Narrative:

Our departure from sfo had been delayed and we were doing everything possible to get to our arrival gate as soon as possible. We landed on runway 3L at dtw at let the aircraft roll to the turnoff nearest garte that happened to be taxiway 0-9. Earlier I had switched from my personal headset to the company provided telex headset and put mine away to minimize our transfer time to our outbound aircraft. (Scheduled to depart in 30 min from another concourse). The telex sound quality was not as good as that of my headset. Ground control cleared us to 'turn left on the outer and 0- 10 to the gate.' I did not hear 'turn left on the outer.' in the dark I momentarily mistook east concourse for F concourse, and thought I was on 0-10. So I proceeded straight ahead thinking I was complying with the taxi clearance. (Both captain and first officer had clear 10-9 out). My copilot was busy tuning his radio and talking to our 'gate control.' he didn't notice that I hadn't turned. My attention was mostly on the congested gate area ahead. Meanwhile a widebody transport was taxiing sbound on the inner a beam east concourse. At the last instant I saw him and realized that he wasn't going to stop and hit the brakes just as my copilot looked up and yelled stop! We came to an abrupt stop just as the widebody transport continued rapidly by - his wing tip missing our nose by about 10 ft. He gave no indication of having seen us. Both aircraft had taillights on, we advised ground control that we had issued our turn and were cleared to the gate via the inner. Conclusions: 1. Never let anything or anyone hurry me. (I should know better). This led to a breakdown in situational awareness and crew resource management. 2. Stick with headset I am familiar with. 3. Pilot accepting a clearance must make sure the other pilot has heard and understood it. The other pilot should repeat it. If he/she doesn't. The pilot accepting the clearance should prompt him/her. Supplemental information from acn: 204647. During the course of this trip and particularly this leg the captain had rambled on continuously about many subjects regardless of the critical phase of the flight and had missed approximately 2 of every 3 ATC radio calls. After the near collision he attempt to down play the event despite complaints from several first class passengers to the lead flight attendant. My errors were not stopping the aircraft myself, caused I believe by the 'copilot passive' roll on the ground. Not presetting the ramp frequency on the #2 radio despite it being my leg to fly, and our joint confusion as to the open status of our gate caused by both pilots seeing an aircraft at gate and misidenting it as the 'F' concourse.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: NEAR GND COLLISION WITH TAXIING ACFT WHEN TAXI INSTRUCTIONS NOT FOLLOWED.

Narrative: OUR DEP FROM SFO HAD BEEN DELAYED AND WE WERE DOING EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO GET TO OUR ARR GATE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. WE LANDED ON RWY 3L AT DTW AT LET THE ACFT ROLL TO THE TURNOFF NEAREST GARTE THAT HAPPENED TO BE TAXIWAY 0-9. EARLIER I HAD SWITCHED FROM MY PERSONAL HEADSET TO THE COMPANY PROVIDED TELEX HEADSET AND PUT MINE AWAY TO MINIMIZE OUR TRANSFER TIME TO OUR OUTBOUND ACFT. (SCHEDULED TO DEPART IN 30 MIN FROM ANOTHER CONCOURSE). THE TELEX SOUND QUALITY WAS NOT AS GOOD AS THAT OF MY HEADSET. GND CTL CLRED US TO 'TURN L ON THE OUTER AND 0- 10 TO THE GATE.' I DID NOT HEAR 'TURN L ON THE OUTER.' IN THE DARK I MOMENTARILY MISTOOK E CONCOURSE FOR F CONCOURSE, AND THOUGHT I WAS ON 0-10. SO I PROCEEDED STRAIGHT AHEAD THINKING I WAS COMPLYING WITH THE TAXI CLRNC. (BOTH CAPT AND FO HAD CLR 10-9 OUT). MY COPLT WAS BUSY TUNING HIS RADIO AND TALKING TO OUR 'GATE CTL.' HE DIDN'T NOTICE THAT I HADN'T TURNED. MY ATTN WAS MOSTLY ON THE CONGESTED GATE AREA AHEAD. MEANWHILE A WDB WAS TAXIING SBOUND ON THE INNER A BEAM E CONCOURSE. AT THE LAST INSTANT I SAW HIM AND REALIZED THAT HE WASN'T GOING TO STOP AND HIT THE BRAKES JUST AS MY COPLT LOOKED UP AND YELLED STOP! WE CAME TO AN ABRUPT STOP JUST AS THE WDB CONTINUED RAPIDLY BY - HIS WING TIP MISSING OUR NOSE BY ABOUT 10 FT. HE GAVE NO INDICATION OF HAVING SEEN US. BOTH ACFT HAD TAILLIGHTS ON, WE ADVISED GND CTL THAT WE HAD ISSUED OUR TURN AND WERE CLRED TO THE GATE VIA THE INNER. CONCLUSIONS: 1. NEVER LET ANYTHING OR ANYONE HURRY ME. (I SHOULD KNOW BETTER). THIS LED TO A BREAKDOWN IN SITUATIONAL AWARENESS AND CREW RESOURCE MGMNT. 2. STICK WITH HEADSET I AM FAMILIAR WITH. 3. PLT ACCEPTING A CLRNC MUST MAKE SURE THE OTHER PLT HAS HEARD AND UNDERSTOOD IT. THE OTHER PLT SHOULD REPEAT IT. IF HE/SHE DOESN'T. THE PLT ACCEPTING THE CLRNC SHOULD PROMPT HIM/HER. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN: 204647. DURING THE COURSE OF THIS TRIP AND PARTICULARLY THIS LEG THE CAPT HAD RAMBLED ON CONTINUOUSLY ABOUT MANY SUBJECTS REGARDLESS OF THE CRITICAL PHASE OF THE FLT AND HAD MISSED APPROX 2 OF EVERY 3 ATC RADIO CALLS. AFTER THE NEAR COLLISION HE ATTEMPT TO DOWN PLAY THE EVENT DESPITE COMPLAINTS FROM SEVERAL FIRST CLASS PASSENGERS TO THE LEAD FLT ATTENDANT. MY ERRORS WERE NOT STOPPING THE ACFT MYSELF, CAUSED I BELIEVE BY THE 'COPLT PASSIVE' ROLL ON THE GND. NOT PRESETTING THE RAMP FREQ ON THE #2 RADIO DESPITE IT BEING MY LEG TO FLY, AND OUR JOINT CONFUSION AS TO THE OPEN STATUS OF OUR GATE CAUSED BY BOTH PLTS SEEING AN ACFT AT GATE AND MISIDENTING IT AS THE 'F' CONCOURSE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.