Narrative:

After takeoff on a ferry flight from mdt, the gear handle was selected up. The landing gear indicator showed 3 green and 3 red. The gear handle was selected down and a safe 3 green condition indicated. ATC was advised that we wanted to stay in the pattern and land. We were handed back to the tower and they in turn cleared us to land. The landing was without incident. The factors leading up to this event included fatigue, stress, improper nourishment, and trust in maintenance. During the approach to lns the #2 AC generator failed. After conferring with maintenance and receipt of a ferry permit, the aircraft was ferried to mdt. We found maintenance running the right engine. I was led to believe that they had changed the #2 AC generator. I was also informed by dispatch we would ferry to pit. Maintenance then informed me that the AC generator problem was fixed and that 'everything has been double-checked and she is ready to go' and did I want them to shut down the right engine? Given that we had flown the aircraft in and that I could see everything that I needed to for the walk around, I saw no reason to go through an additional start cycle. The first officer took his seat, then the mechanic that had run the engine got out and I took my seat. We started the second engine and proceeded to depart. During the climb when the gear would not come up, I momentarily thought of gear pins, but I had personally watched a mechanic check them as I walked around prior to getting in. My attention was divided between the gear, ATC, and monitoring the rest of the aircraft system. By selecting the gear down we achieved a safe indication. With the safe indication and the way the day had been going, I was inclined to address my attention to the landing checks and to getting the aircraft back on the ground as safely and quickly as possible. I had no reason to suspect that a hydraulic valve had been left in the wrong position. I didn't see it and it didn't occur to me. (On the aircraft D there is an emergency gear extension access door which, when opened, allows access to the emergency gear extension handle. This door is located above and behind the first officer's head in the cockpit overhead. When open, the door doubles as a hydraulic valve, shutting off hydraulic pressure to the normal gear retraction actuator. The handle is also pulled routinely on the ground to open the gear doors. For some reason, maintenance had opened this door and forgot to close it. It was dark in the cockpit and we didn't see it open. As a checklist item, it is on the acceptance checklist. We had checked it closed during the acceptance check when we picked the aircraft up from the previous crew). Because this situation seems to be an unfortunately common occurrence, I offer 3 possible solutions: an advisory light when the access door is inhibiting gear retraction, a gear failure to retract abnormal checklist, or at least, a decal placed on the panel just above the 3 red gear lights that reads 'check emergency gear extension access door.' without a solution, and as long as this aircraft is operated by human beings, this problem will continue to be a source of embarrassment to us all.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR MDT PLT HAD AN ACFT WITH THE LNDG GEAR DISABLED IN THE DOWN POS. HE RETURNED AND LANDED SAFELY. THE GEAR WAS DISABLED DOWN DUE TO MAINT. BOTH THE FLC AND THE GND CREW FAILED TO SEE THAT THE GEAR WAS DISABLED PRIOR TO TKOF. THE PLT MAKES 3 GOOD SUGGESTIONS ON PROCEDURAL CHANGES TO AVOID THE PROBLEM.

