Narrative:

Our carrier (commuter) feeds traffic to a larger airline's international gateway (jfk). On these particular flts we often operate at near full gross weight (28500 pounds) and aft center of gravity limits due to passenger and baggage loads. On this particular flight, the aircraft was 1000 pounds below maximum gross weight and loaded with an aft center of gravity though not as far aft as I have seen (included is a sample weight and balance form with an approximately loading of this flight). Form was double-checked by myself (first officer) and captain before being given to ramp agent. On the takeoff roll from phl, the aircraft was trimmed to a neutral elevator position. Needed some forward pressure on control column to keep it from becoming airborne prematurely on takeoff roll and once airborne, was quite pitch sensitive. Though not especially out of character for that type of loading on takeoff, the aircraft flew as if the center of gravity was farther aft than calculated. Cruise and descent were uneventful. About 10 mi out on jfk's ILS 4R I took control of aircraft from the autoplt. Again, pitch was sensitive but ctlable. We then proceeded to sidestep to 4L and the approach was well stabilized from 5 mi out. Transitioned to v-ref by the time we reached the threshold with normal rate of descent. Touchdown occurred in a normal nose high attitude. During rollout, nose normally 'falls through' shortly after touchdown and aft elevator pressure is needed to keep nose from slamming down. Not in this case! With control column in neutral position, nose would not go down. In fact, as airspeed decreased, the nose went higher still! Captain and I became concerned and shoved control column forward. Nosewheel did touchdown but with nowhere near commensurate impact with the shove we gave the control column. I have never had this happen before ever with center of gravity at far upper right center of gravity loading (maximum gross weight at 64 inches aft). Taxi was uneventful but during shutdown, we made damn sure the tail stand was installed before we shut down the right engine, which we had at 20% torque to be sure the nose stayed down. After shutdown, weight and balance form was triple checked with no discrepancy found. Captain had bags in cargo area counted, and there were 50 bags as stated on the manifest. Due to connecting flight constraints for passenger, captain elected not to have the bags weighed. Our belief was the bags weighed on the average, much more than the 24 pounds allotted per bag because of the size of the bags and the type of trip (international) that these people were going on. Thus, the center of gravity was probably much farther aft than was calculated. How can a potentially disastrous situation such as this be prevented? 1. Company rules that require baggage weights used not be calculated as a given weight per bag, but with actual weights of bags. 2. Have FAA adopt above rule. 3. Enforce baggage weight limits at passenger check-in counter. 4. We as flcs should, if any doubts exist as to weight and balance, insist that each bag be weighed. We are the last link in this chain and need to stop the chain of events if we have any doubts. How does something like this happen? 1. Schedule pressures. 2. Company and flcs not wanting to inconvenience passenger and baggage crews. 3. Company profits due to upset passenger when asked to pay for overweight bags or bags that would miss the flight due to weight and balance concerns. 4. Lax rulemaking by FAA. 5 apathy on part of flight crew (not asking bags to be weighed) and passenger service agents not enforcing baggage weight rules.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: COMMUTER FO RPTS ON DIFFICULTY IN CTLING AN EXTRA TAIL- HVY ACFT DURING PAX OPS.

