Narrative:

Shortly after takeoff I noticed a moldy odor in the cockpit. I at first thought it to be the cargo from the previous trip (potted palm trees-very moldy) but then the smell progressed to a burning smell. By this time I was with departure control (124.8) passing 4000' en route direct to lanai airport VFR. I decided at this point to turn around and sort out the problem on the ground. I attempted to notify ATC but my transmitter chose this moment to quit, probably (in retrospect) low voltage. I therefore put 7700 in the transponder, waited a short time-very short 1-2 sweeps, shut down the entire electrical system (3 switches to isolate everything) and began a right turn back to the airport. I then began shutting each electrical item off individually. After all were shut off, I turned on port bus only and electrical master and radio master. This got me radios. I call approach advised that I would be returning for a precautionary landing. Incidentally, if this had happened in any other civilized country I would have declared an emergency. But in the USA declaring an emergency in my experience is extremely hazardous to one's career (yes, this did go through my mind during the problem). I turned around once before at a towered field in springfield, il, and a gentleman from the springfield GADO met me and the fire trucks and started an incident report on the ramp, which of course means when you go for an airline job that you have to answer 'yes' to the question: have you ever had an accident or incident? Thereby destroying (nearly) my career before it even got started. For in fact doing the prudent thing. I believe as do many of my colleagues that this sort of overreaction (if you will) from the enforcement arm of the FAA is more dangerous to aviation than the electrical failure I experienced, simply because it enters into a pilot's judgement in times of crisis. Anyway, back to the narrative. I told approach that I would be shutting off the radios and looking for the light sun. He in a heads up professional way cleared me to land, runway 4R and taxi to the ramp. I then shut the radios off and made a normal landing. The problem turned out to be a runway hydraulic pump (they are intermittent duty motors malfunction) which overheated and blew the breaker a bit late at the motor appears to be destroyed. There was enough residual hydraulic pressure to accomplish getting the flaps down and making a normal landing. Hydraulic system on runs flaps elevator trim, nose wheel steering, brakes, emergency accumulator. As this is a STOL aircraft and hnl runway 4R is very big, I elected not to mess with the emergency accumulator and just landed, steering with engines only, something our company trains, encourages us to practice due to icy conditions we operate in in alaska. I then taxied to the ramp, gave the firemen the information they needed and felt around the hydraulic pump to confirm that it was the problem. It was. Suggest better type breaker (sloblo?) to trip motor off line sooner, brighter hydraulic pump operation light. Also the servicing procedure for the hydraulic system is not well written in the skypan maintenance manual and I believe low fluid may have been contributory to this occurrence. I feel the biggest change to improve safety would be to get the enforcement arm of the FAA to react with fewer teeth bared to such occurrences. I have wasted 4 hours of my off duty time conversing with the FAA, hnl FSDO, today. I would not be inclined to even tell anyone there was a problem in the future based on these two experiences.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: BURNING ODOR IN COCKPIT DURING CLIMB PERSUADED PLT OF FREIGHTER TO RETURN LAND. PLT WAS ABLE TO RECOVER RADIO COM LONG ENOUGH TO RECEIVE CLRNC TO LAND AND TAXI TO RAMP.

