Narrative:

Flight XXX departed elp-hou. Before departure, I had amended his release to change his alternate from crp to sat, and iah also had similar amendments, and a convective SIGMET was in effect for a trw line on a shv-GGG-cll axis moving from 2840. I briefed the PIC on all this. The normal ATC route was elp-J2-fst-J138-sat-lissez-hou. Later, the trw's developed further southwest along the axis, and extended to crp, stilling moving 2840. I accessed the NWS radar at gls, and it appeared that the line was 40-50 NM from iah/hou. I contacted XXX via company radio abeam sjt and advised him of all this, plus my recommendation that he slow from U74 to lrc to delay his arrival, including holding in the ela area so as to allow the WX to clear hou, and an approach from behind the line. The captain concurred. I expected to hear from XXX in the ela area about 30 mins later, but didn't, and was unable to reestablish contact via radio. I was advised that XXX had contacted a nearby company station, and relayed the message that he was proceeding to crp to go around to the east side of the line. The line was about 10 NM out of iah/hou at this time, and my repeated attempts to contact were to no avail. Flight XXX shot an approach to hou runway 4, but missed approach due to the WX, and came around and landed on 30L. The WX hit shortly thereafter. As I later discussed with the captain, while I wasn't trying to usurp his PIC authority, I was concurrently trying to keep the operation safe, and trying to minimize economic impact to the company. Had XXX held over ela area (as other company flts were), he would have only consumed another $300 in fuel. I chose to spend that money to prevent exposing the crew and passenger to a trw event, and to also prevent the flight from getting trapped on the east side of the line (which built to almost lrp after XXX turned it at crp). Had XXX not made it into hou, I would have diverted him to bpt (a non company station) and held him there until the line cleared there, 2 hours later. The total cost for such a diversion (fuel, aircraft/crew time, hotels for misconnected passenger) would have come to about $7000. After almost 15 yrs of dispatching, it continues to amaze me how little some crews and management really understand about operational control and how it affects the airline. Since most dedicated airline departments disappeared after 1978's deregulation, more responsibility falls upon us, but we often get only minimal company support (computers, decent VHF communication system, staff, etc), and indifference from many crews who don't/can't see us for the resource that we are.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR MLG FLT CREW FAILED TO RESPOND TO DISPATCHER'S RECOMMENDATION AND PROCEEDED TO DESTINATION.

Narrative: FLT XXX DEPARTED ELP-HOU. BEFORE DEP, I HAD AMENDED HIS RELEASE TO CHANGE HIS ALTERNATE FROM CRP TO SAT, AND IAH ALSO HAD SIMILAR AMENDMENTS, AND A CONVECTIVE SIGMET WAS IN EFFECT FOR A TRW LINE ON A SHV-GGG-CLL AXIS MOVING FROM 2840. I BRIEFED THE PIC ON ALL THIS. THE NORMAL ATC RTE WAS ELP-J2-FST-J138-SAT-LISSEZ-HOU. LATER, THE TRW'S DEVELOPED FURTHER SW ALONG THE AXIS, AND EXTENDED TO CRP, STILLING MOVING 2840. I ACCESSED THE NWS RADAR AT GLS, AND IT APPEARED THAT THE LINE WAS 40-50 NM FROM IAH/HOU. I CONTACTED XXX VIA COMPANY RADIO ABEAM SJT AND ADVISED HIM OF ALL THIS, PLUS MY RECOMMENDATION THAT HE SLOW FROM U74 TO LRC TO DELAY HIS ARR, INCLUDING HOLDING IN THE ELA AREA SO AS TO ALLOW THE WX TO CLR HOU, AND AN APCH FROM BEHIND THE LINE. THE CAPT CONCURRED. I EXPECTED TO HEAR FROM XXX IN THE ELA AREA ABOUT 30 MINS LATER, BUT DIDN'T, AND WAS UNABLE TO REESTABLISH CONTACT VIA RADIO. I WAS ADVISED THAT XXX HAD CONTACTED A NEARBY COMPANY STATION, AND RELAYED THE MESSAGE THAT HE WAS PROCEEDING TO CRP TO GO AROUND TO THE E SIDE OF THE LINE. THE LINE WAS ABOUT 10 NM OUT OF IAH/HOU AT THIS TIME, AND MY REPEATED ATTEMPTS TO CONTACT WERE TO NO AVAIL. FLT XXX SHOT AN APCH TO HOU RWY 4, BUT MISSED APCH DUE TO THE WX, AND CAME AROUND AND LANDED ON 30L. THE WX HIT SHORTLY THEREAFTER. AS I LATER DISCUSSED WITH THE CAPT, WHILE I WASN'T TRYING TO USURP HIS PIC AUTHORITY, I WAS CONCURRENTLY TRYING TO KEEP THE OPERATION SAFE, AND TRYING TO MINIMIZE ECONOMIC IMPACT TO THE COMPANY. HAD XXX HELD OVER ELA AREA (AS OTHER COMPANY FLTS WERE), HE WOULD HAVE ONLY CONSUMED ANOTHER $300 IN FUEL. I CHOSE TO SPEND THAT MONEY TO PREVENT EXPOSING THE CREW AND PAX TO A TRW EVENT, AND TO ALSO PREVENT THE FLT FROM GETTING TRAPPED ON THE E SIDE OF THE LINE (WHICH BUILT TO ALMOST LRP AFTER XXX TURNED IT AT CRP). HAD XXX NOT MADE IT INTO HOU, I WOULD HAVE DIVERTED HIM TO BPT (A NON COMPANY STATION) AND HELD HIM THERE UNTIL THE LINE CLRED THERE, 2 HRS LATER. THE TOTAL COST FOR SUCH A DIVERSION (FUEL, ACFT/CREW TIME, HOTELS FOR MISCONNECTED PAX) WOULD HAVE COME TO ABOUT $7000. AFTER ALMOST 15 YRS OF DISPATCHING, IT CONTINUES TO AMAZE ME HOW LITTLE SOME CREWS AND MGMNT REALLY UNDERSTAND ABOUT OPERATIONAL CTL AND HOW IT AFFECTS THE AIRLINE. SINCE MOST DEDICATED AIRLINE DEPARTMENTS DISAPPEARED AFTER 1978'S DEREGULATION, MORE RESPONSIBILITY FALLS UPON US, BUT WE OFTEN GET ONLY MINIMAL COMPANY SUPPORT (COMPUTERS, DECENT VHF COM SYS, STAFF, ETC), AND INDIFFERENCE FROM MANY CREWS WHO DON'T/CAN'T SEE US FOR THE RESOURCE THAT WE ARE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.