Narrative:

I was flying the aircraft. ZDC advised 'cross kerno intersection at FL260.' I was using the NANCI4 STAR arrival plate. I wrote down the DME for the crossing restriction on my note pad, as I always do in large letters, to preempt the possibility of misreading the small print on the chart. I wrote 'kerno direct 49', which was correct DME north of nottingham VOR. The copilot said 'I'll tune in dupont.' I then mentally transferred my attention to his DME information instead of mine. He had incorrectly dialed frequency 114.4 instead of 114.0 for dupont. I had looked down and seen, what I thought, was 114.0 dialed in. The DME read about 130 mi and I thought it rather odd to give us such advance room for a crossing going into lga. Not 5 mins before I had briefed the brand new copilot that going into ny, always start down immediately on receipt of a crossing restriction because invariably there is no time to waste. Next sector queried us as I was in a leisurely descent if the previous sector had given us a crossing restriction at kerno. Copilot replied 'affirmative.' controller said, 'do you know where kerno is?' big silence, followed by (expletive deleted) in cockpit. No loss of separation with other traffic. We made the crossing about 10 mi late. Classic human factors abortion: I returned from 3 weeks vacation. This my first day flying. My body rhythm only 3 days back from being on england circadian rhythm (+5 hours). Just moved house full of furniture and belongings to my new house 2 days before. Commuted to base day before, after further tasks in new house. Poor sleep last 4 days. New copilot whom I trusted too much. He did a good job throughout earlier in the day so I assumed he would not make mistakes. I have flown into ny many times before and know my way around. I never would have missed the absurdity of the DME readings which did not total to a reasonable distance for a typical lga arrival. Obviously, my alertness was quite suboptimum and I was too dulled to even know it. Pretty bad. Copilot obviously did not identify his NAVAID. Copilot did not catch a basic error in the DME's or pay suitable attention to his chart. We had 2 omega navigation units right in front of us (not being directly utilized) which display approximately distance to fix. Did not register with my awareness. If I had kept my en route chart out, it would have more clearly given a chance to catch the obvious. Terrible show on my part, terrible show by the copilot. We got a cheap lesson here.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: LGT FLC TUNES WRONG VOR FREQ MISSES XING RESTRICTION.

Narrative: I WAS FLYING THE ACFT. ZDC ADVISED 'CROSS KERNO INTXN AT FL260.' I WAS USING THE NANCI4 STAR ARR PLATE. I WROTE DOWN THE DME FOR THE XING RESTRICTION ON MY NOTE PAD, AS I ALWAYS DO IN LARGE LETTERS, TO PREEMPT THE POSSIBILITY OF MISREADING THE SMALL PRINT ON THE CHART. I WROTE 'KERNO DIRECT 49', WHICH WAS CORRECT DME N OF NOTTINGHAM VOR. THE COPLT SAID 'I'LL TUNE IN DUPONT.' I THEN MENTALLY TRANSFERRED MY ATTN TO HIS DME INFO INSTEAD OF MINE. HE HAD INCORRECTLY DIALED FREQ 114.4 INSTEAD OF 114.0 FOR DUPONT. I HAD LOOKED DOWN AND SEEN, WHAT I THOUGHT, WAS 114.0 DIALED IN. THE DME READ ABOUT 130 MI AND I THOUGHT IT RATHER ODD TO GIVE US SUCH ADVANCE ROOM FOR A XING GOING INTO LGA. NOT 5 MINS BEFORE I HAD BRIEFED THE BRAND NEW COPLT THAT GOING INTO NY, ALWAYS START DOWN IMMEDIATELY ON RECEIPT OF A XING RESTRICTION BECAUSE INVARIABLY THERE IS NO TIME TO WASTE. NEXT SECTOR QUERIED US AS I WAS IN A LEISURELY DSCNT IF THE PREVIOUS SECTOR HAD GIVEN US A XING RESTRICTION AT KERNO. COPLT REPLIED 'AFFIRMATIVE.' CTLR SAID, 'DO YOU KNOW WHERE KERNO IS?' BIG SILENCE, FOLLOWED BY (EXPLETIVE DELETED) IN COCKPIT. NO LOSS OF SEPARATION WITH OTHER TFC. WE MADE THE XING ABOUT 10 MI LATE. CLASSIC HUMAN FACTORS ABORTION: I RETURNED FROM 3 WKS VACATION. THIS MY FIRST DAY FLYING. MY BODY RHYTHM ONLY 3 DAYS BACK FROM BEING ON ENGLAND CIRCADIAN RHYTHM (+5 HRS). JUST MOVED HOUSE FULL OF FURNITURE AND BELONGINGS TO MY NEW HOUSE 2 DAYS BEFORE. COMMUTED TO BASE DAY BEFORE, AFTER FURTHER TASKS IN NEW HOUSE. POOR SLEEP LAST 4 DAYS. NEW COPLT WHOM I TRUSTED TOO MUCH. HE DID A GOOD JOB THROUGHOUT EARLIER IN THE DAY SO I ASSUMED HE WOULD NOT MAKE MISTAKES. I HAVE FLOWN INTO NY MANY TIMES BEFORE AND KNOW MY WAY AROUND. I NEVER WOULD HAVE MISSED THE ABSURDITY OF THE DME READINGS WHICH DID NOT TOTAL TO A REASONABLE DISTANCE FOR A TYPICAL LGA ARR. OBVIOUSLY, MY ALERTNESS WAS QUITE SUBOPTIMUM AND I WAS TOO DULLED TO EVEN KNOW IT. PRETTY BAD. COPLT OBVIOUSLY DID NOT IDENT HIS NAVAID. COPLT DID NOT CATCH A BASIC ERROR IN THE DME'S OR PAY SUITABLE ATTN TO HIS CHART. WE HAD 2 OMEGA NAV UNITS RIGHT IN FRONT OF US (NOT BEING DIRECTLY UTILIZED) WHICH DISPLAY APPROX DISTANCE TO FIX. DID NOT REGISTER WITH MY AWARENESS. IF I HAD KEPT MY ENRTE CHART OUT, IT WOULD HAVE MORE CLRLY GIVEN A CHANCE TO CATCH THE OBVIOUS. TERRIBLE SHOW ON MY PART, TERRIBLE SHOW BY THE COPLT. WE GOT A CHEAP LESSON HERE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.