Narrative:

A frontal system had moved through ZJX airspace. Stretching from the gulf of mexico northeast all the way to north carolina. The ride reports from the pilots had been negative all shift. There was a hole in the front near cty VOR. All of the traffic going through the central area was going through that one hole. At one point the controller at R17 reported severe turbulence from an aircraft at the flight level in the mid to high 30's. Right before this I was returning from break to relieve the os (operations supervisor) on duty in the central. Once that report came though we both were helping to run the area. We informed the omic (operations manager in charge); and he came down to monitor. He told us to keep getting pilot reports from aircraft that were also going through the same area of weather to see if the report was an isolated incident.after getting a few more reports; multiple aircraft had a difficult time maintaining altitude and there were multiple new reports of severe turbulence. Upon receiving the additional reports the omic decided to stop having aircraft go through that one hole in the weather. We told the sector north of the sector with all the severe turbulence reports to start pushing the aircraft east since there was a report of a new hold near the sav VOR in the east area. We coordinated with ZTL to start routing aircraft through that hole and to not send aircraft south. The east area was given a heads up and the os split the appropriate sectors off for the increased workload. After some time had passed the os in the east area asked us to stop sending aircraft that way due to an additional 9 severe turbulence reports. At this time there was no safe way to traverse the front. It stretched too far north and too far south to go around it and there was no hole to attempt to get through it that didn't have multiple severe turbulence reports.a ground stop order was given to alleviate the complexity that the front had caused and to keep more aircraft from having to fly into it. The ground stop order was given too late and the volume that was already in the air was not helped at all by being driven into the weather. Later that night I was on the watch desk and the front had pushed through to the coast line. Aircraft in the ocean sectors in the north area were trapped on the east side of the front with multiple deviations and the workload and complexity were high. I called ZDC to ask when they think they might not be able to take any more aircraft since the weather would make them deviate further and further east. The ZDC supervisor that I talked to on the phone said I needed to start rerouting aircraft into the hanri sector going into ZNY which would let them go even further east and away from the front and bad rides. The controllers working the ocean sectors were far too busy to put in and give reroutes to every plane they had so I coordinated with tmu to shut down the ar traffic from ZMA unless they were going to ZNY hanri sector. They put the request in and I was told it was denied by the command center.all of this started to happen roughly around xa:15 pm; but the front was a known even from that morning. There was no stmc and the whole plan was being run by a controller in charge in tmu. It seems as if when we get severe weather in ZJX we run until we can't and there is rarely a back up plan. When the weather gets too intense or the aircraft cannot deviate a certain way; whether its due to volume or more likely military airspace; the controllers are the ones caught in the middle trying to stay safe and get the aircraft where they need to go. In situations like this a ground stop worked for future aircraft but did not help the airborne volume and was not implemented in time. As of now there are no reports of injuries due to the severe turbulence that I'm aware of; but I feel like it would have been a different story if there was a report of severe turbulence and then an injury occurred on an aircraft after the initialreport. Our task is for the safe efficient and expeditious flow of traffic. It feels as if after days like this one safety can be negated for the expeditious. There was risked introduced into the NAS by not having a plan or even an idea of what to do with the airborne aircraft after the second hole had multiple severe turbulence reports. I worked as a supervisor and a controller on this shift and in both rolls I made sure that the option to hold was given to the aircraft instead of letting them keep on going through the front. It did not seem as if that option was given to the aircraft coming from the north. There was moderate chop reported all day and the rides deteriorated closer to the front. If you are too busy to put in all your moderate turbulence reports; which was told to me by some east area controllers; then you cannot pass along the information into the PIREP system to get other aircraft going through the stretch of airspace a fighting chance. The situation snowballs into what we ended up with; which was an unsafe event.the plan was not implemented early enough and nothing was really done to help the aircraft that were already airborne.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Jacksonville Center Controller reported severe weather in the sectors lead to rerouting of several aircraft.

