future, I am disregarding the company's '3 min taxi' rule and will only delay second engine start if I know I will be able to start it while the aircraft is stopped on the taxiway. While taxiing, I will be looking outside as I should be. I don't think the fuel we are saving is worth the risk.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR LTT TAXIED PAST A POINT WHERE GND CTL TOLD THEM TO HOLD. THE FO HAD NO APCH OR ARPT PAGES BY COMPANY POLICY.

Narrative: I WAS INSTRUCTED TO TAXI 'R OUTER, HOLD SHORT OF NOV,' HOWEVER, I FAILED TO HOLD SHORT OF NOV. I REALIZED THIS AS I PASSED IT AND SHORTLY AFTER THAT, GND CTL NOTICED ALSO, SOME BACKGND INFO WILL HELP EXPLAIN HOW THIS HAPPENED. RECENTLY, MY COMPANY HAS ANNOUNCED A MANDATORY PROGRAM TO SAVE FUEL AND THEREBY CUT COSTS. WE ARE EXPECTED TO TAXI OFF THE GATE ON 1 ENG AND DELAY SECOND ENG START, ANY TIME THE FOLLOWING 3 CONDITIONS ARE MET: 1) EXPECTED TAXI TIME MORE THAN 3 MINS (A RIDICULOUS POLICY), 2) AMBIENT TEMP LESS THAN 85 DEGS F (RIDICULOUS) AND NOSEWHEEL STEERING NOT AFFECTED BY MEL/SLIPPERY SURFACE. SEVERAL PLTS HAVE EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT DELAYING THE ENG START COMPROMISES SAFETY. RECENTLY, I EXPERIENCED THAT WHEN I MISCALCULATED THE AMOUNT OF TIME I HAD REMAINING IN THE TKOF LINE-UP. I DELAYED SECOND ENG START LONGER THAN I SHOULD HAVE, AND SUBSEQUENTLY THE CHKLISTS WERE RUSHED. I VOWED NOT TO MAKE THAT MISTAKE AGAIN. ON THE FLT WHEN THE TAXIWAY INCIDENT OCCURRED, I HAD MADE THE CALL TO GND FOR TAXI WHILE MY FO CALLED COMPANY FOR CLRNC OUT OF 'THE ALLEY.' I ADVISED HIM, FO, OF THE TAXI RTE AS WE LEFT THE GATE 'R OUTER HOLD SHORT OF NOV.' AS I NEARED NOV, I WAS LOOKING AT THE LINE-UP AT RWY END WHICH WAS ONLY 3 ACFT AND, TO AVOID REPEATING MY PREVIOUS MISTAKE, (RUSHING CHKLISTS), I DECIDED TO THEN START THE SECOND ENG WHILE TAXIING (APPROVED PROC) SO MY ATTN WAS NOT COMPLETELY ON TAXIING AND I WENT RIGHT PAST NOV. GND CTL THEN SAID 'IT LOOKS LIKE YOU PASSED NOV, MAKE A R ON 'PA,' HOLD SHORT OF 'P' ON 'PD,' WHICH I THEN DID, AND THE REMAINDER OF TAXI WAS WITHOUT INCIDENT. OTHER CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: 1) THE FO'S ARE NOT PROVIDED WITH CHARTS (ARPT, APCH, ENRTE) 2) JFK IS A RELATIVELY NEW ARPT FOR US AND WITH THE COMPLEX TAXIWAY LAYOUT WE DON'T HAVE IT 'MEMORIZED' YET SO MY BACKUP (FO) WAS NOT WELL-EQUIPPED. TO AVOID THIS IN THE FUTURE, I AM DISREGARDING THE COMPANY'S '3 MIN TAXI' RULE AND WILL ONLY DELAY SECOND ENG START IF I KNOW I WILL BE ABLE TO START IT WHILE THE ACFT IS STOPPED ON THE TAXIWAY. WHILE TAXIING, I WILL BE LOOKING OUTSIDE AS I SHOULD BE. I DON'T THINK THE FUEL WE ARE SAVING IS WORTH THE RISK.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.