Narrative:

I was working local control at sln ATCT, runway 17 was in sue, and I had an small aircraft X climbing out from runway 17 in left traffic. MTR Y was on a right base for runway 17, touch and go in right traffic. Fgt Z, practice IFR approach, was estimating the OM for the ILS approach to runway 35 at XA32Z. Due to the length of the runway, I knew that the MTR will overtake the small aircraft on the upwind. So, I was trying to tell the pilot of the small aircraft to offset the runway to the east side and to start a left crosswind at midfield. The pilot of the small aircraft did not understand, so I told him to start his left crosswind anyway. At that moment, a fellow controller behind me yelled out about an fgt on the runway. I turned my attention to the MTR to tell him to go around, but, as I was saying that, the MTR was already taking evasive action to the west to avoid the fgt. Turned to look at the fgt and he was also maneuvering to the west to avoid the MTR at midfield and then he saw the MTR and maneuvered back to the east to avoid the MTR after he had passed the small aircraft. At no time did we have communication with the fgt until he was approximately 2 mi north of the airport northbound. When we finally established communication with the fgt, I had told him that he was not cleared for runway 35 and that he should have talked to the tower before touching down on the runway. In return he said that they were cleared for the approach to sln and weren't we notified by ZKC. I said yes, but that does not clear you for the runway. Also, I asked him how come he never talked to us until he was north of the airport. He said he had radio problems. Then we switched him back to ZKC so he can continue his flight plan. The contributing factor to this situation was we were not given an update from ZKC on the fgt position, since ZKC runs our IFR approachs to the airport. I believe the situation occurred because there was a lack of communication from ZKC to sln. And the pilot of the fgt assumed that once you are cleared for the IFR approach, that also meant that he was cleared onto the runway. My suggestions into how to prevent a recurrence of this situation would be couple of factors. 1) there is a problem in that ZKC, en route center, is providing our radar approach control services to our airport. But, also due to this, there is no radar coverage for aircraft approximately 5 mi south of the field 3000 MSL and below, and it extends to the north of the field to 7000 MSL and below, so ZKC cannot give us an accurate radar position of aircraft below these altitudes. To provide a safe and expeditious flow of traffic in this area, we need radar coverage, and also move an approach control job out of an en route center to an approach control facility. 2) if an aircraft is on a practice approach, and not talking to the tower before the final approach fix, then that aircraft should go missed approach and return to the last assigned frequency.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: 2 MIL ACFT, 1 CIVILIAN ACFT, AND 2 AIR TFC FACILITIES GET ALL 3 ACFT INVOLVED IN A CONFLICT.

Narrative: I WAS WORKING LCL CTL AT SLN ATCT, RWY 17 WAS IN SUE, AND I HAD AN SMA X CLBING OUT FROM RWY 17 IN L TFC. MTR Y WAS ON A R BASE FOR RWY 17, TOUCH AND GO IN R TFC. FGT Z, PRACTICE IFR APCH, WAS ESTIMATING THE OM FOR THE ILS APCH TO RWY 35 AT XA32Z. DUE TO THE LENGTH OF THE RWY, I KNEW THAT THE MTR WILL OVERTAKE THE SMA ON THE UPWIND. SO, I WAS TRYING TO TELL THE PLT OF THE SMA TO OFFSET THE RWY TO THE E SIDE AND TO START A L XWIND AT MIDFIELD. THE PLT OF THE SMA DID NOT UNDERSTAND, SO I TOLD HIM TO START HIS L XWIND ANYWAY. AT THAT MOMENT, A FELLOW CTLR BEHIND ME YELLED OUT ABOUT AN FGT ON THE RWY. I TURNED MY ATTN TO THE MTR TO TELL HIM TO GAR, BUT, AS I WAS SAYING THAT, THE MTR WAS ALREADY TAKING EVASIVE ACTION TO THE W TO AVOID THE FGT. TURNED TO LOOK AT THE FGT AND HE WAS ALSO MANEUVERING TO THE W TO AVOID THE MTR AT MIDFIELD AND THEN HE SAW THE MTR AND MANEUVERED BACK TO THE E TO AVOID THE MTR AFTER HE HAD PASSED THE SMA. AT NO TIME DID WE HAVE COM WITH THE FGT UNTIL HE WAS APPROX 2 MI N OF THE ARPT NBOUND. WHEN WE FINALLY ESTABLISHED COM WITH THE FGT, I HAD TOLD HIM THAT HE WAS NOT CLRED FOR RWY 35 AND THAT HE SHOULD HAVE TALKED TO THE TWR BEFORE TOUCHING DOWN ON THE RWY. IN RETURN HE SAID THAT THEY WERE CLRED FOR THE APCH TO SLN AND WEREN'T WE NOTIFIED BY ZKC. I SAID YES, BUT THAT DOES NOT CLR YOU FOR THE RWY. ALSO, I ASKED HIM HOW COME HE NEVER TALKED TO US UNTIL HE WAS N OF THE ARPT. HE SAID HE HAD RADIO PROBS. THEN WE SWITCHED HIM BACK TO ZKC SO HE CAN CONTINUE HIS FLT PLAN. THE CONTRIBUTING FACTOR TO THIS SIT WAS WE WERE NOT GIVEN AN UPDATE FROM ZKC ON THE FGT POS, SINCE ZKC RUNS OUR IFR APCHS TO THE ARPT. I BELIEVE THE SIT OCCURRED BECAUSE THERE WAS A LACK OF COM FROM ZKC TO SLN. AND THE PLT OF THE FGT ASSUMED THAT ONCE YOU ARE CLRED FOR THE IFR APCH, THAT ALSO MEANT THAT HE WAS CLRED ONTO THE RWY. MY SUGGESTIONS INTO HOW TO PREVENT A RECURRENCE OF THIS SIT WOULD BE COUPLE OF FACTORS. 1) THERE IS A PROB IN THAT ZKC, ENRTE CTR, IS PROVIDING OUR RADAR APCH CTL SVCS TO OUR ARPT. BUT, ALSO DUE TO THIS, THERE IS NO RADAR COVERAGE FOR ACFT APPROX 5 MI S OF THE FIELD 3000 MSL AND BELOW, AND IT EXTENDS TO THE N OF THE FIELD TO 7000 MSL AND BELOW, SO ZKC CANNOT GIVE US AN ACCURATE RADAR POS OF ACFT BELOW THESE ALTS. TO PROVIDE A SAFE AND EXPEDITIOUS FLOW OF TFC IN THIS AREA, WE NEED RADAR COVERAGE, AND ALSO MOVE AN APCH CTL JOB OUT OF AN ENRTE CTR TO AN APCH CTL FACILITY. 2) IF AN ACFT IS ON A PRACTICE APCH, AND NOT TALKING TO THE TWR BEFORE THE FINAL APCH FIX, THEN THAT ACFT SHOULD GO MISSED APCH AND RETURN TO THE LAST ASSIGNED FREQ.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.