Narrative:

Pilot was informed to call ZHU by operations duty officer after the flight had landed. Mr. X at ZHU advised during initial phone conversation that there had been an MOA spillout and a 'possible pilot deviation' due to a close approach to an large transport during our flight. He referred us to mr. Y at quality assurance for more detailed information. Mr. Y explained that initial indications from tapes were that we had come as close as 4.6 mi to an large transport on the southwest edge of the kings 1 MOA. From the perspective of the pilots in our flight, we saw the airliner off to the south during our maneuvers and idented it as a civil aircraft, then elected to 'knock-off' our engagement and reset for another engagement further to the north. We realized we were working the south boundary of the MOA, but showed on our tacans that we were still inside the boundaries. The training rules we briefed include an agreement to 'knock-it-off' any time an 'unbriefed aircraft enters the fight.' this includes any sightings of any civilians. We assume they cannot see us, and if we can see them, then we stop maneuvers, keep them in sight and move to an area away from the civilian. A boundary alert was issued for us, but we did not receive it because we had secured 243.0 earlier and forgot to turn it back on. There were a lot of beacon signals on guard frequency that made radio communications extremely difficult on the front radios. Our mission required clear radio communications for all phases. Forgetting to turn the guard frequency back on was a definite human factor contributing to the missed alert call. Our TACAN radio navigation sets checked out fully operational prior to flight and we relied on them for area navigation while in the MOA. At no time did we have indications that we were out of the MOA.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: LOSS OF STANDARD SEPARATION CREATES A POTENTIAL CONFLICT DURING A SPILLOUT FROM AN MOA FOR 2 MIL FTR'S.

Narrative: PLT WAS INFORMED TO CALL ZHU BY OPS DUTY OFFICER AFTER THE FLT HAD LANDED. MR. X AT ZHU ADVISED DURING INITIAL PHONE CONVERSATION THAT THERE HAD BEEN AN MOA SPILLOUT AND A 'POSSIBLE PLT DEVIATION' DUE TO A CLOSE APCH TO AN LGT DURING OUR FLT. HE REFERRED US TO MR. Y AT QUALITY ASSURANCE FOR MORE DETAILED INFO. MR. Y EXPLAINED THAT INITIAL INDICATIONS FROM TAPES WERE THAT WE HAD COME AS CLOSE AS 4.6 MI TO AN LGT ON THE SW EDGE OF THE KINGS 1 MOA. FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE PLTS IN OUR FLT, WE SAW THE AIRLINER OFF TO THE S DURING OUR MANEUVERS AND IDENTED IT AS A CIVIL ACFT, THEN ELECTED TO 'KNOCK-OFF' OUR ENGAGEMENT AND RESET FOR ANOTHER ENGAGEMENT FURTHER TO THE N. WE REALIZED WE WERE WORKING THE S BOUNDARY OF THE MOA, BUT SHOWED ON OUR TACANS THAT WE WERE STILL INSIDE THE BOUNDARIES. THE TRNING RULES WE BRIEFED INCLUDE AN AGREEMENT TO 'KNOCK-IT-OFF' ANY TIME AN 'UNBRIEFED ACFT ENTERS THE FIGHT.' THIS INCLUDES ANY SIGHTINGS OF ANY CIVILIANS. WE ASSUME THEY CANNOT SEE US, AND IF WE CAN SEE THEM, THEN WE STOP MANEUVERS, KEEP THEM IN SIGHT AND MOVE TO AN AREA AWAY FROM THE CIVILIAN. A BOUNDARY ALERT WAS ISSUED FOR US, BUT WE DID NOT RECEIVE IT BECAUSE WE HAD SECURED 243.0 EARLIER AND FORGOT TO TURN IT BACK ON. THERE WERE A LOT OF BEACON SIGNALS ON GUARD FREQ THAT MADE RADIO COMS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT ON THE FRONT RADIOS. OUR MISSION REQUIRED CLR RADIO COMS FOR ALL PHASES. FORGETTING TO TURN THE GUARD FREQ BACK ON WAS A DEFINITE HUMAN FACTOR CONTRIBUTING TO THE MISSED ALERT CALL. OUR TACAN RADIO NAV SETS CHKED OUT FULLY OPERATIONAL PRIOR TO FLT AND WE RELIED ON THEM FOR AREA NAV WHILE IN THE MOA. AT NO TIME DID WE HAVE INDICATIONS THAT WE WERE OUT OF THE MOA.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.