Narrative:

As an F/east, one of my normal preflight duties is to calculate maximum allowable takeoff gross weight based upon departure/destination airport performance date, environmental conditions and flight release estimated fuel burn, then compare it against actual takeoff gross weight generated by a computerized load plan to prevent takeoffs/lndgs in an overweight condition. The computerized load plan is withheld from flight crews by the load supervisor until all cargo containers are loaded and cargo doors are closed just prior to engine start. Because of this, there is some pressure on F/east's to quickly complete load plan verification in order to block out on schedule. On this occasion, I completed my preliminary takeoff/landing performance calculations and figured maximum allowable takeoff gross weight to be 152000# based on a maximum structural landing weight of 142500# plus a flight release fuel burn of 9500 pounds. After this, aircraft loading was completed and I left the cockpit to close the main cargo door and verify it locked. Upon my return to the cockpit, I discovered an inoperative aft cargo door annunciator warning light. While troubleshooting this, the load supervisor appeared with the load plan. I quickly 'verified' the load plan and handed it to the captain for signature, not noticing that the actual takeoff gross weight exceeded the maximum allowable takeoff weight by 1000 pounds (153000 pounds). My oversight was likely due to my preoccupation with troubleshooting the cargo door light problem. I was also somewhat fatigued at the time because this was my first flight after 13 days off, and I had been awake approximately 15 hours previously attempting to readjust my body clock to working nights. The captain signed the load plan, also not noticing the error. The cargo door annunciator light was deferred by maintenance. We started engines and blocked out 23 mins late. Approximately 345 mins into the 1 1/2 hour flight, I noticed the error on my copy of the load plan. I did not advise the captain of the error (and he still does not know) because he is a management pilot. I am a probationary pilot and fear job termination if I were to bring the error ot his attention. This is because we are currently in contract negotiations with the company, and there have been a # of recent probationary pilot terminations and non-probationary pilot furloughs (disciplinary) by management for such things as 'attitude problems,' minor procedural errors and 'service delays' when capts diverted to alternate airports in the interest of safety because of marginal destination WX. Having closely monitored fuel consumption for the remainder of the flight, I advised the captain during initial descent that we must burn 1500 pounds more fuel to land at our maximum structural landing weight. He acknowledged, and the extra fuel was burned off by briefly deploying speed brakes and increasing power west/O deviating from our normal route of descent profile. A normal landing was performed more than 1000 pounds below maximum structural landing weight.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: TKOF 1000@ OVERWEIGHT.

Narrative: AS AN F/E, ONE OF MY NORMAL PREFLT DUTIES IS TO CALCULATE MAX ALLOWABLE TKOF GROSS WT BASED UPON DEP/DEST ARPT PERFORMANCE DATE, ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS AND FLT RELEASE ESTIMATED FUEL BURN, THEN COMPARE IT AGAINST ACTUAL TKOF GROSS WT GENERATED BY A COMPUTERIZED LOAD PLAN TO PREVENT TKOFS/LNDGS IN AN OVERWT CONDITION. THE COMPUTERIZED LOAD PLAN IS WITHHELD FROM FLT CREWS BY THE LOAD SUPVR UNTIL ALL CARGO CONTAINERS ARE LOADED AND CARGO DOORS ARE CLOSED JUST PRIOR TO ENG START. BECAUSE OF THIS, THERE IS SOME PRESSURE ON F/E'S TO QUICKLY COMPLETE LOAD PLAN VERIFICATION IN ORDER TO BLOCK OUT ON SCHEDULE. ON THIS OCCASION, I COMPLETED MY PRELIMINARY TKOF/LNDG PERFORMANCE CALCULATIONS AND FIGURED MAX ALLOWABLE TKOF GROSS WT TO BE 152000# BASED ON A MAX STRUCTURAL LNDG WT OF 142500# PLUS A FLT RELEASE FUEL BURN OF 9500 LBS. AFTER THIS, ACFT LOADING WAS COMPLETED AND I LEFT THE COCKPIT TO CLOSE THE MAIN CARGO DOOR AND VERIFY IT LOCKED. UPON MY RETURN TO THE COCKPIT, I DISCOVERED AN INOP AFT CARGO DOOR ANNUNCIATOR WARNING LIGHT. WHILE TROUBLESHOOTING THIS, THE LOAD SUPVR APPEARED WITH THE LOAD PLAN. I QUICKLY 'VERIFIED' THE LOAD PLAN AND HANDED IT TO THE CAPT FOR SIGNATURE, NOT NOTICING THAT THE ACTUAL TKOF GROSS WT EXCEEDED THE MAX ALLOWABLE TKOF WT BY 1000 LBS (153000 LBS). MY OVERSIGHT WAS LIKELY DUE TO MY PREOCCUPATION WITH TROUBLESHOOTING THE CARGO DOOR LIGHT PROB. I WAS ALSO SOMEWHAT FATIGUED AT THE TIME BECAUSE THIS WAS MY FIRST FLT AFTER 13 DAYS OFF, AND I HAD BEEN AWAKE APPROX 15 HRS PREVIOUSLY ATTEMPTING TO READJUST MY BODY CLOCK TO WORKING NIGHTS. THE CAPT SIGNED THE LOAD PLAN, ALSO NOT NOTICING THE ERROR. THE CARGO DOOR ANNUNCIATOR LIGHT WAS DEFERRED BY MAINT. WE STARTED ENGS AND BLOCKED OUT 23 MINS LATE. APPROX 345 MINS INTO THE 1 1/2 HR FLT, I NOTICED THE ERROR ON MY COPY OF THE LOAD PLAN. I DID NOT ADVISE THE CAPT OF THE ERROR (AND HE STILL DOES NOT KNOW) BECAUSE HE IS A MGMNT PLT. I AM A PROBATIONARY PLT AND FEAR JOB TERMINATION IF I WERE TO BRING THE ERROR OT HIS ATTN. THIS IS BECAUSE WE ARE CURRENTLY IN CONTRACT NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE COMPANY, AND THERE HAVE BEEN A # OF RECENT PROBATIONARY PLT TERMINATIONS AND NON-PROBATIONARY PLT FURLOUGHS (DISCIPLINARY) BY MGMNT FOR SUCH THINGS AS 'ATTITUDE PROBS,' MINOR PROCEDURAL ERRORS AND 'SVC DELAYS' WHEN CAPTS DIVERTED TO ALTERNATE ARPTS IN THE INTEREST OF SAFETY BECAUSE OF MARGINAL DEST WX. HAVING CLOSELY MONITORED FUEL CONSUMPTION FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE FLT, I ADVISED THE CAPT DURING INITIAL DSNT THAT WE MUST BURN 1500 LBS MORE FUEL TO LAND AT OUR MAX STRUCTURAL LNDG WT. HE ACKNOWLEDGED, AND THE EXTRA FUEL WAS BURNED OFF BY BRIEFLY DEPLOYING SPD BRAKES AND INCREASING PWR W/O DEVIATING FROM OUR NORMAL RTE OF DSNT PROFILE. A NORMAL LNDG WAS PERFORMED MORE THAN 1000 LBS BELOW MAX STRUCTURAL LNDG WT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.