Narrative:

During cruise at FL280, approximately 280 KIAS/.74 mach, the first officer's windscreen began a slow, gradual crack on outer pane. It started on window edge right side, and after several mins it extended to left side window edge. While cracking was in progress, we asked for and received a clearance to 14000'. We also advised ATC we would be reducing to 250 KIAS. During the descent and slow down process, we accomplished the appropriate abnormal checklist procedure. Although checklist does not require a slowdown or descent, my plan was to be cautious and conservative, plus be set up if the situation deteriorated. The checklist procedure addresses a cracked outer pane as a minor problem. At this time, we were about 100 NM out and we asked for and received clearance to go direct the airport. At no time to my knowledge did we received any traffic priority, nor was any expected. We did not declare an emergency because I did not feel it was a critical or emergency situation. After we were established at 14000' and 250 KIAS for some time, center asked us why we had wanted lower and slower. In answer to his question, I told him we had what looked like a cracked window pane and I wanted lower and slower as a precaution. There was no other inquiry. When we got handed over to approach control, they asked us if we wanted equipment standing by. I responded with a negative and told them we were, 'negative emergency.' after landing we noticed there had been fire equipment standing by near the runway. In fact, during taxi-in, ground control asked us if we still needed the 'equipment.' we told them we did not need it and had not asked for it. It appears that ATC thought this was an emergency situation and was handling us as if we were an emergency aircraft, when in fact we were not.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MLG SLOWS DOWN AND DESCENDS AS A PRECAUTION WHEN A CRACK APPEARS IN THE OUTER (NON STRUCTURAL) PANE OF THE WIND SHIELD.

Narrative: DURING CRUISE AT FL280, APPROX 280 KIAS/.74 MACH, THE F/O'S WINDSCREEN BEGAN A SLOW, GRADUAL CRACK ON OUTER PANE. IT STARTED ON WINDOW EDGE RIGHT SIDE, AND AFTER SEVERAL MINS IT EXTENDED TO LEFT SIDE WINDOW EDGE. WHILE CRACKING WAS IN PROGRESS, WE ASKED FOR AND RECEIVED A CLRNC TO 14000'. WE ALSO ADVISED ATC WE WOULD BE REDUCING TO 250 KIAS. DURING THE DSNT AND SLOW DOWN PROCESS, WE ACCOMPLISHED THE APPROPRIATE ABNORMAL CHKLIST PROC. ALTHOUGH CHKLIST DOES NOT REQUIRE A SLOWDOWN OR DSNT, MY PLAN WAS TO BE CAUTIOUS AND CONSERVATIVE, PLUS BE SET UP IF THE SITUATION DETERIORATED. THE CHKLIST PROC ADDRESSES A CRACKED OUTER PANE AS A MINOR PROB. AT THIS TIME, WE WERE ABOUT 100 NM OUT AND WE ASKED FOR AND RECEIVED CLRNC TO GO DIRECT THE ARPT. AT NO TIME TO MY KNOWLEDGE DID WE RECEIVED ANY TFC PRIORITY, NOR WAS ANY EXPECTED. WE DID NOT DECLARE AN EMER BECAUSE I DID NOT FEEL IT WAS A CRITICAL OR EMER SITUATION. AFTER WE WERE ESTABLISHED AT 14000' AND 250 KIAS FOR SOME TIME, CENTER ASKED US WHY WE HAD WANTED LOWER AND SLOWER. IN ANSWER TO HIS QUESTION, I TOLD HIM WE HAD WHAT LOOKED LIKE A CRACKED WINDOW PANE AND I WANTED LOWER AND SLOWER AS A PRECAUTION. THERE WAS NO OTHER INQUIRY. WHEN WE GOT HANDED OVER TO APCH CTL, THEY ASKED US IF WE WANTED EQUIP STANDING BY. I RESPONDED WITH A NEGATIVE AND TOLD THEM WE WERE, 'NEGATIVE EMER.' AFTER LNDG WE NOTICED THERE HAD BEEN FIRE EQUIP STANDING BY NEAR THE RWY. IN FACT, DURING TAXI-IN, GND CTL ASKED US IF WE STILL NEEDED THE 'EQUIP.' WE TOLD THEM WE DID NOT NEED IT AND HAD NOT ASKED FOR IT. IT APPEARS THAT ATC THOUGHT THIS WAS AN EMER SITUATION AND WAS HANDLING US AS IF WE WERE AN EMER ACFT, WHEN IN FACT WE WERE NOT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.