Narrative:

I have had serious misgivings about the cockpit workload in the new 2 man cockpit aircraft that are equipped with the new state-of-the-art supposedly workload reducing technology. This equipment is great when it works, but if it gives problems, the workload increases well beyond what I believe is acceptable for a 2 man operation. In addition, programming this equipment is not yet 'user friendly' and results with too much 'head in the cockpit' time. This coupled with some critical cockpit equipment placement that could be much better designed. The following incident, I believe is an excellent example. We were inbound to dfw. The first officer was flying this leg. We had been detouring off the normal arrival routing from over little rock due to thunderstorms and had been placed on a vector for a visual approach to 17L (one of the east parallel runways at dfw). We were on a west heading, looking into the afternoon sun for the airport and it was a little hazy, but we did pick up the airport for the visual approach. Immediately after being cleared for a visual approach to runway 17L, my attention had been diverted inside the cockpit accomplishing the remaining items of the landing checklist down to gear and flaps. My company uses a mechanical checklist which is installed on the first officer's instrument panel and necessitates the pilot in the left seat leaning down and across the center console to reach it. As I completed the items, I again looked up to see we had flown through the centerline of both east runways and was passing the center of the airport headed toward the approach paths for the west side runways. I immediately said turn left, at the same time the controller called us and instructed us to turn left, we were overshooting our final and traffic was inbound to runway 18R. We turned sharply back to the left to again line up for 17L. It was then that I realized our RNAV display, that I was using to monitor the first officer's approach, while my head was in the cockpit, had shown us well east of runway 17L when in fact we were west of the runway centerline. We had experienced a map shift and due to our being off route, detouring the last 40 to 45 mins, it had gone undetected. To complicate matters the 17L localizer was OTS, so it could not be used as I normally did to verify correct line-up. The first officer said he had turned towards the wrong runway, but I rather think he fell into the same trap I did and was using the RNAV map display, or possibly it was a combination of the 2 that caused him to overshoot. My company's present procedures do not require or even suggest that RNAV accuracy be verified prior to entering the terminal area, and yet it is assumed that the system has remained accurate since the last check which is made turning onto the runway for takeoff. I plan on making 2 changes in the way that I personally operate. The first officer, who has the mechanical checklist in front of him will accomplish operation of it, allowing me more time to be head up, and the RNAV map display will be verified prior to entering the terminal area on every leg. I also am going to suggest that these procedures be incorporated into our operations manual.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLC OF ADVANCED LGT DEVIATED FROM APCH COURSE ON APCH TO DFW.

Narrative: I HAVE HAD SERIOUS MISGIVINGS ABOUT THE COCKPIT WORKLOAD IN THE NEW 2 MAN COCKPIT ACFT THAT ARE EQUIPPED WITH THE NEW STATE-OF-THE-ART SUPPOSEDLY WORKLOAD REDUCING TECHNOLOGY. THIS EQUIP IS GREAT WHEN IT WORKS, BUT IF IT GIVES PROBLEMS, THE WORKLOAD INCREASES WELL BEYOND WHAT I BELIEVE IS ACCEPTABLE FOR A 2 MAN OPERATION. IN ADDITION, PROGRAMMING THIS EQUIP IS NOT YET 'USER FRIENDLY' AND RESULTS WITH TOO MUCH 'HEAD IN THE COCKPIT' TIME. THIS COUPLED WITH SOME CRITICAL COCKPIT EQUIP PLACEMENT THAT COULD BE MUCH BETTER DESIGNED. THE FOLLOWING INCIDENT, I BELIEVE IS AN EXCELLENT EXAMPLE. WE WERE INBOUND TO DFW. THE FO WAS FLYING THIS LEG. WE HAD BEEN DETOURING OFF THE NORMAL ARR ROUTING FROM OVER LITTLE ROCK DUE TO TSTMS AND HAD BEEN PLACED ON A VECTOR FOR A VISUAL APCH TO 17L (ONE OF THE E PARALLEL RWYS AT DFW). WE WERE ON A W HDG, LOOKING INTO THE AFTERNOON SUN FOR THE ARPT AND IT WAS A LITTLE HAZY, BUT WE DID PICK UP THE ARPT FOR THE VISUAL APCH. IMMEDIATELY AFTER BEING CLRED FOR A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 17L, MY ATTN HAD BEEN DIVERTED INSIDE THE COCKPIT ACCOMPLISHING THE REMAINING ITEMS OF THE LNDG CHKLIST DOWN TO GEAR AND FLAPS. MY COMPANY USES A MECHANICAL CHKLIST WHICH IS INSTALLED ON THE FO'S INSTRUMENT PANEL AND NECESSITATES THE PLT IN THE L SEAT LEANING DOWN AND ACROSS THE CENTER CONSOLE TO REACH IT. AS I COMPLETED THE ITEMS, I AGAIN LOOKED UP TO SEE WE HAD FLOWN THROUGH THE CENTERLINE OF BOTH E RWYS AND WAS PASSING THE CENTER OF THE ARPT HEADED TOWARD THE APCH PATHS FOR THE W SIDE RWYS. I IMMEDIATELY SAID TURN L, AT THE SAME TIME THE CTLR CALLED US AND INSTRUCTED US TO TURN L, WE WERE OVERSHOOTING OUR FINAL AND TFC WAS INBOUND TO RWY 18R. WE TURNED SHARPLY BACK TO THE L TO AGAIN LINE UP FOR 17L. IT WAS THEN THAT I REALIZED OUR RNAV DISPLAY, THAT I WAS USING TO MONITOR THE FO'S APCH, WHILE MY HEAD WAS IN THE COCKPIT, HAD SHOWN US WELL E OF RWY 17L WHEN IN FACT WE WERE W OF THE RWY CENTERLINE. WE HAD EXPERIENCED A MAP SHIFT AND DUE TO OUR BEING OFF RTE, DETOURING THE LAST 40 TO 45 MINS, IT HAD GONE UNDETECTED. TO COMPLICATE MATTERS THE 17L LOC WAS OTS, SO IT COULD NOT BE USED AS I NORMALLY DID TO VERIFY CORRECT LINE-UP. THE FO SAID HE HAD TURNED TOWARDS THE WRONG RWY, BUT I RATHER THINK HE FELL INTO THE SAME TRAP I DID AND WAS USING THE RNAV MAP DISPLAY, OR POSSIBLY IT WAS A COMBINATION OF THE 2 THAT CAUSED HIM TO OVERSHOOT. MY COMPANY'S PRESENT PROCS DO NOT REQUIRE OR EVEN SUGGEST THAT RNAV ACCURACY BE VERIFIED PRIOR TO ENTERING THE TERMINAL AREA, AND YET IT IS ASSUMED THAT THE SYSTEM HAS REMAINED ACCURATE SINCE THE LAST CHK WHICH IS MADE TURNING ONTO THE RWY FOR TKOF. I PLAN ON MAKING 2 CHANGES IN THE WAY THAT I PERSONALLY OPERATE. THE FO, WHO HAS THE MECHANICAL CHKLIST IN FRONT OF HIM WILL ACCOMPLISH OPERATION OF IT, ALLOWING ME MORE TIME TO BE HEAD UP, AND THE RNAV MAP DISPLAY WILL BE VERIFIED PRIOR TO ENTERING THE TERMINAL AREA ON EVERY LEG. I ALSO AM GOING TO SUGGEST THAT THESE PROCS BE INCORPORATED INTO OUR OPS MANUAL.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.