Lack of alerting standby emergency services of aircraft equipment malfunction during landing.

Attributes
ACN	202136
Time
Date	199202
Day	Tue
Local Time Of Day	1201 To 1800
Place
Locale Reference	airport : msp
State Reference	MN
Environment
Flight Conditions	IMC
Light	Daylight
Aircraft 1
Controlling Facilities	artcc : zmp tracon : msp tower : msp
Operator	common carrier : air carrier
Make Model Name	Light Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turboprop Eng
Flight Phase	cruise other descent : approach descent other
Route In Use	arrival other arrival star : star enroute airway : zmp
Flight Plan	IFR
Person 1
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	flight crew : captain oversight : pic
Qualification	pilot : atp pilot : cfi
Experience	flight time last 90 days : 190 flight time total : 3700 flight time type : 2150
ASRS Report	202136
Person 2
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	flight crew : first officer
Qualification	pilot : instrument pilot : commercial
Events
Anomaly	aircraft equipment problem : critical
Independent Detector	aircraft equipment other aircraft equipment : unspecified other flight crewa
Resolutory Action	flight crew : overcame equipment problem
Consequence	Other
Supplementary
Primary Problem	Aircraft
Air Traffic Incident	other

Narrative:

During cruise of flight alo-msp O2/tue/92 we noticed loss of hydraulic pressure on both right and left pumps. Both main supply and emergency supply brakes indicated 2000 psi (normal pressure) we got out crew manual volume ii, which had no procedures for en route loss of hydraulic pressure. We then reviewed the procedures for manual extension of the gear, and on our approach into minneapolis, I pumped the gear down by hand, getting all 3 green gear down lights. We landed safely without incident. The hydraulic loss did not affect the flight control surfaces in any way. I felt that the situation was under full control however I did not ask for crash fire (rescue) equipment to be standing by I felt at that time that it was not needed. After further analysis of the situation I feel that the crash fire rescue equipment equipment would have been a good idea. I feel that the airlines train people very well but T hey cannot prepare you for everything I feel this is a very good learning experience but it is not something I would like to practice every day in a real situation.

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: LACK OF ALERTING STANDBY EMER SVCS OF ACFT EQUIP MALFUNCTION DURING LNDG.

Narrative: DURING CRUISE OF FLT ALO-MSP O2/TUE/92 WE NOTICED LOSS OF HYD PRESSURE ON BOTH R AND L PUMPS. BOTH MAIN SUPPLY AND EMER SUPPLY BRAKES INDICATED 2000 PSI (NORMAL PRESSURE) WE GOT OUT CREW MANUAL VOLUME II, WHICH HAD NO PROCS FOR ENRTE LOSS OF HYD PRESSURE. WE THEN REVIEWED THE PROCS FOR MANUAL EXTENSION OF THE GEAR, AND ON OUR APCH INTO MINNEAPOLIS, I PUMPED THE GEAR DOWN BY HAND, GETTING ALL 3 GREEN GEAR DOWN LIGHTS. WE LANDED SAFELY WITHOUT INCIDENT. THE HYD LOSS DID NOT AFFECT THE FLT CTL SURFACES IN ANY WAY. I FELT THAT THE SITUATION WAS UNDER FULL CTL HOWEVER I DID NOT ASK FOR CRASH FIRE (RESCUE) EQUIP TO BE STANDING BY I FELT AT THAT TIME THAT IT WAS NOT NEEDED. AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATION I FEEL THAT THE CFR EQUIP WOULD HAVE BEEN A GOOD IDEA. I FEEL THAT THE AIRLINES TRAIN PEOPLE VERY WELL BUT T HEY CANNOT PREPARE YOU FOR EVERYTHING I FEEL THIS IS A VERY GOOD LEARNING EXPERIENCE BUT IT IS NOT SOMETHING I WOULD LIKE TO PRACTICE EVERY DAY IN A REAL SITUATION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.