Narrative:

My first flight of the summer season, making a strange approach into palo alto airport for first time. I did insufficient flight planning due to outside pressures pre-empting my research time. I was picking up a passenger at palo alto who has his plane stationed there, and I knew that after landing, he would know all the 'numbers' and procedures. He had told me how to approach palo alto, and how to avoid the sfo TCA. It simply did not occur to me that a small airport like palo alto would have a control tower. One reason for this is that I fly regularly to visalia in the summers, and they do not, at that large, busy airport. The san francisco sectional is very crowded with detail, and the 'ct' frequency was not terribly plain. My flight guide showed the unicom frequency with great clarity, but the control tower frequency was confused by the notation 'CTAF', which is a recent change in terminology, and in my mind a negative one. What can be the purpose of adding 'af' (advisory frequency) to something that is crystal clear in meaning, the 'ct' (control tower?) in this case, it was this verbal proliferation which was my undoing. I would have instantly read 'ct', and thus would not have made the incursion/airspace violation. The rest of the incident merely involved my making a proper route approach to palo alto, making the proper reports to the unicom advisory frequency, with, of course, no communication to the tower. While on final, I noted a very slow aircraft departing, probably a motor-sailor plane like a fournier, plus an aircraft in the position and hold area. Because of the fact that the runway was not in a situation in which I could land, I went around, and of course in initiating the go-around, I noted the control tower visly, and realized what the whole situation was. I could not stay behind the slow motor-sailor in front, so I make an early turn behind him to right downwind (from runway 30) because I could see another aircraft in pattern, and so surmised that right traffic was in force. From that point, I continued in downwind on heading 120 until reaching the point where I could turn westbound to the foothills whence I had come, in order to figure out what to do next. In extending if the palo alto right downwind, I concerned myself with going out far enough so that my turn to the west would occur below the glidepath of landing palo alto traffic. In doing the downwind extension, I probably went into moffett field airspace, but inasmuch as I was nicely in their downwind as well, it seemed less hazardous than cutting across the palo alto glidepath. Upon vacating the area, I found the right numbers (palo alto ATIS and tower), and returned to palo alto and landed. Of course, the tower chief explained to me in great detail all the things that I had done wrong, but his actions were courteous and proper. 5 factors contributed to this incident: the bad notation, 'CTAF'. My reliance on the palo alto 'native' that getting into there was easy, and allowing him to, in effect, do my only 'real' preflight planning or research. At home, we had company the night before, which is my normal time to research a flying trip, followed by a heavy conference with my boss the following morning immediately before takeoff. The overriding concern on my part with the san francisco TCA, with the exclusion of concern about the approach per southeast into palo alto airport itself. It was my first flight in several months, I fly a lot in the summers, for business, but fly hardly at all during the winter months.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: SMA PLT WITH POOR PREFLT PLANNING PENETRATES ATA, UNAWARE OF TWR.

