Narrative:

During takeoff roll; after 80 kt.s; master caution illuminated briefly. First officer (first officer) didn't say anything at first. Then he said 'over temp'. I looked at the speed and it was 125 kts. I looked down at the engine instruments and the #2 engine N1 numerical presentation was displayed in red with a red box around it. I looked back at the speed and it was 131 kts. V1 was 134 kts. I immediately applied the phase one and rejected. First officer did not call tower to advise our reject. After taxiing clear; I noticed a level one engine 2 exceedance . Ran appropriate checklists and taxied back to the gate. This was the second time in the same day that this aircraft rejected for the same thing. Maintenance ended up replacing the engine fan speed sensor.poor analysis; troubleshooting and resolution of the same issue earlier that morning.the maintenance sign off of the morning's reject before I got the airplane was a joke. Both rejects in this aircraft that day are extremely serious in nature and the first of the two wasn't treated as such. That kind of maintenance practice is gonna get someone killed. It's an understatement to say rejecting 3 knots before V1 is highly dangerous. Further; I would have rejected at a much lower speed had my first officer been doing his job correctly. I don't think he was looking at the engine instruments during the takeoff roll as he should have been. When the master caution came on; I doubt he wasn't looking where he should have been to notice the alert. And when he finally did notice the alert; he said the wrong problem. He said 'over temp'. There was no over temp it was pretty clearly spelled out in amber 'engine 2 exceedance' is this the result of him not bringing his a game to work that day? Is this the result of poor training? Is this the result of hiring low hour [type aircraft] pilots directly to the right seat of a heavy? Whatever the case; I was on my own during this one.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Air Carrier Captain reported a rejected takeoff complicated by First Officer being slow to recognize an engine issue close to refusal speed.

Narrative: During takeoff roll; after 80 kt.s; Master Caution illuminated briefly. FO (First Officer) didn't say anything at first. Then he said 'over temp'. I looked at the speed and it was 125 kts. I looked down at the engine instruments and the #2 engine N1 numerical presentation was displayed in red with a red box around it. I looked back at the speed and it was 131 kts. V1 was 134 kts. I immediately applied the Phase One and rejected. FO did not call tower to advise our reject. After taxiing clear; I noticed a Level One ENG 2 EXCEEDANCE . Ran appropriate checklists and taxied back to the gate. This was the second time in the same day that this aircraft rejected for the same thing. Maintenance ended up replacing the engine fan speed sensor.Poor analysis; troubleshooting and resolution of the same issue earlier that morning.The maintenance sign off of the morning's reject before I got the airplane was a joke. Both rejects in this aircraft that day are extremely serious in nature and the first of the two wasn't treated as such. That kind of maintenance practice is gonna get someone killed. It's an understatement to say rejecting 3 knots before V1 is highly dangerous. Further; I would have rejected at a much lower speed had my FO been doing his job correctly. I don't think he was looking at the engine instruments during the takeoff roll as he should have been. When the Master Caution came on; I doubt he wasn't looking where he should have been to notice the alert. And when he finally did notice the alert; he said the wrong problem. He said 'over temp'. There was no over temp it was pretty clearly spelled out in amber 'ENG 2 EXCEEDANCE' Is this the result of him not bringing his A Game to work that day? Is this the result of poor training? Is this the result of hiring low hour [type aircraft] pilots directly to the right seat of a heavy? Whatever the case; I was on my own during this one.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.