Narrative:

On approach to the airport; I set up for a GPS runway xx approach. ATC cleared me for the approach. I engaged the aircraft's anti-icing systems well before descending. I engaged the autopilot for assistance; executed all checklists and began a stabilized descent. I entered IMC and encountered a trace rime icing beginning at approximately 8;500 feet. After passing zzzzz; I was approved to switch to advisories and did.reaching [navigation fix]; I turned inbound on the final approach course and began to descend to 4000 MSL. The aircraft was still in IMC. I had made my advisory radio calls to ZZZ and I had the runway lighting system activated to high intensity. Prior to glideslope intercept at ZZZZZ1; I heard a distinct 'crack' noise and the autopilot appeared to come offline. I attempted to diagnose the issue; yet my primary focus was now on hand-flying the aircraft properly. My primary instruments initially appeared to be operational. Very close in time to this; I observed the red 'engine fire' and 'fuel selector off' annunciator warning lights illuminate; but with no corresponding warning horns. This caused me to anticipate a larger electrical loss than I initially suspected.I applied power to stop my descent. It was at this time that I became aware that all engine-indicating instruments were indicating zero (i.e. All turbine engine instruments; including torque; ng; fuel flow and itt; were dead). I applied maximum power at a setting consistent with my earlier in-limit power lever positions in the day.I had no helpful outside visibility at this time; although I could intermittently see the ground beneath the plane and I knew I did not recognize anything I routinely saw on any approach into ZZZ. I radioed to ZZZ that we would not be landing and immediately switched to ZZZ center; [advised ATC]; informed them of the exact nature of my situation and that I required radar assistance to verify my position and climb. ATC advised me that they had lost adsb from my aircraft at about my turn inbound to ZZZ. I still had the visual display of a single garmin 430; although it kept displaying error messages and I had to consider it to be suspect. My instruments at this time had either begun a gyroscopic roll (the primary ai) or were showing flags (my HSI) so they were eliminated from my scan. I had to continually cross check my pitot-static instruments against the right-side pitot-static instruments; given that I was in IMC and had pitot icing blockage considerations. I continued my climb and flew headings based on the wet compass until I broke out of the tops at approximately 10;500 feet. I requested 11;000 feet to remain VMC and asked for assistance reviewing all weather in the area to identify any possible VFR landing resolutions. I am aware of the oxygen limitations this presented; but I opted to remain VMC and out of icing. Unfortunately; at reaching 11;000 feet; the sun was now almost set. It was at this time that I determined all interior lighting was dark and that my instrumentation was becoming harder to see.I carry a pen light in my left arm jacket pocket. Realizing that this was potentially soon my only option of seeing anything; and concerned for dropping it and/or losing battery power; I enlisted the assistance of my front seat passenger as a precaution. I indicated that I would need her to go into my flight bag under her seat and retrieve my full-power flashlight. I had her confirm that she could turn it off and on. I briefed her on where I would need her to point the flashlight so I could navigate the aircraft if I lost the flashlight in my hand. I informed her that it was critical she not drop nor lose the flashlight. I established straight and level flight and requested radar vectors to ZZZ1; which was the closest airport reporting above-freezing temperatures at the surface. Because the aircraft was stuck above what I knew was a minimum of 5000-6000 feet of IMC and potential icing conditions; and because I knew ZZZ1 has a well-maintained and accurate TRSA; I felt this was my best initial option. I also knew that I had topped my aircraft's fuel tanks. Even though the fuel tank indicators were indicating zero; I calculated my worst-case endurance to be at least three more hours.although I knew I had lost a circuit breaker of some sort; it was only about this time that I could finally turn my attention to fully diagnose the issue. With my light; I confirmed that I had lost 5 out of my 9 lead bus circuit breakers - which cut power to over 40 individual electrical systems onboard the aircraft. I attempted to reset each of the 9 lead bus circuit breakers; individually; and with time between each reset. Each would hold for several seconds and then blow again. Although general caravan training and company policy limit circuit breaker resets to one attempt; I had time and the circumstances were emergent. I made the decision to cautiously reattempt each lead circuit breaker breaker reset one more time after this first attempt cycle. During these resets; I made it a point to observe the engine instruments come online long enough to confirm my power settings and observe fuel remaining. Still; each reset resulted in another pop or failure to reset; and I could not risk a fire.I was able to determine that my exterior lighting was impacted (by cycling my left side landing and taxi lights with no resulting illumination) and that my aircraft was now probably unlit from the outside. I also determined primary and standby flaps to be inoperative. I relayed this to ATC.working with ZZZ center; we determined that the ceiling at ZZZ2 was sufficient to coordinate a no-gyro approach attempt to runway xy. Additionally; this would put the aircraft on the ground as quickly as possible without sacrificing my radar coverage assistance. I informed them that I would like to be vectored toward [the] lake for obstacle clearance during the lower portions of the descent and that I required close monitoring because I would be entering icing conditions again. I was not positive that my pitot-static heat was operating on one or both sides; and I had remaining concerns of an ice blockage and the compounding of false information on the few remaining instruments I had available. (I was flying primarily off the wet compass; the single garmin 430 unit and right cockpit side ai; vsi and altimeter at this time). I set up for the approach by placing a vectors-to-final ZZZ2 ILS runway xx in the garmin and putting the appropriate paper plates on my kneeboard. I fully briefed and set up the approach before descending.I initiated the descent and approach. We descended from VMC into IMC around 9;500 MSL. The aircraft accumulated moderate rime icing in the descent. Ice accumulated on the front window and impeded my forward view; which I had anticipated. My window deicing plate was not functioning. At approximately 3;500 MSL (approximatley 2;500 AGL); the aircraft broke out of the bases into marginal VMC. I was able to make out the field and I called for a visual approach to runway xy. I set up for a no-light; no-flaps; landing; and executed the maneuver by side slipping as necessary to maintain runway visibility. I maintained an appropriate airspeed to compensate for the level of icing I anticipated had accumulated in the descent. I landed without incident and cleared the runway at the first available taxiway. The airport was shut down to accommodate our arrival.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: C208 Captain reported an electrical failure during approach in IFR and icing conditions.