Narrative: MY FIRST FLT OF THE SUMMER SEASON, MAKING A STRANGE APCH INTO PALO ALTO ARPT FOR FIRST TIME. I DID INSUFFICIENT FLT PLANNING DUE TO OUTSIDE PRESSURES PRE-EMPTING MY RESEARCH TIME. I WAS PICKING UP A PAX AT PALO ALTO WHO HAS HIS PLANE STATIONED THERE, AND I KNEW THAT AFTER LNDG, HE WOULD KNOW ALL THE 'NUMBERS' AND PROCS. HE HAD TOLD ME HOW TO APCH PALO ALTO, AND HOW TO AVOID THE SFO TCA. IT SIMPLY DID NOT OCCUR TO ME THAT A SMALL ARPT LIKE PALO ALTO WOULD HAVE A CTL TWR. ONE REASON FOR THIS IS THAT I FLY REGULARLY TO VISALIA IN THE SUMMERS, AND THEY DO NOT, AT THAT LARGE, BUSY ARPT. THE SAN FRANCISCO SECTIONAL IS VERY CROWDED WITH DETAIL, AND THE 'CT' FREQ WAS NOT TERRIBLY PLAIN. MY FLT GUIDE SHOWED THE UNICOM FREQ WITH GREAT CLARITY, BUT THE CTL TWR FREQ WAS CONFUSED BY THE NOTATION 'CTAF', WHICH IS A RECENT CHANGE IN TERMINOLOGY, AND IN MY MIND A NEGATIVE ONE. WHAT CAN BE THE PURPOSE OF ADDING 'AF' (ADVISORY FREQ) TO SOMETHING THAT IS CRYSTAL CLR IN MEANING, THE 'CT' (CTL TWR?) IN THIS CASE, IT WAS THIS VERBAL PROLIFERATION WHICH WAS MY UNDOING. I WOULD HAVE INSTANTLY READ 'CT', AND THUS WOULD NOT HAVE MADE THE INCURSION/AIRSPACE VIOLATION. THE REST OF THE INCIDENT MERELY INVOLVED MY MAKING A PROPER RTE APCH TO PALO ALTO, MAKING THE PROPER RPTS TO THE UNICOM ADVISORY FREQ, WITH, OF COURSE, NO COM TO THE TWR. WHILE ON FINAL, I NOTED A VERY SLOW ACFT DEPARTING, PROBABLY A MOTOR-SAILOR PLANE LIKE A FOURNIER, PLUS AN ACFT IN THE POS AND HOLD AREA. BECAUSE OF THE FACT THAT THE RWY WAS NOT IN A SITUATION IN WHICH I COULD LAND, I WENT AROUND, AND OF COURSE IN INITIATING THE GO-AROUND, I NOTED THE CTL TWR VISLY, AND REALIZED WHAT THE WHOLE SITUATION WAS. I COULD NOT STAY BEHIND THE SLOW MOTOR-SAILOR IN FRONT, SO I MAKE AN EARLY TURN BEHIND HIM TO R DOWNWIND (FROM RWY 30) BECAUSE I COULD SEE ANOTHER ACFT IN PATTERN, AND SO SURMISED THAT R TFC WAS IN FORCE. FROM THAT POINT, I CONTINUED IN DOWNWIND ON HDG 120 UNTIL REACHING THE POINT WHERE I COULD TURN WBND TO THE FOOTHILLS WHENCE I HAD COME, IN ORDER TO FIGURE OUT WHAT TO DO NEXT. IN EXTENDING IF THE PALO ALTO R DOWNWIND, I CONCERNED MYSELF WITH GOING OUT FAR ENOUGH SO THAT MY TURN TO THE W WOULD OCCUR BELOW THE GLIDEPATH OF LNDG PALO ALTO TFC. IN DOING THE DOWNWIND EXTENSION, I PROBABLY WENT INTO MOFFETT FIELD AIRSPACE, BUT INASMUCH AS I WAS NICELY IN THEIR DOWNWIND AS WELL, IT SEEMED LESS HAZARDOUS THAN CUTTING ACROSS THE PALO ALTO GLIDEPATH. UPON VACATING THE AREA, I FOUND THE R NUMBERS (PALO ALTO ATIS AND TWR), AND RETURNED TO PALO ALTO AND LANDED. OF COURSE, THE TWR CHIEF EXPLAINED TO ME IN GREAT DETAIL ALL THE THINGS THAT I HAD DONE WRONG, BUT HIS ACTIONS WERE COURTEOUS AND PROPER. 5 FACTORS CONTRIBUTED TO THIS INCIDENT: THE BAD NOTATION, 'CTAF'. MY RELIANCE ON THE PALO ALTO 'NATIVE' THAT GETTING INTO THERE WAS EASY, AND ALLOWING HIM TO, IN EFFECT, DO MY ONLY 'REAL' PREFLT PLANNING OR RESEARCH. AT HOME, WE HAD COMPANY THE NIGHT BEFORE, WHICH IS MY NORMAL TIME TO RESEARCH A FLYING TRIP, FOLLOWED BY A HVY CONFERENCE WITH MY BOSS THE FOLLOWING MORNING IMMEDIATELY BEFORE TKOF. THE OVERRIDING CONCERN ON MY PART WITH THE SAN FRANCISCO TCA, WITH THE EXCLUSION OF CONCERN ABOUT THE APCH PER SE INTO PALO ALTO ARPT ITSELF. IT WAS MY FIRST FLT IN SEVERAL MONTHS, I FLY A LOT IN THE SUMMERS, FOR BUSINESS, BUT FLY HARDLY AT ALL DURING THE WINTER MONTHS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.