Narrative:

We were given clearance to take off runway 15 and given notification of traffic 2 miles final runway 19 into dca. At around 80 knots we received the EICAS master warning message door crg fwd open. We rejected the takeoff and began to slow on centerline while maintaining control of the aircraft. We notified tower and were given instructions to turn right onto taxiway M and hold short runway 19. We exited runway 15 at about 20-25 knots. Given those instructions it was my understanding that there was ample room on taxiway M to exit the active runway 15. I planned to exit the runway; stop on M; and handle the situation. However; there is no room on taxiway M in between runway 15 and runway 19 to stop while remaining clear of both active runways. By the time this was realized while turning the aircraft and noticing the poor runway markings; we came to a stop with our nose approximately five feet over the hold-short line for runway 19. Tower instructed the landing aircraft to go around and we were given clearance to cross runway 19. Ground gave me a phone number to call and while talking with the individual I expressed my concern with how that instruction was almost impossible to comply with. Given that we need to clear the threshold of 15 to be clear of the active runway there; it is impossible to be clear of both active runways at taxiway M. The situation was made even more difficult given it was a rejected takeoff; creating a high-stress workload. The individual on the phone stated he understood that it is hard to do and that they have known that for some time. I accepted responsibility for the mistake. The cause of the incursion was a high-stress workload caused by a rejected takeoff and possible emergency situation. This combined with ambiguous instructions from tower and poorly labeled runway markings created enough confusion for me to cross over the hold-short line for runway 19. Looking back; it would have been much easier; either through ATC instruction or by crew suggestion; to instead roll to the end of runway 15 (about 1500-2000 feet beyond taxiway M) and exit at F. There is ample room there and even a runup pad to pull to the side. The short distance at taxiway M does not provide enough room for an aircraft to clear runway 15 and be compliant; while simultaneously holding short of runway 19. Exiting the runway a bit slower (despite the high-speed cutaway) would have given me more time to assess the given distance.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Air carrier flight crew reported a runway incursion after a rejected takeoff. Flight crew stated poorly labeled runway markings at DCA airport contributed to the event.

Narrative: We were given clearance to take off Runway 15 and given notification of traffic 2 miles final Runway 19 into DCA. At around 80 knots we received the EICAS master warning message DOOR CRG FWD OPEN. We rejected the takeoff and began to slow on centerline while maintaining control of the aircraft. We notified Tower and were given instructions to turn right onto Taxiway M and hold short Runway 19. We exited Runway 15 at about 20-25 knots. Given those instructions it was my understanding that there was ample room on Taxiway M to exit the active Runway 15. I planned to exit the runway; stop on M; and handle the situation. However; there is no room on Taxiway M in between Runway 15 and Runway 19 to stop while remaining clear of both active runways. By the time this was realized while turning the aircraft and noticing the poor runway markings; we came to a stop with our nose approximately five feet over the hold-short line for Runway 19. Tower instructed the landing aircraft to go around and we were given clearance to cross Runway 19. Ground gave me a phone number to call and while talking with the individual I expressed my concern with how that instruction was almost impossible to comply with. Given that we need to clear the threshold of 15 to be clear of the active runway there; it is impossible to be clear of both active runways at Taxiway M. The situation was made even more difficult given it was a rejected takeoff; creating a high-stress workload. The individual on the phone stated he understood that it is hard to do and that they have known that for some time. I accepted responsibility for the mistake. The cause of the incursion was a high-stress workload caused by a rejected takeoff and possible emergency situation. This combined with ambiguous instructions from Tower and poorly labeled runway markings created enough confusion for me to cross over the hold-short line for Runway 19. Looking back; it would have been much easier; either through ATC instruction or by crew suggestion; to instead roll to the end of Runway 15 (about 1500-2000 feet beyond Taxiway M) and exit at F. There is ample room there and even a runup pad to pull to the side. The short distance at Taxiway M does not provide enough room for an aircraft to clear Runway 15 and be compliant; while simultaneously holding short of Runway 19. Exiting the runway a bit slower (despite the high-speed cutaway) would have given me more time to assess the given distance.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.