Narrative:

Terminal forecast at koa favored use of 17 and I had planned a STAR that would line us up for these approachs, and had reviewed the runway 17 approachs. ATIS for kona, however, gave winds of 060/28, which far exceeded both my own and the aircraft's crosswind capability. My husband plotted a cruise to ogg from koa. After doing that we advised center that we would be unable to land, but wanted an approach followed by a missed and continuation to ogg. I was given the clearance to ogg right in the middle of executing a t-dme arc. After being instructed to contact the tower, we were cleared to land after crossing the FAF. We explained that we could not, and then were given instructions that made it very unclr to me what we should do at the missed approach point. The frequency was busy. At 600-700' MSL, we encountered what was approaching severe turbulence, which put the aircraft on its side. I recovered. Tower called my missed approach and I did what I thought to be the right thing to do. I flew the published missed until 1500' MSL to get us away from the runway, and then followed center's instructions to fly heading 350 degrees and climb to 8000'. Center controller seemed mighty peeved when we showed up again on his frequency. At this point, we also requested an amended clearance to kahului to avoid the moderate to severe turbulence anticipated in the area of makena point on maui. My husband had thought that the proper thing to do was to fly the missed approach instructions given to us by center immediately, even though this would take us right over the runway at kona. However, he was not sure enough about this to prevail and tell me what to, even though he was technically the person accepting the clearance as the INS rated pilot. There were no traffic conflicts that were apparent to my safety pilot. However, I think the major problems in this incident boil down to 2 major areas--neither of which has been addressed well in our training. 1) how does a low-time instrument pilot go about relating that they are becoming overwhelmed? (I was so flustered by the missed approach procedure that I forgot to raise the gear in the climb until my husband reminded me.) 2) we might have avoided the mistakes altogether if we worked together better as a crew. However, crew coordination has not been addressed in our training, or at any of the safety meetings that we have attended.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: SMA PLT IN A DEVIATION FROM ATC INSTRUCTION AFTER AN INFLT UPSET AND LOSS OF ACFT CTL.

Narrative: TERMINAL FORECAST AT KOA FAVORED USE OF 17 AND I HAD PLANNED A STAR THAT WOULD LINE US UP FOR THESE APCHS, AND HAD REVIEWED THE RWY 17 APCHS. ATIS FOR KONA, HOWEVER, GAVE WINDS OF 060/28, WHICH FAR EXCEEDED BOTH MY OWN AND THE ACFT'S XWIND CAPABILITY. MY HUSBAND PLOTTED A CRUISE TO OGG FROM KOA. AFTER DOING THAT WE ADVISED CENTER THAT WE WOULD BE UNABLE TO LAND, BUT WANTED AN APCH FOLLOWED BY A MISSED AND CONTINUATION TO OGG. I WAS GIVEN THE CLRNC TO OGG RIGHT IN THE MIDDLE OF EXECUTING A T-DME ARC. AFTER BEING INSTRUCTED TO CONTACT THE TWR, WE WERE CLRED TO LAND AFTER XING THE FAF. WE EXPLAINED THAT WE COULD NOT, AND THEN WERE GIVEN INSTRUCTIONS THAT MADE IT VERY UNCLR TO ME WHAT WE SHOULD DO AT THE MISSED APCH POINT. THE FREQ WAS BUSY. AT 600-700' MSL, WE ENCOUNTERED WHAT WAS APCHING SEVERE TURB, WHICH PUT THE ACFT ON ITS SIDE. I RECOVERED. TWR CALLED MY MISSED APCH AND I DID WHAT I THOUGHT TO BE THE RIGHT THING TO DO. I FLEW THE PUBLISHED MISSED UNTIL 1500' MSL TO GET US AWAY FROM THE RWY, AND THEN FOLLOWED CENTER'S INSTRUCTIONS TO FLY HDG 350 DEGS AND CLB TO 8000'. CENTER CTLR SEEMED MIGHTY PEEVED WHEN WE SHOWED UP AGAIN ON HIS FREQ. AT THIS POINT, WE ALSO REQUESTED AN AMENDED CLRNC TO KAHULUI TO AVOID THE MODERATE TO SEVERE TURB ANTICIPATED IN THE AREA OF MAKENA POINT ON MAUI. MY HUSBAND HAD THOUGHT THAT THE PROPER THING TO DO WAS TO FLY THE MISSED APCH INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN TO US BY CENTER IMMEDIATELY, EVEN THOUGH THIS WOULD TAKE US RIGHT OVER THE RWY AT KONA. HOWEVER, HE WAS NOT SURE ENOUGH ABOUT THIS TO PREVAIL AND TELL ME WHAT TO, EVEN THOUGH HE WAS TECHNICALLY THE PERSON ACCEPTING THE CLRNC AS THE INS RATED PLT. THERE WERE NO TFC CONFLICTS THAT WERE APPARENT TO MY SAFETY PLT. HOWEVER, I THINK THE MAJOR PROBS IN THIS INCIDENT BOIL DOWN TO 2 MAJOR AREAS--NEITHER OF WHICH HAS BEEN ADDRESSED WELL IN OUR TRNING. 1) HOW DOES A LOW-TIME INST PLT GO ABOUT RELATING THAT THEY ARE BECOMING OVERWHELMED? (I WAS SO FLUSTERED BY THE MISSED APCH PROC THAT I FORGOT TO RAISE THE GEAR IN THE CLB UNTIL MY HUSBAND REMINDED ME.) 2) WE MIGHT HAVE AVOIDED THE MISTAKES ALTOGETHER IF WE WORKED TOGETHER BETTER AS A CREW. HOWEVER, CREW COORD HAS NOT BEEN ADDRESSED IN OUR TRNING, OR AT ANY OF THE SAFETY MEETINGS THAT WE HAVE ATTENDED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.