Narrative: OUR CARRIER (COMMUTER) FEEDS TFC TO A LARGER AIRLINE'S INTL GATEWAY (JFK). ON THESE PARTICULAR FLTS WE OFTEN OPERATE AT NEAR FULL GROSS WT (28500 POUNDS) AND AFT CENTER OF GRAVITY LIMITS DUE TO PAX AND BAGGAGE LOADS. ON THIS PARTICULAR FLT, THE ACFT WAS 1000 POUNDS BELOW MAX GROSS WT AND LOADED WITH AN AFT CENTER OF GRAVITY THOUGH NOT AS FAR AFT AS I HAVE SEEN (INCLUDED IS A SAMPLE WT AND BAL FORM WITH AN APPROX LOADING OF THIS FLT). FORM WAS DOUBLE-CHKED BY MYSELF (FO) AND CAPT BEFORE BEING GIVEN TO RAMP AGENT. ON THE TKOF ROLL FROM PHL, THE ACFT WAS TRIMMED TO A NEUTRAL ELEVATOR POS. NEEDED SOME FORWARD PRESSURE ON CTL COLUMN TO KEEP IT FROM BECOMING AIRBORNE PREMATURELY ON TKOF ROLL AND ONCE AIRBORNE, WAS QUITE PITCH SENSITIVE. THOUGH NOT ESPECIALLY OUT OF CHARACTER FOR THAT TYPE OF LOADING ON TKOF, THE ACFT FLEW AS IF THE CENTER OF GRAVITY WAS FARTHER AFT THAN CALCULATED. CRUISE AND DSCNT WERE UNEVENTFUL. ABOUT 10 MI OUT ON JFK'S ILS 4R I TOOK CTL OF ACFT FROM THE AUTOPLT. AGAIN, PITCH WAS SENSITIVE BUT CTLABLE. WE THEN PROCEEDED TO SIDESTEP TO 4L AND THE APCH WAS WELL STABILIZED FROM 5 MI OUT. TRANSITIONED TO V-REF BY THE TIME WE REACHED THE THRESHOLD WITH NORMAL RATE OF DSCNT. TOUCHDOWN OCCURRED IN A NORMAL NOSE HIGH ATTITUDE. DURING ROLLOUT, NOSE NORMALLY 'FALLS THROUGH' SHORTLY AFTER TOUCHDOWN AND AFT ELEVATOR PRESSURE IS NEEDED TO KEEP NOSE FROM SLAMMING DOWN. NOT IN THIS CASE! WITH CTL COLUMN IN NEUTRAL POS, NOSE WOULD NOT GO DOWN. IN FACT, AS AIRSPD DECREASED, THE NOSE WENT HIGHER STILL! CAPT AND I BECAME CONCERNED AND SHOVED CTL COLUMN FORWARD. NOSEWHEEL DID TOUCHDOWN BUT WITH NOWHERE NEAR COMMENSURATE IMPACT WITH THE SHOVE WE GAVE THE CTL COLUMN. I HAVE NEVER HAD THIS HAPPEN BEFORE EVER WITH CENTER OF GRAVITY AT FAR UPPER R CENTER OF GRAVITY LOADING (MAX GROSS WT AT 64 INCHES AFT). TAXI WAS UNEVENTFUL BUT DURING SHUTDOWN, WE MADE DAMN SURE THE TAIL STAND WAS INSTALLED BEFORE WE SHUT DOWN THE R ENG, WHICH WE HAD AT 20% TORQUE TO BE SURE THE NOSE STAYED DOWN. AFTER SHUTDOWN, WT AND BAL FORM WAS TRIPLE CHKED WITH NO DISCREPANCY FOUND. CAPT HAD BAGS IN CARGO AREA COUNTED, AND THERE WERE 50 BAGS AS STATED ON THE MANIFEST. DUE TO CONNECTING FLT CONSTRAINTS FOR PAX, CAPT ELECTED NOT TO HAVE THE BAGS WEIGHED. OUR BELIEF WAS THE BAGS WEIGHED ON THE AVERAGE, MUCH MORE THAN THE 24 POUNDS ALLOTTED PER BAG BECAUSE OF THE SIZE OF THE BAGS AND THE TYPE OF TRIP (INTL) THAT THESE PEOPLE WERE GOING ON. THUS, THE CENTER OF GRAVITY WAS PROBABLY MUCH FARTHER AFT THAN WAS CALCULATED. HOW CAN A POTENTIALLY DISASTROUS SITUATION SUCH AS THIS BE PREVENTED? 1. COMPANY RULES THAT REQUIRE BAGGAGE WTS USED NOT BE CALCULATED AS A GIVEN WT PER BAG, BUT WITH ACTUAL WTS OF BAGS. 2. HAVE FAA ADOPT ABOVE RULE. 3. ENFORCE BAGGAGE WT LIMITS AT PAX CHK-IN COUNTER. 4. WE AS FLCS SHOULD, IF ANY DOUBTS EXIST AS TO WT AND BAL, INSIST THAT EACH BAG BE WEIGHED. WE ARE THE LAST LINK IN THIS CHAIN AND NEED TO STOP THE CHAIN OF EVENTS IF WE HAVE ANY DOUBTS. HOW DOES SOMETHING LIKE THIS HAPPEN? 1. SCHEDULE PRESSURES. 2. COMPANY AND FLCS NOT WANTING TO INCONVENIENCE PAX AND BAGGAGE CREWS. 3. COMPANY PROFITS DUE TO UPSET PAX WHEN ASKED TO PAY FOR OVERWT BAGS OR BAGS THAT WOULD MISS THE FLT DUE TO WT AND BAL CONCERNS. 4. LAX RULEMAKING BY FAA. 5 APATHY ON PART OF FLC (NOT ASKING BAGS TO BE WEIGHED) AND PAX SVC AGENTS NOT ENFORCING BAGGAGE WT RULES.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.