Narrative:

I was PIC and pm (pilot monitoring) for this flight. The flight started off normally; everything from gate to initial takeoff was normal. Just after the 80 kt call I smelled something electrical burning; I glanced to my left and saw white/blueish hazy smoke; I performed an aborted takeoff. After bringing the aircraft to a stop a master warning for lav smoke aft appeared. I asked my first officer (first officer) to review the qrc for anything related to lav smoke while I called the flight attendants. The flight attendants reported seeing and smelling hazy smoke in the cabin and did not report any visible fire. When we were asked by ATC if we required any assistance we told them we do require assistance. First officer remarked that the smoke was causing him eye irritation. I talked to the flight attendants again and they said passengers could see and smell the same things we were. I briefly considered making a U turn to clear the runway and in a blur of thought I considered the following. I have electrical smelling hazy smoke from the flight deck to the aft lav and in the cabin; this all occurred from just before the abort to stopping. I do not know where it is originating from or how much time I have before the suspected problem becomes an immediate threat to the passengers and crew. If it is indeed electrical I need to cut power to the aircraft and get the people to safety. All of these thoughts went through my head as we asked for assistance.I told my first officer to get ready to run the evacuation/expedited deplaning qrc and notified the flight attendants that we would be performing an expedited deplaning through the main cabin door and to assess and wait for my command. We ran the qrc; I advised the passengers to follow the direction of the flight attendants. Upon completion of the qrc my first officer grabbed the fire extinguisher and exited the aircraft to direct passengers to a safe location. I remained at the flight deck door until all passengers were off the aircraft. I swept the lavs and cabin to confirm that all passengers were off and followed the last flight attendant off the aircraft. I coordinated with my crew via my first officer to keep the passengers together and to not answer questions; or give statements. While I was on the phone with operations and then the maintenance manager all the passengers were accounted for and arrangements were make to take the passengers the terminal and tow the aircraft to a gate. I filled out [a report] for the event and maintenance asked me to wright up two separate [discrepancy reports]; one for the smoke and the other for the rejected takeoff. The crew and I got to the crew lounge to start filling out [reports] we were all happy that the passengers were safe. I was confident that I followed the correct procedure to minimize any injury to the passengers while deplaning; I am still confident in those decisions. What surprised me was being told by my assistant chief pilot that the expedited deplaning procedure was now an aircraft at the gate procedure only and that that I performed the wrong procedure. I had completely forgot that a while back that an email was sent out outlining the new procedure. In the heat of the moment during the abort my mind reverted to my last training event; my caption check ride. During my training and on my check ride I had run the expedited deplaning procedure and knew it was safest way I could quickly get passengers off the aircraft for the given situation. I was asked when I went to [recurrent training]; I told him I am scheduled for this upcoming october. He told me that this years [training] was training the new procedure and drilling it in the sim; I had no idea. I do remember briefly seeing the email for the change in procedure. I would suggest for changes to emergency procedures be accompanied with cbt; even if it just highlights the new changes and provides examples of how the new procedure looks in action. I know events like this are rare and we train for these events andwhen we have to perform these procedures on the line we fall back on what we were trained to do. Having a cbt would help all pilots understand the changes and see how the new procedures are performed by example.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Air carrier Captain reported an uneventful RTO event followed by a safe passenger evacuation due to electrical burning fumes during takeoff roll.

Narrative: I was PIC and PM (Pilot Monitoring) for this flight. The flight started off normally; everything from gate to initial takeoff was normal. Just after the 80 kt call I smelled something electrical burning; I glanced to my left and saw white/blueish hazy smoke; I performed an aborted takeoff. After bringing the aircraft to a stop a master warning for Lav smoke aft appeared. I asked my FO (First Officer) to review the QRC for anything related to Lav Smoke while I called the flight attendants. The flight attendants reported seeing and smelling hazy smoke in the cabin and did not report any visible fire. When we were asked by ATC if we required any assistance we told them we do require assistance. First Officer remarked that the smoke was causing him eye irritation. I talked to the flight attendants again and they said passengers could see and smell the same things we were. I briefly considered making a U turn to clear the runway and in a blur of thought I considered the following. I have electrical smelling hazy smoke from the flight deck to the aft lav and in the cabin; this all occurred from just before the abort to stopping. I do not know where it is originating from or how much time I have before the suspected problem becomes an immediate threat to the passengers and crew. If it is indeed electrical I need to cut power to the aircraft and get the people to safety. All of these thoughts went through my head as we asked for assistance.I told my FO to get ready to run the Evacuation/Expedited Deplaning QRC and Notified the flight attendants that we would be performing an expedited deplaning through the main cabin door and to assess and wait for my command. We ran the QRC; I advised the passengers to follow the direction of the flight attendants. Upon completion of the QRC my FO grabbed the fire extinguisher and exited the aircraft to direct passengers to a safe location. I remained at the flight deck door until all passengers were off the aircraft. I swept the lavs and cabin to confirm that all passengers were off and followed the last flight attendant off the aircraft. I coordinated with my crew via my FO to keep the passengers together and to not answer questions; or give statements. While I was on the phone with Operations and then the Maintenance Manager all the passengers were accounted for and arrangements were make to take the passengers the terminal and tow the aircraft to a gate. I filled out [a report] for the event and maintenance asked me to wright up two separate [discrepancy reports]; one for the smoke and the other for the rejected takeoff. The crew and I got to the crew lounge to start filling out [reports] we were all happy that the passengers were safe. I was confident that I followed the correct procedure to minimize any injury to the passengers while deplaning; I am still confident in those decisions. What surprised me was being told by my assistant chief pilot that the expedited deplaning procedure was now an aircraft at the gate procedure only and that that I performed the wrong procedure. I had completely forgot that a while back that an email was sent out outlining the new procedure. In the heat of the moment during the abort my mind reverted to my last training event; my caption check ride. During my training and on my check ride I had run the expedited deplaning procedure and knew it was safest way I could quickly get passengers off the aircraft for the given situation. I was asked when I went to [recurrent training]; I told him I am scheduled for this upcoming October. He told me that this years [training] was training the new procedure and drilling it in the sim; I had no idea. I do remember briefly seeing the email for the change in procedure. I would suggest for changes to emergency procedures be accompanied with CBT; even if it just highlights the new changes and provides examples of how the new procedure looks in action. I know events like this are rare and we train for these events andwhen we have to perform these procedures on the line we fall back on what we were trained to do. Having a CBT would help all pilots understand the changes and see how the new procedures are performed by example.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.