Narrative: AFTER TKOF ON A FERRY FLT FROM MDT, THE GEAR HANDLE WAS SELECTED UP. THE LNDG GEAR INDICATOR SHOWED 3 GREEN AND 3 RED. THE GEAR HANDLE WAS SELECTED DOWN AND A SAFE 3 GREEN CONDITION INDICATED. ATC WAS ADVISED THAT WE WANTED TO STAY IN THE PATTERN AND LAND. WE WERE HANDED BACK TO THE TWR AND THEY IN TURN CLRED US TO LAND. THE LNDG WAS WITHOUT INCIDENT. THE FACTORS LEADING UP TO THIS EVENT INCLUDED FATIGUE, STRESS, IMPROPER NOURISHMENT, AND TRUST IN MAINT. DURING THE APCH TO LNS THE #2 AC GENERATOR FAILED. AFTER CONFERRING WITH MAINT AND RECEIPT OF A FERRY PERMIT, THE ACFT WAS FERRIED TO MDT. WE FOUND MAINT RUNNING THE R ENG. I WAS LED TO BELIEVE THAT THEY HAD CHANGED THE #2 AC GENERATOR. I WAS ALSO INFORMED BY DISPATCH WE WOULD FERRY TO PIT. MAINT THEN INFORMED ME THAT THE AC GENERATOR PROBLEM WAS FIXED AND THAT 'EVERYTHING HAS BEEN DOUBLE-CHKED AND SHE IS READY TO GO' AND DID I WANT THEM TO SHUT DOWN THE R ENG? GIVEN THAT WE HAD FLOWN THE ACFT IN AND THAT I COULD SEE EVERYTHING THAT I NEEDED TO FOR THE WALK AROUND, I SAW NO REASON TO GO THROUGH AN ADDITIONAL START CYCLE. THE FO TOOK HIS SEAT, THEN THE MECH THAT HAD RUN THE ENG GOT OUT AND I TOOK MY SEAT. WE STARTED THE SECOND ENG AND PROCEEDED TO DEPART. DURING THE CLB WHEN THE GEAR WOULD NOT COME UP, I MOMENTARILY THOUGHT OF GEAR PINS, BUT I HAD PERSONALLY WATCHED A MECH CHK THEM AS I WALKED AROUND PRIOR TO GETTING IN. MY ATTN WAS DIVIDED BTWN THE GEAR, ATC, AND MONITORING THE REST OF THE ACFT SYS. BY SELECTING THE GEAR DOWN WE ACHIEVED A SAFE INDICATION. WITH THE SAFE INDICATION AND THE WAY THE DAY HAD BEEN GOING, I WAS INCLINED TO ADDRESS MY ATTN TO THE LNDG CHKS AND TO GETTING THE ACFT BACK ON THE GND AS SAFELY AND QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. I HAD NO REASON TO SUSPECT THAT A HYD VALVE HAD BEEN LEFT IN THE WRONG POS. I DIDN'T SEE IT AND IT DIDN'T OCCUR TO ME. (ON THE ACFT D THERE IS AN EMER GEAR EXTENSION ACCESS DOOR WHICH, WHEN OPENED, ALLOWS ACCESS TO THE EMER GEAR EXTENSION HANDLE. THIS DOOR IS LOCATED ABOVE AND BEHIND THE FO'S HEAD IN THE COCKPIT OVERHEAD. WHEN OPEN, THE DOOR DOUBLES AS A HYD VALVE, SHUTTING OFF HYD PRESSURE TO THE NORMAL GEAR RETRACTION ACTUATOR. THE HANDLE IS ALSO PULLED ROUTINELY ON THE GND TO OPEN THE GEAR DOORS. FOR SOME REASON, MAINT HAD OPENED THIS DOOR AND FORGOT TO CLOSE IT. IT WAS DARK IN THE COCKPIT AND WE DIDN'T SEE IT OPEN. AS A CHKLIST ITEM, IT IS ON THE ACCEPTANCE CHKLIST. WE HAD CHKED IT CLOSED DURING THE ACCEPTANCE CHK WHEN WE PICKED THE ACFT UP FROM THE PREVIOUS CREW). BECAUSE THIS SITUATION SEEMS TO BE AN UNFORTUNATELY COMMON OCCURRENCE, I OFFER 3 POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS: AN ADVISORY LIGHT WHEN THE ACCESS DOOR IS INHIBITING GEAR RETRACTION, A GEAR FAILURE TO RETRACT ABNORMAL CHKLIST, OR AT LEAST, A DECAL PLACED ON THE PANEL JUST ABOVE THE 3 RED GEAR LIGHTS THAT READS 'CHK EMER GEAR EXTENSION ACCESS DOOR.' WITHOUT A SOLUTION, AND AS LONG AS THIS ACFT IS OPERATED BY HUMAN BEINGS, THIS PROBLEM WILL CONTINUE TO BE A SOURCE OF EMBARRASSMENT TO US ALL.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.