Narrative:

Earlier in the trip; the first officer (first officer) was rushing and executed FMC navigation changes before I had a chance to verify them. I asked him to slow down and give me a chance to verify before he executed changes and he accommodated my request. I also noted that the first officer was doing what almost all [company] pilots do when an altitude change came in. He dialed in the new altitude on the MCP (mode control panel); pointed at it; stated it and began the climb or descent with no input from the other pilot. I did not counsel him about this because that is so commonly the way altitude changes are handled; despite guidance to the contrary in the fom.on the flight in question; we were on an assigned heading when the controller cleared us direct and a climb to FL390. As I read back the clearance; I observed the first officer dial 39000 in the MCP; point at it and state 'three nine oh' and press the altitude intervention button. I verified that FL390 came up as the target altitude on the mcdu (multi-function control and display unit). While I was verifying that the aircraft was beginning to climb; the first officer brought up [clearance point] on the FMC legs page 1. I verified the programming was correct and stated; 'that looks good' and watched him execute the change. I took my attention back to the altitude and could see by then that the aircraft was beginning a climb and the thrust was increasing. I never confirmed that the first officer selected LNAV or that the aircraft turned [to comply with clearance]. A few minutes later the controller called and pointed out our error. We then took the proper procedural steps to get the airplane on course.slow down. I think guys feel like when they get two items in a clearance; they have to rush or they'll forget one of them. I think if we simply slow down and work methodically; we'll make fewer errors. Obviously; I failed to properly monitor the situation. I think if [company] focused on and insisted upon proper altitude change procedures; it would force the cockpit crew to slow down and not move on to the lateral part of the clearance until the vertical part had been worked through as a team.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737NG Captain reported a track deviation occurred when the crew let themselves get rushed in executing a clearance change.

Narrative: Earlier in the trip; the First Officer (FO) was rushing and executed FMC navigation changes before I had a chance to verify them. I asked him to slow down and give me a chance to verify before he executed changes and he accommodated my request. I also noted that the First Officer was doing what almost all [company] pilots do when an altitude change came in. He dialed in the new altitude on the MCP (Mode Control Panel); pointed at it; stated it and began the climb or descent with no input from the other pilot. I did not counsel him about this because that is so commonly the way altitude changes are handled; despite guidance to the contrary in the FOM.On the flight in question; we were on an assigned heading when the Controller cleared us direct and a climb to FL390. As I read back the clearance; I observed the FO dial 39000 in the MCP; point at it and state 'three nine oh' and press the altitude intervention button. I verified that FL390 came up as the target altitude on the MCDU (Multi-Function Control and Display Unit). While I was verifying that the aircraft was beginning to climb; the First Officer brought up [clearance point] on the FMC Legs Page 1. I verified the programming was correct and stated; 'That looks good' and watched him execute the change. I took my attention back to the altitude and could see by then that the aircraft was beginning a climb and the thrust was increasing. I never confirmed that the First Officer selected LNAV or that the aircraft turned [to comply with clearance]. A few minutes later the Controller called and pointed out our error. We then took the proper procedural steps to get the airplane on course.Slow down. I think guys feel like when they get two items in a clearance; they have to rush or they'll forget one of them. I think if we simply slow down and work methodically; we'll make fewer errors. Obviously; I failed to properly monitor the situation. I think if [company] focused on and insisted upon proper altitude change procedures; it would force the cockpit crew to slow down and not move on to the lateral part of the clearance until the vertical part had been worked through as a team.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.