Narrative: A frontal system had moved through ZJX airspace. Stretching from the Gulf of Mexico northeast all the way to North Carolina. The ride reports from the pilots had been negative all shift. There was a hole in the front near CTY VOR. All of the traffic going through the central area was going through that one hole. At one point the Controller at R17 reported severe turbulence from an aircraft at the flight level in the mid to high 30's. Right before this I was returning from break to relieve the OS (Operations Supervisor) on duty in the central. Once that report came though we both were helping to run the area. We informed the OMIC (Operations Manager In Charge); and he came down to monitor. He told us to keep getting pilot reports from aircraft that were also going through the same area of weather to see if the report was an isolated incident.After getting a few more reports; multiple aircraft had a difficult time maintaining altitude and there were multiple new reports of severe turbulence. Upon receiving the additional reports the OMIC decided to stop having aircraft go through that one hole in the weather. We told the sector north of the sector with all the severe turbulence reports to start pushing the aircraft east since there was a report of a new hold near the SAV VOR in the east area. We coordinated with ZTL to start routing aircraft through that hole and to not send aircraft south. The east area was given a heads up and the OS split the appropriate sectors off for the increased workload. After some time had passed the OS in the east area asked us to stop sending aircraft that way due to an additional 9 severe turbulence reports. At this time there was no safe way to traverse the front. It stretched too far north and too far south to go around it and there was no hole to attempt to get through it that didn't have multiple severe turbulence reports.A ground stop order was given to alleviate the complexity that the front had caused and to keep more aircraft from having to fly into it. The ground stop order was given too late and the volume that was already in the air was not helped at all by being driven into the weather. Later that night I was on the watch desk and the front had pushed through to the coast line. Aircraft in the ocean sectors in the north area were trapped on the east side of the front with multiple deviations and the workload and complexity were high. I called ZDC to ask when they think they might not be able to take any more aircraft since the weather would make them deviate further and further east. The ZDC Supervisor that I talked to on the phone said I needed to start rerouting aircraft into the HANRI sector going into ZNY which would let them go even further east and away from the front and bad rides. The controllers working the ocean sectors were far too busy to put in and give reroutes to every plane they had so I coordinated with TMU to shut down the AR traffic from ZMA unless they were going to ZNY HANRI sector. They put the request in and I was told it was denied by the command center.All of this started to happen roughly around XA:15 pm; but the front was a known even from that morning. There was no STMC and the whole plan was being run by a CIC in TMU. It seems as if when we get severe weather in ZJX we run until we can't and there is rarely a back up plan. When the weather gets too intense or the aircraft cannot deviate a certain way; whether its due to volume or more likely military airspace; the controllers are the ones caught in the middle trying to stay safe and get the aircraft where they need to go. In situations like this a ground stop worked for future aircraft but did not help the airborne volume and was not implemented in time. As of now there are no reports of injuries due to the severe turbulence that I'm aware of; but I feel like it would have been a different story if there was a report of severe turbulence and then an injury occurred on an aircraft after the initialreport. Our task is for the safe efficient and expeditious flow of traffic. It feels as if after days like this one safety can be negated for the expeditious. There was risked introduced into the NAS by not having a plan or even an idea of what to do with the airborne aircraft after the second hole had multiple severe turbulence reports. I worked as a supervisor and a controller on this shift and in both rolls I made sure that the option to hold was given to the aircraft instead of letting them keep on going through the front. It did not seem as if that option was given to the aircraft coming from the north. There was moderate chop reported all day and the rides deteriorated closer to the front. If you are too busy to put in all your moderate turbulence reports; which was told to me by some east area controllers; then you cannot pass along the information into the PIREP system to get other aircraft going through the stretch of airspace a fighting chance. The situation snowballs into what we ended up with; which was an unsafe event.The plan was not implemented early enough and nothing was really done to help the aircraft that were already airborne.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.