Narrative:

ZME gave us a descent clearance from FL350, pilot's discretion to FL240. I would normally begin the descent approximately 90 mi from mem, planning to cross middy intersection (046 radial from mem, 30 DME) at 10000 ft and 250 KIAS as shown on the middy arrival to mem. Sometime between 90 and 110 mi from mem, ZME gave us the clearance to cross middy at 10000 ft and 250 KTS. When the first officer still had not begun the descent 80 mi out, I started to say something to him about starting down. Concurrently, he began his descent. Although I felt that we were running behind on the descent, the first officer was obviously working at it, so I said nothing, but kept track of how we were doing. I still felt it was possible to make the crossing restriction, but that it would be close. The first officer was a little slow in deciding to use the speed brakes, not extending them until we were passing FL200 about 20 mi from middy. While I did ask mem approach if they really needed the speed reduction at middy, I never told them that we were unable to comply with the restriction. The response from mem approach was that we were 200 KTS faster than traffic we were following, so that the speed reduction was necessary. We were not level at 10000 and slowed to 250 KIAS until we were about 5 mi past middy.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN LGT FREIGHTER CREW MISSED THEIR XING RESTRICTION LETTING DOWN INTO MEM.

Narrative: ZME GAVE US A DSCNT CLRNC FROM FL350, PLT'S DISCRETION TO FL240. I WOULD NORMALLY BEGIN THE DSCNT APPROX 90 MI FROM MEM, PLANNING TO CROSS MIDDY INTXN (046 RADIAL FROM MEM, 30 DME) AT 10000 FT AND 250 KIAS AS SHOWN ON THE MIDDY ARR TO MEM. SOMETIME BTWN 90 AND 110 MI FROM MEM, ZME GAVE US THE CLRNC TO CROSS MIDDY AT 10000 FT AND 250 KTS. WHEN THE FO STILL HAD NOT BEGUN THE DSCNT 80 MI OUT, I STARTED TO SAY SOMETHING TO HIM ABOUT STARTING DOWN. CONCURRENTLY, HE BEGAN HIS DSCNT. ALTHOUGH I FELT THAT WE WERE RUNNING BEHIND ON THE DSCNT, THE FO WAS OBVIOUSLY WORKING AT IT, SO I SAID NOTHING, BUT KEPT TRACK OF HOW WE WERE DOING. I STILL FELT IT WAS POSSIBLE TO MAKE THE XING RESTRICTION, BUT THAT IT WOULD BE CLOSE. THE FO WAS A LITTLE SLOW IN DECIDING TO USE THE SPD BRAKES, NOT EXTENDING THEM UNTIL WE WERE PASSING FL200 ABOUT 20 MI FROM MIDDY. WHILE I DID ASK MEM APCH IF THEY REALLY NEEDED THE SPD REDUCTION AT MIDDY, I NEVER TOLD THEM THAT WE WERE UNABLE TO COMPLY WITH THE RESTRICTION. THE RESPONSE FROM MEM APCH WAS THAT WE WERE 200 KTS FASTER THAN TFC WE WERE FOLLOWING, SO THAT THE SPD REDUCTION WAS NECESSARY. WE WERE NOT LEVEL AT 10000 AND SLOWED TO 250 KIAS UNTIL WE WERE ABOUT 5 MI PAST MIDDY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.