Narrative:

During a repositioning flight departing from ZZZ climbing through 15;000 ft.; the first officer and I noticed that the cabin altitude displayed 8;800 ft. In amber and was climbing slowly. We were cleared to 17;000 ft.; and upon reaching; the cabin aural warning had just gone off and the displayed altitude of 10;500 ft. Was in red. Upon noticing this; we coordinated with ATC to descend to 15;000 ft. In order to help with the pressurization. Reaching 15;000 ft.; we ran the QRH and determined that the manual controller knob was not in the auto position (full left); but was closer to the dump position. After correcting the knob's position back to auto; the plane began to re-pressurize. We stayed at 15;000 ft. For a few minutes to assist with the pressurization and once it achieved safe levels; we began a slow climb to our final altitude of 21;000 ft.. We then continued the flight with constant monitoring of the system and no further issues.the issue was detected by the flight crew during climb out and noticing that the cabin altitude on the EICAS was abnormal.the cause of this event was due both pilots missing items at certain points. During the first officer's final cockpit scan; the landing field elevation was selected but the knob's position was not fully verified. Also; during climb out and the after takeoff checklist; the pilot monitoring didn't effectively check the pressurization.the flight crew reacted appropriately to the issue by leveling off to troubleshoot; descending to help with the pressurization; and running the QRH and discovering the problem. We also continued to monitor the situation for the remainder of the flight.there are certainly a few things to suggest here. First; it is vitally important that both crew members thoroughly review everything all the time; especially with a plane that has just come out of maintenance. Second; it is equally important to make sure checklists are run to their completion - meaning that the expanded portions of the checklists are also adhered to. Lastly; I would suggest that; if possible; maintenance goes over the actions taken and switches moved with the flight crew before a repo flight leaves any station. While it is the responsibility of the crew to conduct a safe and compliant flight; it is often assumed that maintenance has done their best to leave the plane as a crew would receive it on the line. Sometimes there are switches and lights out of place; but I have never experienced an item as important as pressurization until now. I will continue to be exceptionally vigilant in the future.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ERJ 145 air carrier Flight Crew reported that during climb; the cabin pressurization was not climbing correctly. It was determined that the manual controller knob was set closer to the dump position; instead of in the auto position.

Narrative: During a repositioning flight departing from ZZZ climbing through 15;000 ft.; the First Officer and I noticed that the cabin altitude displayed 8;800 ft. in amber and was climbing slowly. We were cleared to 17;000 ft.; and upon reaching; the cabin aural warning had just gone off and the displayed altitude of 10;500 ft. was in red. Upon noticing this; we coordinated with ATC to descend to 15;000 ft. in order to help with the pressurization. Reaching 15;000 ft.; we ran the QRH and determined that the manual controller knob was not in the auto position (full left); but was closer to the dump position. After correcting the knob's position back to auto; the plane began to re-pressurize. We stayed at 15;000 ft. for a few minutes to assist with the pressurization and once it achieved safe levels; we began a slow climb to our final altitude of 21;000 ft.. We then continued the flight with constant monitoring of the system and no further issues.The issue was detected by the flight crew during climb out and noticing that the cabin altitude on the EICAS was abnormal.The cause of this event was due both pilots missing items at certain points. During the FO's final cockpit scan; the landing field elevation was selected but the knob's position was not fully verified. Also; during climb out and the after takeoff checklist; the Pilot Monitoring didn't effectively check the pressurization.The Flight Crew reacted appropriately to the issue by leveling off to troubleshoot; descending to help with the pressurization; and running the QRH and discovering the problem. We also continued to monitor the situation for the remainder of the flight.There are certainly a few things to suggest here. First; it is vitally important that both crew members thoroughly review everything all the time; especially with a plane that has just come out of maintenance. Second; it is equally important to make sure checklists are run to their completion - meaning that the expanded portions of the checklists are also adhered to. Lastly; I would suggest that; if possible; Maintenance goes over the actions taken and switches moved with the Flight Crew before a repo flight leaves any station. While it is the responsibility of the crew to conduct a safe and compliant flight; it is often assumed that maintenance has done their best to leave the plane as a crew would receive it on the line. Sometimes there are switches and lights out of place; but I have never experienced an item as important as pressurization until now. I will continue to be exceptionally vigilant in the future.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.