Narrative: SHORTLY AFTER TKOF I NOTICED A MOLDY ODOR IN THE COCKPIT. I AT FIRST THOUGHT IT TO BE THE CARGO FROM THE PREVIOUS TRIP (POTTED PALM TREES-VERY MOLDY) BUT THEN THE SMELL PROGRESSED TO A BURNING SMELL. BY THIS TIME I WAS WITH DEP CTL (124.8) PASSING 4000' ENRTE DIRECT TO LANAI ARPT VFR. I DECIDED AT THIS POINT TO TURN AROUND AND SORT OUT THE PROB ON THE GND. I ATTEMPTED TO NOTIFY ATC BUT MY XMITTER CHOSE THIS MOMENT TO QUIT, PROBABLY (IN RETROSPECT) LOW VOLTAGE. I THEREFORE PUT 7700 IN THE XPONDER, WAITED A SHORT TIME-VERY SHORT 1-2 SWEEPS, SHUT DOWN THE ENTIRE ELECTRICAL SYS (3 SWITCHES TO ISOLATE EVERYTHING) AND BEGAN A R TURN BACK TO THE ARPT. I THEN BEGAN SHUTTING EACH ELECTRICAL ITEM OFF INDIVIDUALLY. AFTER ALL WERE SHUT OFF, I TURNED ON PORT BUS ONLY AND ELECTRICAL MASTER AND RADIO MASTER. THIS GOT ME RADIOS. I CALL APCH ADVISED THAT I WOULD BE RETURNING FOR A PRECAUTIONARY LNDG. INCIDENTALLY, IF THIS HAD HAPPENED IN ANY OTHER CIVILIZED COUNTRY I WOULD HAVE DECLARED AN EMER. BUT IN THE USA DECLARING AN EMER IN MY EXPERIENCE IS EXTREMELY HAZARDOUS TO ONE'S CAREER (YES, THIS DID GO THROUGH MY MIND DURING THE PROB). I TURNED AROUND ONCE BEFORE AT A TOWERED FIELD IN SPRINGFIELD, IL, AND A GENTLEMAN FROM THE SPRINGFIELD GADO MET ME AND THE FIRE TRUCKS AND STARTED AN INCIDENT RPT ON THE RAMP, WHICH OF COURSE MEANS WHEN YOU GO FOR AN AIRLINE JOB THAT YOU HAVE TO ANSWER 'YES' TO THE QUESTION: HAVE YOU EVER HAD AN ACCIDENT OR INCIDENT? THEREBY DESTROYING (NEARLY) MY CAREER BEFORE IT EVEN GOT STARTED. FOR IN FACT DOING THE PRUDENT THING. I BELIEVE AS DO MANY OF MY COLLEAGUES THAT THIS SORT OF OVERREACTION (IF YOU WILL) FROM THE ENFORCEMENT ARM OF THE FAA IS MORE DANGEROUS TO AVIATION THAN THE ELECTRICAL FAILURE I EXPERIENCED, SIMPLY BECAUSE IT ENTERS INTO A PLT'S JUDGEMENT IN TIMES OF CRISIS. ANYWAY, BACK TO THE NARRATIVE. I TOLD APCH THAT I WOULD BE SHUTTING OFF THE RADIOS AND LOOKING FOR THE LIGHT SUN. HE IN A HEADS UP PROFESSIONAL WAY CLRED ME TO LAND, RWY 4R AND TAXI TO THE RAMP. I THEN SHUT THE RADIOS OFF AND MADE A NORMAL LNDG. THE PROB TURNED OUT TO BE A RWY HYD PUMP (THEY ARE INTERMITTENT DUTY MOTORS MALFUNCTION) WHICH OVERHEATED AND BLEW THE BREAKER A BIT LATE AT THE MOTOR APPEARS TO BE DESTROYED. THERE WAS ENOUGH RESIDUAL HYD PRESSURE TO ACCOMPLISH GETTING THE FLAPS DOWN AND MAKING A NORMAL LNDG. HYD SYS ON RUNS FLAPS ELEVATOR TRIM, NOSE WHEEL STEERING, BRAKES, EMER ACCUMULATOR. AS THIS IS A STOL ACFT AND HNL RWY 4R IS VERY BIG, I ELECTED NOT TO MESS WITH THE EMER ACCUMULATOR AND JUST LANDED, STEERING WITH ENGS ONLY, SOMETHING OUR COMPANY TRAINS, ENCOURAGES US TO PRACTICE DUE TO ICY CONDITIONS WE OPERATE IN IN ALASKA. I THEN TAXIED TO THE RAMP, GAVE THE FIREMEN THE INFO THEY NEEDED AND FELT AROUND THE HYD PUMP TO CONFIRM THAT IT WAS THE PROB. IT WAS. SUGGEST BETTER TYPE BREAKER (SLOBLO?) TO TRIP MOTOR OFF LINE SOONER, BRIGHTER HYD PUMP OPERATION LIGHT. ALSO THE SVCING PROC FOR THE HYD SYS IS NOT WELL WRITTEN IN THE SKYPAN MAINT MANUAL AND I BELIEVE LOW FLUID MAY HAVE BEEN CONTRIBUTORY TO THIS OCCURRENCE. I FEEL THE BIGGEST CHANGE TO IMPROVE SAFETY WOULD BE TO GET THE ENFORCEMENT ARM OF THE FAA TO REACT WITH FEWER TEETH BARED TO SUCH OCCURRENCES. I HAVE WASTED 4 HRS OF MY OFF DUTY TIME CONVERSING WITH THE FAA, HNL FSDO, TODAY. I WOULD NOT BE INCLINED TO EVEN TELL ANYONE THERE WAS A PROB IN THE FUTURE BASED ON THESE TWO EXPERIENCES.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.