Narrative:

Air carrier X cleared for takeoff, (issued 140 degree turn to right), from runway intersection. Air carrier Y 3 plus mi final. Air carrier Y observed braking out of clouds. Air carrier X not airborne. Air carrier Y issued go around with 40 degree left turn. In my judgement, the go around was issued at or prior to the threshold. The pilot says he was at approximately 50 ft. As the air carrier Y began the go around I observed air carrier X airborne. I had both aircraft in sight at all times and issued both diverging heading. I advised the air carrier X of the go around and reiterated to start the right turn as soon as possible. The air carrier Y did not turn as quickly as I expected. We learned later that it was operating on only 3 engines and was low on fuel. I was charged with an operational error on 2 counts. Aircraft beginning takeoff roll prior to aircraft on 2 mi final so that distance could increase to 3 mi within 1 min. I believe the takeoff action began correctly to fulfill this. I applied visual separation when air carrier Y was in sight. Landing aircraft crossing threshold prior to departure airborne and 1000 from threshold. I believe the operation would be in compliance, when I observed air carrier Y approaching the threshold, I had doubts that I would retain separation and initiated the go around. At no time during this operation did I fear a collision. Needless to say, if I had known of air carrier Y situation, this situation would never have occurred. Every time we squeeze a departure out prior to an arrival we take the risk of a go around situation. Expeditious movement of traffic involves some risk at all times. My usual routine is to advise the arrival about the departure and vice versa. Although not required, I feel that giving the pilots a full picture helps them and me to complete a successful operation. Air carrier X was advised of the air carrier Y but for some reason I did not advise air carrier Y of the departure. Perhaps he would have told me of his engine problem and the situation would not have occurred. Why I didn't tell air carrier Y I don't know. That is a very rare case for me and I instruct all trainees of the same just to avoid situations like this. Because of this, my go around ratio is very low.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR Y ISSUED GAR HAD LTSS FROM ACR X TKOF. SYS ERROR.

Narrative: ACR X CLRED FOR TKOF, (ISSUED 140 DEG TURN TO R), FROM RWY INTXN. ACR Y 3 PLUS MI FINAL. ACR Y OBSERVED BRAKING OUT OF CLOUDS. ACR X NOT AIRBORNE. ACR Y ISSUED GAR WITH 40 DEG L TURN. IN MY JUDGEMENT, THE GAR WAS ISSUED AT OR PRIOR TO THE THRESHOLD. THE PLT SAYS HE WAS AT APPROX 50 FT. AS THE ACR Y BEGAN THE GAR I OBSERVED ACR X AIRBORNE. I HAD BOTH ACFT IN SIGHT AT ALL TIMES AND ISSUED BOTH DIVERGING HDG. I ADVISED THE ACR X OF THE GAR AND REITERATED TO START THE R TURN ASAP. THE ACR Y DID NOT TURN AS QUICKLY AS I EXPECTED. WE LEARNED LATER THAT IT WAS OPERATING ON ONLY 3 ENGS AND WAS LOW ON FUEL. I WAS CHARGED WITH AN OPERROR ON 2 COUNTS. ACFT BEGINNING TKOF ROLL PRIOR TO ACFT ON 2 MI FINAL SO THAT DISTANCE COULD INCREASE TO 3 MI WITHIN 1 MIN. I BELIEVE THE TKOF ACTION BEGAN CORRECTLY TO FULFILL THIS. I APPLIED VISUAL SEPARATION WHEN ACR Y WAS IN SIGHT. LNDG ACFT XING THRESHOLD PRIOR TO DEP AIRBORNE AND 1000 FROM THRESHOLD. I BELIEVE THE OP WOULD BE IN COMPLIANCE, WHEN I OBSERVED ACR Y APCHING THE THRESHOLD, I HAD DOUBTS THAT I WOULD RETAIN SEPARATION AND INITIATED THE GAR. AT NO TIME DURING THIS OP DID I FEAR A COLLISION. NEEDLESS TO SAY, IF I HAD KNOWN OF ACR Y SITUATION, THIS SITUATION WOULD NEVER HAVE OCCURRED. EVERY TIME WE SQUEEZE A DEP OUT PRIOR TO AN ARR WE TAKE THE RISK OF A GAR SITUATION. EXPEDITIOUS MOVEMENT OF TFC INVOLVES SOME RISK AT ALL TIMES. MY USUAL ROUTINE IS TO ADVISE THE ARR ABOUT THE DEP AND VICE VERSA. ALTHOUGH NOT REQUIRED, I FEEL THAT GIVING THE PLTS A FULL PICTURE HELPS THEM AND ME TO COMPLETE A SUCCESSFUL OP. ACR X WAS ADVISED OF THE ACR Y BUT FOR SOME REASON I DID NOT ADVISE ACR Y OF THE DEP. PERHAPS HE WOULD HAVE TOLD ME OF HIS ENG PROBLEM AND THE SITUATION WOULD NOT HAVE OCCURRED. WHY I DIDN'T TELL ACR Y I DON'T KNOW. THAT IS A VERY RARE CASE FOR ME AND I INSTRUCT ALL TRAINEES OF THE SAME JUST TO AVOID SITUATIONS LIKE THIS. BECAUSE OF THIS, MY GAR RATIO IS VERY LOW.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.