Narrative:

After completing a far 135.297 check ride, I offered to let the FAA examiner to fly the aircraft, to which he accepted. While on downwind I simulated an engine failure, after he idented the failed engine I added a little power to simulated '0 thrust.' at this point he let the airspeed decay below blue-line to eventually about 85 KIAS on short final. I was very concerned about this slow airspeed and was preparing to resume command and initiate a stall recovery should any sign of a pre-stall buffet occur. I didn't say anything to the examiner due to my respect of him and especially his position. My view of the landing gear indicators was blocked by the approach plates on the control yoke and the gear warning horn would not activate due to the power being used. My first indication of the gear not being in the correct position was when the propellers struck the runway. Lessons: cockpit resource management should always be used when more than 1 pilot is on board. In addition cockpit resource management should not be 'you do your job and I do mine' but each should back-up the other. Even if you are flying with your boss, FAA, or any other pilot make sure that both of you use that checklist. And if one other pilot does make a mistake be diplomatic about it, it can happen to you.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN SMT, WITH AN AIR CARRIER INSPECTOR AT THE CTLS, MADE A WHEELS UP LNDG.

Narrative: AFTER COMPLETING A FAR 135.297 CHK RIDE, I OFFERED TO LET THE FAA EXAMINER TO FLY THE ACFT, TO WHICH HE ACCEPTED. WHILE ON DOWNWIND I SIMULATED AN ENG FAILURE, AFTER HE IDENTED THE FAILED ENG I ADDED A LITTLE PWR TO SIMULATED '0 THRUST.' AT THIS POINT HE LET THE AIRSPD DECAY BELOW BLUE-LINE TO EVENTUALLY ABOUT 85 KIAS ON SHORT FINAL. I WAS VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THIS SLOW AIRSPD AND WAS PREPARING TO RESUME COMMAND AND INITIATE A STALL RECOVERY SHOULD ANY SIGN OF A PRE-STALL BUFFET OCCUR. I DIDN'T SAY ANYTHING TO THE EXAMINER DUE TO MY RESPECT OF HIM AND ESPECIALLY HIS POS. MY VIEW OF THE LNDG GEAR INDICATORS WAS BLOCKED BY THE APCH PLATES ON THE CTL YOKE AND THE GEAR WARNING HORN WOULD NOT ACTIVATE DUE TO THE PWR BEING USED. MY FIRST INDICATION OF THE GEAR NOT BEING IN THE CORRECT POS WAS WHEN THE PROPS STRUCK THE RWY. LESSONS: COCKPIT RESOURCE MGMNT SHOULD ALWAYS BE USED WHEN MORE THAN 1 PLT IS ON BOARD. IN ADDITION COCKPIT RESOURCE MGMNT SHOULD NOT BE 'YOU DO YOUR JOB AND I DO MINE' BUT EACH SHOULD BACK-UP THE OTHER. EVEN IF YOU ARE FLYING WITH YOUR BOSS, FAA, OR ANY OTHER PLT MAKE SURE THAT BOTH OF YOU USE THAT CHKLIST. AND IF ONE OTHER PLT DOES MAKE A MISTAKE BE DIPLOMATIC ABOUT IT, IT CAN HAPPEN TO YOU.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.