Narrative:

During pushback/engine start I had deselected VHF and 1 and 2 (ground control and clearance del) in order to communication with ground crew. Aircraft next to us called ground for permission to push. Ground controller told the other aircraft to hold until we could taxi clear. The copilot, hearing this exchange, told the other aircraft and the ground controller that we would be ready for taxi in a few seconds. The ground controller issued us taxi instructions, at that time, to 31C, hold short of 31R. I was not privy to any of this chatter. When the tug was disconnected, and we completed our after start checklist, the first officer relayed to me that we were cleared to 31C, that he told me to hold short of 31R was either not said, or went in one ear and out the other. As I approached 31R, and it was apparent that I wasn't slowing down, ground control called us demanding an immediate stop, which we did. We stopped short of the runway as a commuter was landing on 31R. We were then cleared to cross 31R and subsequently cleared for takeoff on 31C. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information. Reporter explained that he had deselected his communication radio because, in this model aircraft, there is no individual volume control for the various radios, and his ability to coordination the pushback with the ground crew would have been hampered. Callback was conducted as part of a structured callback effort on runway incursions.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CAPT OF MLG TAXIING TO RWY 31C AT MDW ALMOST TAXIES ACROSS THE APCH END OF RWY 31R WITH A COMMUTER ACFT ON SHORT FINAL. CAPT HAD NOT HEARD HOLD SHORT INSTRUCTION BECAUSE HE WAS TALKING WITH GND CREW WHEN FO RECEIVED TAXI CLRNC.

Narrative: DURING PUSHBACK/ENG START I HAD DESELECTED VHF AND 1 AND 2 (GND CTL AND CLRNC DEL) IN ORDER TO COM WITH GND CREW. ACFT NEXT TO US CALLED GND FOR PERMISSION TO PUSH. GND CTLR TOLD THE OTHER ACFT TO HOLD UNTIL WE COULD TAXI CLR. THE COPLT, HEARING THIS EXCHANGE, TOLD THE OTHER ACFT AND THE GND CTLR THAT WE WOULD BE READY FOR TAXI IN A FEW SECS. THE GND CTLR ISSUED US TAXI INSTRUCTIONS, AT THAT TIME, TO 31C, HOLD SHORT OF 31R. I WAS NOT PRIVY TO ANY OF THIS CHATTER. WHEN THE TUG WAS DISCONNECTED, AND WE COMPLETED OUR AFTER START CHKLIST, THE F/O RELAYED TO ME THAT WE WERE CLRED TO 31C, THAT HE TOLD ME TO HOLD SHORT OF 31R WAS EITHER NOT SAID, OR WENT IN ONE EAR AND OUT THE OTHER. AS I APCHED 31R, AND IT WAS APPARENT THAT I WASN'T SLOWING DOWN, GND CTL CALLED US DEMANDING AN IMMEDIATE STOP, WHICH WE DID. WE STOPPED SHORT OF THE RWY AS A COMMUTER WAS LNDG ON 31R. WE WERE THEN CLRED TO CROSS 31R AND SUBSEQUENTLY CLRED FOR TKOF ON 31C. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO. RPTR EXPLAINED THAT HE HAD DESELECTED HIS COM RADIO BECAUSE, IN THIS MODEL ACFT, THERE IS NO INDIVIDUAL VOLUME CTL FOR THE VARIOUS RADIOS, AND HIS ABILITY TO COORD THE PUSHBACK WITH THE GND CREW WOULD HAVE BEEN HAMPERED. CALLBACK WAS CONDUCTED AS PART OF A STRUCTURED CALLBACK EFFORT ON RWY INCURSIONS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.