Narrative:

We were being vectored for the ILS 18L at cincinnati international. Left hand traffic pattern. As we were given our final turn onto the localizer, we were descending to an assigned 4000' altitude. Controller was busy with traffic. As we intercepted the localizer, we were to tighten our turn on and cleared for the approach. At that time I noticed traffic displayed on the TCAS screen as a traffic alert went off. Looking down at the screen and trying to interpret the information, my attention was taken away from flying the airplane long enough and at the most inopportune time. I busted the 4000' assigned altitude by 300', altitude alert went off, and I corrected back up to 4000' and continued the approach. At the moment I started correcting with a climb to 4000', I glanced down and noticed that sep between the aircraft on the TCAS screen was down to 500', and this aircraft was approximately 2 1/2 to 3 mi at our 4 O'clock position turning onto the localizer behind us and much faster than us and trying to slow to follow us. I do not believe that a conflict was possible since we were turning away from the traffic onto the localizer with him to follow. But the TCAS alert did give us a TA, but no RA. My concern is this. I realize the added safety that the TCAS system is to allow us concerning sep, but his is an example of attention being diverted from flying the aircraft first. In all the technological marvel I feel that safety can be compromised by too much 'clutter' in the cockpit. What with GPWS, windshear alerters, TCAS alerts, gear horns, bell, buzzers, clackers and split seconds allowed to absorb, process and react, maybe we should reevaluate the addition of more technology into our cockpits and whether it really improves safety?

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR MLG ALT DEVIATION OVERSHOT DURING DESCENT INTO DVG. REPORTER SAYS HE WAS DISTR BY TCASII.

Narrative: WE WERE BEING VECTORED FOR THE ILS 18L AT CINCINNATI INTL. L HAND TFC PATTERN. AS WE WERE GIVEN OUR FINAL TURN ONTO THE LOC, WE WERE DSNDING TO AN ASSIGNED 4000' ALT. CTLR WAS BUSY WITH TFC. AS WE INTERCEPTED THE LOC, WE WERE TO TIGHTEN OUR TURN ON AND CLRED FOR THE APCH. AT THAT TIME I NOTICED TFC DISPLAYED ON THE TCAS SCREEN AS A TFC ALERT WENT OFF. LOOKING DOWN AT THE SCREEN AND TRYING TO INTERPRET THE INFO, MY ATTN WAS TAKEN AWAY FROM FLYING THE AIRPLANE LONG ENOUGH AND AT THE MOST INOPPORTUNE TIME. I BUSTED THE 4000' ASSIGNED ALT BY 300', ALT ALERT WENT OFF, AND I CORRECTED BACK UP TO 4000' AND CONTINUED THE APCH. AT THE MOMENT I STARTED CORRECTING WITH A CLB TO 4000', I GLANCED DOWN AND NOTICED THAT SEP BTWN THE ACFT ON THE TCAS SCREEN WAS DOWN TO 500', AND THIS ACFT WAS APPROX 2 1/2 TO 3 MI AT OUR 4 O'CLOCK POS TURNING ONTO THE LOC BEHIND US AND MUCH FASTER THAN US AND TRYING TO SLOW TO FOLLOW US. I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT A CONFLICT WAS POSSIBLE SINCE WE WERE TURNING AWAY FROM THE TFC ONTO THE LOC WITH HIM TO FOLLOW. BUT THE TCAS ALERT DID GIVE US A TA, BUT NO RA. MY CONCERN IS THIS. I REALIZE THE ADDED SAFETY THAT THE TCAS SYS IS TO ALLOW US CONCERNING SEP, BUT HIS IS AN EXAMPLE OF ATTN BEING DIVERTED FROM FLYING THE ACFT FIRST. IN ALL THE TECHNOLOGICAL MARVEL I FEEL THAT SAFETY CAN BE COMPROMISED BY TOO MUCH 'CLUTTER' IN THE COCKPIT. WHAT WITH GPWS, WINDSHEAR ALERTERS, TCAS ALERTS, GEAR HORNS, BELL, BUZZERS, CLACKERS AND SPLIT SECS ALLOWED TO ABSORB, PROCESS AND REACT, MAYBE WE SHOULD REEVALUATE THE ADDITION OF MORE TECHNOLOGY INTO OUR COCKPITS AND WHETHER IT REALLY IMPROVES SAFETY?

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.