Narrative:

Initial clearance required aircraft to be at or above 14000' over mso VOR eastbound to intercept flight planned route. As we were climbing through 10500' MSL departure control requested a level off at 12000' MSL for traffic. The captain requested vector for climb (not realizing mso departure control a non-radar), departure instructed us to turn right direct salmon VOR maintain 12000'. This clearance was not satisfactory to either of us since it did not result in climb clearance. Captain requested to proceed as filed on V2 to dru. Controller stated 'roger, standby.' we both understood this to mean cleared to proceed as filed standby for climb. In just a min or so he cleared us to climb to FL370 and cleared an medium large transport Y to descend to 10000'. As I started the climb, the second officer noticed traffic on our TCAS ii display and pointed it out to me visly. He was still 7 mi away opp direction. I leveled off at 12000' and made a slight course correction to the left to increase sep. Our TCAS ii also did its job and gave a traffic advisory. We never had a conflict advisory. As it turned out, departure control never understood our desire to remain 'as filed' and thought we had turned south to salmon VOR, therefore, he issued climb and descend clrncs to put us in conflict. This controller had 3 airplanes in his airspace (on IFR plans) 2 inbound and us outbnd. He seemed confused and disorganized making very lengthly and disorganized radio calls to each of us. He asked each of us several times location, altitude, and direction of flight as if he could not keep track of it. In our case the captain was obsessed with climbing he also forgot we were not in radar contact from an already over taxed controller precipitated this communication breakdown. Fortunately due to the sharp eyes of the pilot in both airplanes, the clear WX, and a functioning TCAS ii system, there was never any threat of a conflict. Supplemental information from acn 168365. I was told to maintain 12000'. I asked for a climb and vector southbound. Mso departure said maintain 12000' and turn right to salmon, he would get back to me. I said we would just continue to dru. Departure said 'roger, standby.' we picked the medium large transport Y flight up on TCAS ii and visly. It passed 2-3 mi south and 700' higher. At that point we realized departure didn't realize we had continued to dru on his 'roger'. The medium large transport Y was never a near miss problem, but our TCAS ii really was of great value in giving us a safety margin during the clearance misunderstanding. My lesson is I won't deviate from any canned clearance in a non-radar environment.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: LGT DEVIATED FROM CLEARED ROUTE AND CAUSES LESS THAN STANDARD SEPARATION WITH MLG INBOUND. NON RADAR DEP CTL.

Narrative: INITIAL CLRNC REQUIRED ACFT TO BE AT OR ABOVE 14000' OVER MSO VOR EBND TO INTERCEPT FLT PLANNED RTE. AS WE WERE CLBING THROUGH 10500' MSL DEP CTL REQUESTED A LEVEL OFF AT 12000' MSL FOR TFC. THE CAPT REQUESTED VECTOR FOR CLB (NOT REALIZING MSO DEP CTL A NON-RADAR), DEP INSTRUCTED US TO TURN R DIRECT SALMON VOR MAINTAIN 12000'. THIS CLRNC WAS NOT SATISFACTORY TO EITHER OF US SINCE IT DID NOT RESULT IN CLB CLRNC. CAPT REQUESTED TO PROCEED AS FILED ON V2 TO DRU. CTLR STATED 'ROGER, STANDBY.' WE BOTH UNDERSTOOD THIS TO MEAN CLRED TO PROCEED AS FILED STANDBY FOR CLB. IN JUST A MIN OR SO HE CLRED US TO CLB TO FL370 AND CLRED AN MLG Y TO DSND TO 10000'. AS I STARTED THE CLB, THE S/O NOTICED TFC ON OUR TCAS II DISPLAY AND POINTED IT OUT TO ME VISLY. HE WAS STILL 7 MI AWAY OPP DIRECTION. I LEVELED OFF AT 12000' AND MADE A SLIGHT COURSE CORRECTION TO THE L TO INCREASE SEP. OUR TCAS II ALSO DID ITS JOB AND GAVE A TFC ADVISORY. WE NEVER HAD A CONFLICT ADVISORY. AS IT TURNED OUT, DEP CTL NEVER UNDERSTOOD OUR DESIRE TO REMAIN 'AS FILED' AND THOUGHT WE HAD TURNED S TO SALMON VOR, THEREFORE, HE ISSUED CLB AND DSND CLRNCS TO PUT US IN CONFLICT. THIS CTLR HAD 3 AIRPLANES IN HIS AIRSPACE (ON IFR PLANS) 2 INBND AND US OUTBND. HE SEEMED CONFUSED AND DISORGANIZED MAKING VERY LENGTHLY AND DISORGANIZED RADIO CALLS TO EACH OF US. HE ASKED EACH OF US SEVERAL TIMES LOCATION, ALT, AND DIRECTION OF FLT AS IF HE COULD NOT KEEP TRACK OF IT. IN OUR CASE THE CAPT WAS OBSESSED WITH CLBING HE ALSO FORGOT WE WERE NOT IN RADAR CONTACT FROM AN ALREADY OVER TAXED CTLR PRECIPITATED THIS COM BREAKDOWN. FORTUNATELY DUE TO THE SHARP EYES OF THE PLT IN BOTH AIRPLANES, THE CLR WX, AND A FUNCTIONING TCAS II SYS, THERE WAS NEVER ANY THREAT OF A CONFLICT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 168365. I WAS TOLD TO MAINTAIN 12000'. I ASKED FOR A CLB AND VECTOR SBND. MSO DEP SAID MAINTAIN 12000' AND TURN R TO SALMON, HE WOULD GET BACK TO ME. I SAID WE WOULD JUST CONTINUE TO DRU. DEP SAID 'ROGER, STANDBY.' WE PICKED THE MLG Y FLT UP ON TCAS II AND VISLY. IT PASSED 2-3 MI S AND 700' HIGHER. AT THAT POINT WE REALIZED DEP DIDN'T REALIZE WE HAD CONTINUED TO DRU ON HIS 'ROGER'. THE MLG Y WAS NEVER A NEAR MISS PROB, BUT OUR TCAS II REALLY WAS OF GREAT VALUE IN GIVING US A SAFETY MARGIN DURING THE CLRNC MISUNDERSTANDING. MY LESSON IS I WON'T DEVIATE FROM ANY CANNED CLRNC IN A NON-RADAR ENVIRONMENT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.