Narrative:

Clearance was den #1 SID, J17 ama-dfw. During cockpit setup, captain and first officer both set radials of J13 (185 degree right) rather than J17 (155 degree right) in vors. Missed the error during 2 checklists, 2 briefings, and at intercept 1 after T/O north, departure control clearance was 'left turn, heading 160 degree' then later 'heading 140 degree intercept the arwy, maintain 10000'.' we intercepted J13 (185 degree right). Departure control asked our heading, then restated clearance 'heading 140 degree, intercept J17.' we did it right the second time. Our error may have caused a 'loss of sep.' factors. We were all extremely concerned with traffic watch around den airport, particularly 'byson-drake' inbound. Traffic, descending to 11000'. TCAS operating in a TA mode. I think that our concern with other traffic precise altitude control, watching TCAS, etc diverted our attention from navigating properly. Corrective action. Be sure crew sets controls properly to start with. I think it would be easier nd safer for controllers to give us a heading to fly until we're out of air traffic area, rather than us trying to intercept a right so close to the VOR. We could intercept the arwy 15 or 20 mi out and therefore not have so many things happening at one time. TCAS may be more of a distraction than help. Supplemental information from acn 176853. It has never been more obvious to me that in cockpit crew assignments are going to have to be made to #1 somebody fly airplane (altitude and heading). #2 somebody watch outside for traffic. #3 somebody watch TCAS if alert arises.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR CREW SETS WRONG RADIAL FOR AIRWAY ASSIGNED. HEADING DEVIATION. TCASII DISTR, MANY TAS.

Narrative: CLRNC WAS DEN #1 SID, J17 AMA-DFW. DURING COCKPIT SETUP, CAPT AND F/O BOTH SET RADIALS OF J13 (185 DEG R) RATHER THAN J17 (155 DEG R) IN VORS. MISSED THE ERROR DURING 2 CHKLISTS, 2 BRIEFINGS, AND AT INTERCEPT 1 AFTER T/O N, DEP CTL CLRNC WAS 'L TURN, HDG 160 DEG' THEN LATER 'HDG 140 DEG INTERCEPT THE ARWY, MAINTAIN 10000'.' WE INTERCEPTED J13 (185 DEG R). DEP CTL ASKED OUR HDG, THEN RESTATED CLRNC 'HDG 140 DEG, INTERCEPT J17.' WE DID IT RIGHT THE SEC TIME. OUR ERROR MAY HAVE CAUSED A 'LOSS OF SEP.' FACTORS. WE WERE ALL EXTREMELY CONCERNED WITH TFC WATCH AROUND DEN ARPT, PARTICULARLY 'BYSON-DRAKE' INBND. TFC, DSNDING TO 11000'. TCAS OPERATING IN A TA MODE. I THINK THAT OUR CONCERN WITH OTHER TFC PRECISE ALT CTL, WATCHING TCAS, ETC DIVERTED OUR ATTN FROM NAVIGATING PROPERLY. CORRECTIVE ACTION. BE SURE CREW SETS CTLS PROPERLY TO START WITH. I THINK IT WOULD BE EASIER ND SAFER FOR CTLRS TO GIVE US A HDG TO FLY UNTIL WE'RE OUT OF ATA, RATHER THAN US TRYING TO INTERCEPT A R SO CLOSE TO THE VOR. WE COULD INTERCEPT THE ARWY 15 OR 20 MI OUT AND THEREFORE NOT HAVE SO MANY THINGS HAPPENING AT ONE TIME. TCAS MAY BE MORE OF A DISTR THAN HELP. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 176853. IT HAS NEVER BEEN MORE OBVIOUS TO ME THAT IN COCKPIT CREW ASSIGNMENTS ARE GOING TO HAVE TO BE MADE TO #1 SOMEBODY FLY AIRPLANE (ALT AND HDG). #2 SOMEBODY WATCH OUTSIDE FOR TFC. #3 SOMEBODY WATCH TCAS IF ALERT ARISES.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.