Narrative:

This was a simple mistake of descending below 10000 ft at 310 KIAS. Unfortunately for me, an FAA inspector on our jumpseat was the one who pointed out the violation to me. The WX was very hazy with scattered to broken small clouds, the type of WX that could pass for VFR. When descending into such an environment, I spend more time looking out than looking in. The autoplt was on and the VNAV and heading select modes were on. I had forgotten that I had opened the airspeed window several mins before when ATC instructed us to keep our IAS above 300 KTS. When the speed window is open, there is no automatic slowing of the aircraft to 250 KTS at 10000 ft. The copilot was busy listening to a new ATIS and looking up the GS help on the active runway which was a non-instrument approach runway. The ATIS was broadcast over a low power VOR which we couldn't receive until very close to the airport. I was spending more time looking out than looking at the instruments and did not catch the speed limit bust. I slowed to 250 KTS immediately, but I was about 8800 ft when the speed slowed to 250. ATC did not mention our speed, just the FAA inspector. Simple mistake -- I goofed. If I had called out 11000 ft for 10000 ft for 8000 ft this probably would not have happened. If I had spent more time inside the cockpit than outside the cockpit, this probably would not have happened. If the copilot had not been copying the ATIS and looking up runway details, this probably would not have happened. The above has happened before (not to me, however) and will certainly happen again. No lives were threatened and no near misses occurred. However, what happened after this overspd was not a violation of anything, but good sense, and was a thousand times more dangerous. ATIS, as mentioned, was being broadcast over a weak station and we had to spend time under 10000 ft copying information. The active runway on the ATIS was 19L (no instrument approach) and 19R was reported closed, but we were eventually cleared to 19R. The aircraft in front of us was cleared for an ADF approach to 19R. We were not informed to what runway we were being vectored (we assumed 19L as stated on the ATIS until we heard the ADF approach clearance). The airport was not in our data base. At 3000 ft approach control asked us to contact an airport frequency and give them our landing permission number of we could not land (now turning on base leg). The copilot was now completely out of the loop looking up the number in the flight papers and talking to the field. At this time my FMC decided to quit and my HSI went blank. We were still on autoplt. I switched to the other FMC but had to lean over to the copilot's side and switch his HSI range to equal mine so that I would have an HSI presentation. I was also putting down the flaps and slowing the aircraft while the copilot dealt with the landing permit number. We were then given a localizer intercept heading and cleared for an ILS approach to 19R. Thank god I had entered the ILS frequency for the supposedly closed runway and I switched to manual ILS and made an uneventful approach and landing to 19R. We had the runway at 1000 ft. This is not an isolated case. I have experienced similar scenarios before. We spend hours doing nothing at cruise while the electronic wonderware does all. Near the airport, the wonderware fails, the airport equipment and personnel put unnecessary burdens on us and the 2-MAN cockpit concept becomes frayed which can lead to very serious consequences. The 2 pilots involved here are very experienced, but what would have happened to 2 new guys who were not familiar with glass cockpit procedures? Things could get out of hand very, very fast. As one gains experience with the glass cockpit, one uses old proven concepts such as planning ahead for all the problems one can think of, such as setting up the manual backups in case the magic fails. So much time in training is spent on learning the new glass cockpit procedures, that very little time is spent on common sense training such as backups and what to do when the electronics fail.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: LGT EXCEEDS SPD BELOW 10000 FT. ACI ON BOARD.

