Narrative:

First officer (first officer) flying approach to xxl called for flaps 2 while decelerating through 190 kias and received F/control flaps locked alignment fault ECAM. We performed go around and advised ATC. We retracted flaps to zero which we should not have done; but I was flustered as was the first officer and I were afraid he would over speed the flaps. Retracting them did not make our situation worse however. Ran through ECAM and QRH for the appropriate condition with the assistance of a jump seating [company] pilot who was also a captain on the airbus. The jump seater had us rush into the QRH before running the ECAM which caused some initial confusion for us as to what slat/flap situation we had; but we got it sorted out. We performed runway landing performance distance calculation and reviewed flaps abnormal landing profile. [Coordinated] with ATC and asked for equipment to be standing by. Gave flight attendants test briefing. I did not ask them to prepare the cabin for an evacuation as I was confident we could easily stop on the long runway at ZZZ as the performance calculation showed; but for special instructions I did ask them to review [evacuation] procedures in their heads just in case. Made a PA announcement that we had a flap irregularity and would be making another approach at a higher airspeed than normal and that they would see emergency equipment standing by as a precaution. Had jump seater send ACARS message to dispatch advising of situation. I took over as PF (pilot flying). ECAM and QRH guidance had us put the flap lever to position 3 for a slats 3 flaps 0 landing. Configured before descent on approach as recommended by abnormal flaps landing profile. Used autopilot down to about 700'agl. Firm touchdown near 1000' markers and brought nose gear down quickly. Used medium auto brakes and full reverse that allowed us to only use a little over half the runway before stopping.once passengers disembarked at the gate I asked the first officer if he felt okay to continue with next scheduled leg to ZZZ1. He said he did feel well enough as did I. When the [chief pilot] asked if we wanted to continue I told him we felt well enough to continue with the next flight. About half way to ZZZ1 we both felt like we should have not flown the next leg. When something like this happens you have an adrenaline rush that lasts for some time; but when that goes away you feel totally drained. Not to mention you are replaying the events in your mind which is a distraction. I thought to myself; if another emergency had occurred on the next leg would I handle it as well as I could in the condition I was in? The answer is no. When these events happen crews should not even be asked to continue. They should be removed automatically with no questions asked. They are not in a good position to judge their fitness for duty after an event like this. This needs to change.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A320 flight crew reported a flap locked alignment fault.

Narrative: FO (First Officer) flying approach to XXL called for flaps 2 while decelerating through 190 kias and received F/CTL FLAPS LOCKED ALIGNMENT FAULT ECAM. We performed go around and advised ATC. We retracted flaps to zero which we should not have done; but I was flustered as was the FO and I were afraid he would over speed the flaps. Retracting them did not make our situation worse however. Ran through ECAM and QRH for the appropriate condition with the assistance of a jump seating [company] pilot who was also a Captain on the Airbus. The jump seater had us rush into the QRH before running the ECAM which caused some initial confusion for us as to what slat/flap situation we had; but we got it sorted out. We performed runway landing performance distance calculation and reviewed flaps abnormal landing profile. [Coordinated] with ATC and asked for equipment to be standing by. Gave flight attendants TEST briefing. I did not ask them to prepare the cabin for an evacuation as I was confident we could easily stop on the long runway at ZZZ as the performance calculation showed; but for special instructions I did ask them to review [evacuation] procedures in their heads just in case. Made a PA announcement that we had a flap irregularity and would be making another approach at a higher airspeed than normal and that they would see emergency equipment standing by as a precaution. Had jump seater send ACARS message to dispatch advising of situation. I took over as PF (Pilot Flying). ECAM and QRH guidance had us put the flap lever to position 3 for a slats 3 flaps 0 landing. Configured before descent on approach as recommended by abnormal flaps landing profile. Used autopilot down to about 700'agl. Firm touchdown near 1000' markers and brought nose gear down quickly. Used medium auto brakes and full reverse that allowed us to only use a little over half the runway before stopping.Once passengers disembarked at the gate I asked the FO if he felt okay to continue with next scheduled leg to ZZZ1. He said he did feel well enough as did I. When the [Chief Pilot] asked if we wanted to continue I told him we felt well enough to continue with the next flight. About half way to ZZZ1 we both felt like we should have not flown the next leg. When something like this happens you have an adrenaline rush that lasts for some time; but when that goes away you feel totally drained. Not to mention you are replaying the events in your mind which is a distraction. I thought to myself; if another emergency had occurred on the next leg would I handle it as well as I could in the condition I was in? The answer is no. When these events happen crews should not even be asked to continue. They should be removed automatically with no questions asked. They are not in a good position to judge their fitness for duty after an event like this. This needs to change.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.