Narrative:

For takeoff we had been given runway 36 with a northwest departure via the potomac river. This departure requires a left turn just a few moments after the departure end of the runway in order to remain over the river and to avoid P56. The first officer had flown that same departure earlier that very morning and had basically done a good job. I was expecting a repeat performance. The takeoff was normal until shortly after gear retraction. I was attempting to maintain outside visual references in addition to monitoring the instruments. While checking outside (because he hadn't begun the turn to the northwest), I realized that our pitch attitude was increasing and the airspeed was decreasing significantly. About this time the tower became aware that we were still headed toward P56 and they gave us an immediate left turn to 270. I took control of the airplane and reduced the pitch attitude and banked left as much as I felt that our airspeed would safely permit. I am hopeful that we didn't actually fly over the prohibited area P56, if not we must have come very close. The tower supervisor told me later that day that they had no knowledge of an overfly of P56 that morning. I believe this situation was caused by lack of airline experience by the first officer and the complex departure with its noise abatement requirements was too much for his level of experience. My recommendation to my company will be to require this departure to be flown by the captain or by the first officer who has a level of experience that would be determined as part of a procedure change.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR FAILS TO MAKE TURN AFTER DEP. POSSIBLE PENETRATION OF RESTRICTED AREA.

Narrative: FOR TKOF WE HAD BEEN GIVEN RWY 36 WITH A NW DEP VIA THE POTOMAC RIVER. THIS DEP REQUIRES A L TURN JUST A FEW MOMENTS AFTER THE DEP END OF THE RWY IN ORDER TO REMAIN OVER THE RIVER AND TO AVOID P56. THE FO HAD FLOWN THAT SAME DEP EARLIER THAT VERY MORNING AND HAD BASICALLY DONE A GOOD JOB. I WAS EXPECTING A REPEAT PERFORMANCE. THE TKOF WAS NORMAL UNTIL SHORTLY AFTER GEAR RETRACTION. I WAS ATTEMPTING TO MAINTAIN OUTSIDE VISUAL REFERENCES IN ADDITION TO MONITORING THE INSTRUMENTS. WHILE CHKING OUTSIDE (BECAUSE HE HADN'T BEGUN THE TURN TO THE NW), I REALIZED THAT OUR PITCH ATTITUDE WAS INCREASING AND THE AIRSPD WAS DECREASING SIGNIFICANTLY. ABOUT THIS TIME THE TWR BECAME AWARE THAT WE WERE STILL HEADED TOWARD P56 AND THEY GAVE US AN IMMEDIATE L TURN TO 270. I TOOK CTL OF THE AIRPLANE AND REDUCED THE PITCH ATTITUDE AND BANKED L AS MUCH AS I FELT THAT OUR AIRSPD WOULD SAFELY PERMIT. I AM HOPEFUL THAT WE DIDN'T ACTUALLY FLY OVER THE PROHIBITED AREA P56, IF NOT WE MUST HAVE COME VERY CLOSE. THE TWR SUPVR TOLD ME LATER THAT DAY THAT THEY HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF AN OVERFLY OF P56 THAT MORNING. I BELIEVE THIS SITUATION WAS CAUSED BY LACK OF AIRLINE EXPERIENCE BY THE FO AND THE COMPLEX DEP WITH ITS NOISE ABATEMENT REQUIREMENTS WAS TOO MUCH FOR HIS LEVEL OF EXPERIENCE. MY RECOMMENDATION TO MY COMPANY WILL BE TO REQUIRE THIS DEP TO BE FLOWN BY THE CAPT OR BY THE FO WHO HAS A LEVEL OF EXPERIENCE THAT WOULD BE DETERMINED AS PART OF A PROC CHANGE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.