Narrative:

Ground control cleared us to taxi via a and B to runway 36 and hold short of runway 3. While on a and turning the corner an large transport was in front of us and ground control told us to follow him. The large transport taxied across runway 3 for runway 36 and we followed him. After crossing runway 3, ground control told us we were not cleared to cross. Obviously there was a failure to communication. Our understanding was that we were to follow the large transport. This just points out the need for all parties to make sure that instructions are explicit and understood. We should have probably confirmed that we were to follow the large transport across runway 3 but we felt his last clearance superseded his original clearance. The use of explicit language would have avoided this incident. There was no conflict with other aircraft. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information. Callback was placed as part of a structured callback effort on runway incursions. Reporter simply said that the flight crew interpreted the instruction to follow the aircraft ahead as superseding the one issued earlier with a hold short restriction. Flight crew didn't question clearance because they felt that they understood it. They were somewhat affected by the fact that the instruction to follow came when they were doing the before takeoff checklist. Reporter felt that ATC should have re-emphasized the hold short restriction.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLT CREW OF MLG TAXIING OUR FOR TKOF AT DCA IS TOLD TO FOLLOW ACFT AHEAD AND INTERPRETS HIS INSTRUCTION AS SUPERSEDING THE PREVIOUS ONE THAT CONTAINED A HOLD SHORT. ACFT ERRONEOUSLY CROSSED RWY 3 WHILE ENROUTE TO 36.

Narrative: GND CTL CLRED US TO TAXI VIA A AND B TO RWY 36 AND HOLD SHORT OF RWY 3. WHILE ON A AND TURNING THE CORNER AN LGT WAS IN FRONT OF US AND GND CTL TOLD US TO FOLLOW HIM. THE LGT TAXIED ACROSS RWY 3 FOR RWY 36 AND WE FOLLOWED HIM. AFTER XING RWY 3, GND CTL TOLD US WE WERE NOT CLRED TO CROSS. OBVIOUSLY THERE WAS A FAILURE TO COM. OUR UNDERSTANDING WAS THAT WE WERE TO FOLLOW THE LGT. THIS JUST POINTS OUT THE NEED FOR ALL PARTIES TO MAKE SURE THAT INSTRUCTIONS ARE EXPLICIT AND UNDERSTOOD. WE SHOULD HAVE PROBABLY CONFIRMED THAT WE WERE TO FOLLOW THE LGT ACROSS RWY 3 BUT WE FELT HIS LAST CLRNC SUPERSEDED HIS ORIGINAL CLRNC. THE USE OF EXPLICIT LANGUAGE WOULD HAVE AVOIDED THIS INCIDENT. THERE WAS NO CONFLICT WITH OTHER ACFT. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO. CALLBACK WAS PLACED AS PART OF A STRUCTURED CALLBACK EFFORT ON RWY INCURSIONS. RPTR SIMPLY SAID THAT THE FLT CREW INTERPRETED THE INSTRUCTION TO FOLLOW THE ACFT AHEAD AS SUPERSEDING THE ONE ISSUED EARLIER WITH A HOLD SHORT RESTRICTION. FLT CREW DIDN'T QUESTION CLRNC BECAUSE THEY FELT THAT THEY UNDERSTOOD IT. THEY WERE SOMEWHAT AFFECTED BY THE FACT THAT THE INSTRUCTION TO FOLLOW CAME WHEN THEY WERE DOING THE BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST. RPTR FELT THAT ATC SHOULD HAVE RE-EMPHASIZED THE HOLD SHORT RESTRICTION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.