Narrative:

I was PF (pilot flying). Captain was pm (pilot monitoring). I performed the walk around in VMC and did not observe any evidence of a bird strike on #1 engine. We uneventfully started our engines; taxied for runway 31; and prepared for takeoff. ATIS called for 'airport bird activity-exercise caution.' I forgot to brief this element during my departure briefing. We performed a normal takeoff roll to rotation. Neither pilot observed any individual or flocking birds. As we climbed through 200 ft. AGL; we both smelled the classic 'burnt chicken' odor of a bird strike. We did not see or hear any evidence of a bird strike. Upon sensing the odor; I immediately scanned the engine indications. All indications (then and throughout the flight) showed within normal range and married closely between engines. The pungent odor lasted maybe 15-20 seconds. It was gone by the acceleration altitude. The climb out and rest of the flight was normal. The captain and I discussed the event. His view was that it was a non-event and could not be isolated to when we climbed out. It might have occurred already and not been reported. He was correct. He gave me the impression that further investigation was not required. I initiated a personal review of the logbook; aom; fom; and QRH concerning the bird strike. The logbook did not have any bird strike entries recently. The aom and fom did not preclude us from operating the aircraft to the destination given the normal condition of the engines. However; it did stipulate that a maintenance inspection would be required for a suspected bird strike upon landing. I spoke politely and directly to the captain that I agreed that we could operate the aircraft but that I also thought that that this was a bird strike-even if the only evidence was an odor. Upon arrival in ZZZ; I inspected both engines and found evidence of a bird strike on the #1 engine (blade 10 of the hbf (high bypass fan) had a smear on it and feathers were lodged in the next compressor section behind the hbf). At this point; the next crew for the aircraft had arrived and I explained the event and then showed them the #1 evidence. Operations brought out maintenance for an inspection and I departed the aircraft. The new captain made the logbook entry.I think that we all have different comfort levels for operational issues. I think the captain and I viewed the importance of this issue on different scales. I did my best to convey my concern that we meet the company procedural standard for an engine bird strike. I know that there was scant evidence supporting it; beyond the smell; but the smell is why I did a post flight walk around; where I would find the visual evidence of the bird strike. I have now experienced several significant aircraft engine malfunctions in my aviation career that had no flight deck indications. Flight deck indications are only one (albeit probably most important and telling) of a maintenance event. I thought a deeper investigation and in flight coordination with dispatch for ZZZ was warranted. I accept that the captain did not; and we did not pursue that course of action.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 First Officer reported a bird strike on takeoff that resulted in a maintenance action at the destination airport.

Narrative: I was PF (Pilot Flying). Captain was PM (Pilot Monitoring). I performed the walk around in VMC and did not observe any evidence of a bird strike on #1 engine. We uneventfully started our engines; taxied for Runway 31; and prepared for takeoff. ATIS called for 'airport bird activity-exercise caution.' I forgot to brief this element during my Departure Briefing. We performed a normal takeoff roll to rotation. Neither Pilot observed any individual or flocking birds. As we climbed through 200 ft. AGL; we both smelled the classic 'burnt chicken' odor of a bird strike. We did not see or hear any evidence of a bird strike. Upon sensing the odor; I immediately scanned the engine indications. All indications (then and throughout the flight) showed within normal range and married closely between engines. The pungent odor lasted maybe 15-20 seconds. It was gone by the acceleration altitude. The climb out and rest of the flight was normal. The Captain and I discussed the event. His view was that it was a non-event and could not be isolated to when we climbed out. It might have occurred already and not been reported. He was correct. He gave me the impression that further investigation was not required. I initiated a personal review of the logbook; AOM; FOM; and QRH concerning the bird strike. The logbook did not have any bird strike entries recently. The AOM and FOM did not preclude us from operating the aircraft to the destination given the normal condition of the engines. However; it did stipulate that a Maintenance inspection would be required for a suspected bird strike upon landing. I spoke politely and directly to the Captain that I agreed that we could operate the aircraft but that I also thought that that this was a bird strike-even if the only evidence was an odor. Upon arrival in ZZZ; I inspected both engines and found evidence of a bird strike on the #1 engine (Blade 10 of the HBF (High Bypass Fan) had a smear on it and feathers were lodged in the next compressor section behind the HBF). At this point; the next crew for the aircraft had arrived and I explained the event and then showed them the #1 evidence. Operations brought out Maintenance for an inspection and I departed the aircraft. The new Captain made the logbook entry.I think that we all have different comfort levels for operational issues. I think the Captain and I viewed the importance of this issue on different scales. I did my best to convey my concern that we meet the Company procedural standard for an engine bird strike. I know that there was scant evidence supporting it; beyond the smell; but the smell is why I did a post flight walk around; where I would find the visual evidence of the bird strike. I have now experienced several significant aircraft engine malfunctions in my aviation career that had no flight deck indications. Flight deck indications are only one (albeit probably most important and telling) of a maintenance event. I thought a deeper investigation and in flight coordination with Dispatch for ZZZ was warranted. I accept that the Captain did not; and we did not pursue that course of action.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.