Narrative:

The flight director on this aircraft was MEL'd with proper log book entries, stickers, etc. Both the flight director 115V ess circuit breaker and the 28V ess circuit breaker were pulled, but not tie wrapped. This resulted in both pitch and bank steering bars being centered in both adis. In and out of WX this caused confusion and prevented seeing the adis properly. The MEL for the light transport specifies no maintenance actions for this item. Normally only the 28V ess circuit breaker is pulled and tie wrapped, giving the flight director off flag with steering bars out of sight. The FAA approves all MEL's and directs appropriate maintenance and operations action. It's too bad the MEL conference did provide proper instructions and this aircraft must now be operated with faulty steering bars in view. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following: gave the aircraft type and flight director symbol. Pilots MEL very brief and primarily indicates only if the system can be dispatched inoperative. Instrument is tied in with the ADI and both the captain and first officer's instruments were effected in this incident--only approach minimums were changed. Could not explain why the instrument would not be biased out of view when the power was interrupted by pulling the circuit breaker. Feels a simple fix is available since the bars are biased out of view when the AC power is interrupted.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLT DIRECTOR MINIMUM EQUIPMENT LISTED INOPERATIVE, BUT FLY BARS IN VIEW AND NO WARNING FLAG.

Narrative: THE FLT DIRECTOR ON THIS ACFT WAS MEL'D WITH PROPER LOG BOOK ENTRIES, STICKERS, ETC. BOTH THE FLT DIRECTOR 115V ESS CB AND THE 28V ESS CB WERE PULLED, BUT NOT TIE WRAPPED. THIS RESULTED IN BOTH PITCH AND BANK STEERING BARS BEING CENTERED IN BOTH ADIS. IN AND OUT OF WX THIS CAUSED CONFUSION AND PREVENTED SEEING THE ADIS PROPERLY. THE MEL FOR THE LTT SPECIFIES NO MAINT ACTIONS FOR THIS ITEM. NORMALLY ONLY THE 28V ESS CB IS PULLED AND TIE WRAPPED, GIVING THE FLT DIRECTOR OFF FLAG WITH STEERING BARS OUT OF SIGHT. THE FAA APPROVES ALL MEL'S AND DIRECTS APPROPRIATE MAINT AND OPS ACTION. IT'S TOO BAD THE MEL CONFERENCE DID PROVIDE PROPER INSTRUCTIONS AND THIS ACFT MUST NOW BE OPERATED WITH FAULTY STEERING BARS IN VIEW. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING: GAVE THE ACFT TYPE AND FLT DIRECTOR SYMBOL. PLTS MEL VERY BRIEF AND PRIMARILY INDICATES ONLY IF THE SYS CAN BE DISPATCHED INOP. INST IS TIED IN WITH THE ADI AND BOTH THE CAPT AND F/O'S INSTS WERE EFFECTED IN THIS INCIDENT--ONLY APCH MINIMUMS WERE CHANGED. COULD NOT EXPLAIN WHY THE INST WOULD NOT BE BIASED OUT OF VIEW WHEN THE PWR WAS INTERRUPTED BY PULLING THE CB. FEELS A SIMPLE FIX IS AVAILABLE SINCE THE BARS ARE BIASED OUT OF VIEW WHEN THE AC PWR IS INTERRUPTED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.