Narrative: THIS WAS A SIMPLE MISTAKE OF DSNDING BELOW 10000 FT AT 310 KIAS. UNFORTUNATELY FOR ME, AN FAA INSPECTOR ON OUR JUMPSEAT WAS THE ONE WHO POINTED OUT THE VIOLATION TO ME. THE WX WAS VERY HAZY WITH SCATTERED TO BROKEN SMALL CLOUDS, THE TYPE OF WX THAT COULD PASS FOR VFR. WHEN DSNDING INTO SUCH AN ENVIRONMENT, I SPEND MORE TIME LOOKING OUT THAN LOOKING IN. THE AUTOPLT WAS ON AND THE VNAV AND HDG SELECT MODES WERE ON. I HAD FORGOTTEN THAT I HAD OPENED THE AIRSPD WINDOW SEVERAL MINS BEFORE WHEN ATC INSTRUCTED US TO KEEP OUR IAS ABOVE 300 KTS. WHEN THE SPD WINDOW IS OPEN, THERE IS NO AUTOMATIC SLOWING OF THE ACFT TO 250 KTS AT 10000 FT. THE COPLT WAS BUSY LISTENING TO A NEW ATIS AND LOOKING UP THE GS HELP ON THE ACTIVE RWY WHICH WAS A NON-INST APCH RWY. THE ATIS WAS BROADCAST OVER A LOW PWR VOR WHICH WE COULDN'T RECEIVE UNTIL VERY CLOSE TO THE ARPT. I WAS SPENDING MORE TIME LOOKING OUT THAN LOOKING AT THE INSTS AND DID NOT CATCH THE SPD LIMIT BUST. I SLOWED TO 250 KTS IMMEDIATELY, BUT I WAS ABOUT 8800 FT WHEN THE SPD SLOWED TO 250. ATC DID NOT MENTION OUR SPD, JUST THE FAA INSPECTOR. SIMPLE MISTAKE -- I GOOFED. IF I HAD CALLED OUT 11000 FT FOR 10000 FT FOR 8000 FT THIS PROBABLY WOULD NOT HAVE HAPPENED. IF I HAD SPENT MORE TIME INSIDE THE COCKPIT THAN OUTSIDE THE COCKPIT, THIS PROBABLY WOULD NOT HAVE HAPPENED. IF THE COPLT HAD NOT BEEN COPYING THE ATIS AND LOOKING UP RWY DETAILS, THIS PROBABLY WOULD NOT HAVE HAPPENED. THE ABOVE HAS HAPPENED BEFORE (NOT TO ME, HOWEVER) AND WILL CERTAINLY HAPPEN AGAIN. NO LIVES WERE THREATENED AND NO NEAR MISSES OCCURRED. HOWEVER, WHAT HAPPENED AFTER THIS OVERSPD WAS NOT A VIOLATION OF ANYTHING, BUT GOOD SENSE, AND WAS A THOUSAND TIMES MORE DANGEROUS. ATIS, AS MENTIONED, WAS BEING BROADCAST OVER A WEAK STATION AND WE HAD TO SPEND TIME UNDER 10000 FT COPYING INFO. THE ACTIVE RWY ON THE ATIS WAS 19L (NO INST APCH) AND 19R WAS RPTED CLOSED, BUT WE WERE EVENTUALLY CLRED TO 19R. THE ACFT IN FRONT OF US WAS CLRED FOR AN ADF APCH TO 19R. WE WERE NOT INFORMED TO WHAT RWY WE WERE BEING VECTORED (WE ASSUMED 19L AS STATED ON THE ATIS UNTIL WE HEARD THE ADF APCH CLRNC). THE ARPT WAS NOT IN OUR DATA BASE. AT 3000 FT APCH CTL ASKED US TO CONTACT AN ARPT FREQ AND GIVE THEM OUR LNDG PERMISSION NUMBER OF WE COULD NOT LAND (NOW TURNING ON BASE LEG). THE COPLT WAS NOW COMPLETELY OUT OF THE LOOP LOOKING UP THE NUMBER IN THE FLT PAPERS AND TALKING TO THE FIELD. AT THIS TIME MY FMC DECIDED TO QUIT AND MY HSI WENT BLANK. WE WERE STILL ON AUTOPLT. I SWITCHED TO THE OTHER FMC BUT HAD TO LEAN OVER TO THE COPLT'S SIDE AND SWITCH HIS HSI RANGE TO EQUAL MINE SO THAT I WOULD HAVE AN HSI PRESENTATION. I WAS ALSO PUTTING DOWN THE FLAPS AND SLOWING THE ACFT WHILE THE COPLT DEALT WITH THE LNDG PERMIT NUMBER. WE WERE THEN GIVEN A LOC INTERCEPT HDG AND CLRED FOR AN ILS APCH TO 19R. THANK GOD I HAD ENTERED THE ILS FREQ FOR THE SUPPOSEDLY CLOSED RWY AND I SWITCHED TO MANUAL ILS AND MADE AN UNEVENTFUL APCH AND LNDG TO 19R. WE HAD THE RWY AT 1000 FT. THIS IS NOT AN ISOLATED CASE. I HAVE EXPERIENCED SIMILAR SCENARIOS BEFORE. WE SPEND HRS DOING NOTHING AT CRUISE WHILE THE ELECTRONIC WONDERWARE DOES ALL. NEAR THE ARPT, THE WONDERWARE FAILS, THE ARPT EQUIP AND PERSONNEL PUT UNNECESSARY BURDENS ON US AND THE 2-MAN COCKPIT CONCEPT BECOMES FRAYED WHICH CAN LEAD TO VERY SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES. THE 2 PLTS INVOLVED HERE ARE VERY EXPERIENCED, BUT WHAT WOULD HAVE HAPPENED TO 2 NEW GUYS WHO WERE NOT FAMILIAR WITH GLASS COCKPIT PROCS? THINGS COULD GET OUT OF HAND VERY, VERY FAST. AS ONE GAINS EXPERIENCE WITH THE GLASS COCKPIT, ONE USES OLD PROVEN CONCEPTS SUCH AS PLANNING AHEAD FOR ALL THE PROBLEMS ONE CAN THINK OF, SUCH AS SETTING UP THE MANUAL BACKUPS IN CASE THE MAGIC FAILS. SO MUCH TIME IN TRAINING IS SPENT ON LEARNING THE NEW GLASS COCKPIT PROCS, THAT VERY LITTLE TIME IS SPENT ON COMMON SENSE TRAINING SUCH AS BACKUPS AND WHAT TO DO WHEN THE ELECTRONICS FAIL.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.