Narrative: On approach to the airport; I set up for a GPS RWY XX approach. ATC cleared me for the approach. I engaged the aircraft's anti-icing systems well before descending. I engaged the autopilot for assistance; executed all checklists and began a stabilized descent. I entered IMC and encountered a trace rime icing beginning at approximately 8;500 feet. After passing ZZZZZ; I was approved to switch to advisories and did.Reaching [navigation fix]; I turned inbound on the Final Approach Course and began to descend to 4000 MSL. The aircraft was still in IMC. I had made my advisory radio calls to ZZZ and I had the runway lighting system activated to high intensity. Prior to glideslope intercept at ZZZZZ1; I heard a distinct 'crack' noise and the autopilot appeared to come offline. I attempted to diagnose the issue; yet my primary focus was now on hand-flying the aircraft properly. My primary instruments initially appeared to be operational. Very close in time to this; I observed the red 'ENGINE FIRE' and 'FUEL SELECTOR OFF' annunciator warning lights illuminate; but with no corresponding warning horns. This caused me to anticipate a larger electrical loss than I initially suspected.I applied power to stop my descent. It was at this time that I became aware that all engine-indicating instruments were indicating zero (i.e. all turbine engine instruments; including torque; Ng; fuel flow and ITT; were dead). I applied maximum power at a setting consistent with my earlier in-limit power lever positions in the day.I had no helpful outside visibility at this time; although I could intermittently see the ground beneath the plane and I knew I did not recognize anything I routinely saw on any approach into ZZZ. I radioed to ZZZ that we would not be landing and immediately switched to ZZZ Center; [advised ATC]; informed them of the exact nature of my situation and that I required radar assistance to verify my position and climb. ATC advised me that they had lost ADSB from my aircraft at about my turn inbound to ZZZ. I still had the visual display of a single Garmin 430; although it kept displaying error messages and I had to consider it to be suspect. My instruments at this time had either begun a gyroscopic roll (the primary AI) or were showing flags (my HSI) so they were eliminated from my scan. I had to continually cross check my pitot-static instruments against the right-side pitot-static instruments; given that I was in IMC and had pitot icing blockage considerations. I continued my climb and flew headings based on the wet compass until I broke out of the tops at approximately 10;500 feet. I requested 11;000 feet to remain VMC and asked for assistance reviewing all weather in the area to identify any possible VFR landing resolutions. I am aware of the oxygen limitations this presented; but I opted to remain VMC and out of icing. Unfortunately; at reaching 11;000 feet; the sun was now almost set. It was at this time that I determined all interior lighting was dark and that my instrumentation was becoming harder to see.I carry a pen light in my left arm jacket pocket. Realizing that this was potentially soon my only option of seeing anything; and concerned for dropping it and/or losing battery power; I enlisted the assistance of my front seat passenger as a precaution. I indicated that I would need her to go into my flight bag under her seat and retrieve my full-power flashlight. I had her confirm that she could turn it off and on. I briefed her on where I would need her to point the flashlight so I could navigate the aircraft if I lost the flashlight in my hand. I informed her that it was critical she not drop nor lose the flashlight. I established straight and level flight and requested radar vectors to ZZZ1; which was the closest airport reporting above-freezing temperatures at the surface. Because the aircraft was stuck above what I knew was a minimum of 5000-6000 feet of IMC and potential icing conditions; and because I knew ZZZ1 has a well-maintained and accurate TRSA; I felt this was my best initial option. I also knew that I had topped my aircraft's fuel tanks. Even though the fuel tank indicators were indicating zero; I calculated my worst-case endurance to be at least three more hours.Although I knew I had lost a circuit breaker of some sort; it was only about this time that I could finally turn my attention to fully diagnose the issue. With my light; I confirmed that I had lost 5 out of my 9 lead bus circuit breakers - which cut power to over 40 individual electrical systems onboard the aircraft. I attempted to reset each of the 9 lead bus circuit breakers; individually; and with time between each reset. Each would hold for several seconds and then blow again. Although general Caravan training and company policy limit CB resets to one attempt; I had time and the circumstances were emergent. I made the decision to cautiously reattempt each lead CB breaker reset one more time after this first attempt cycle. During these resets; I made it a point to observe the engine instruments come online long enough to confirm my power settings and observe fuel remaining. Still; each reset resulted in another pop or failure to reset; and I could not risk a fire.I was able to determine that my exterior lighting was impacted (by cycling my left side landing and taxi lights with no resulting illumination) and that my aircraft was now probably unlit from the outside. I also determined primary and standby flaps to be inoperative. I relayed this to ATC.Working with ZZZ Center; we determined that the ceiling at ZZZ2 was sufficient to coordinate a no-gyro approach attempt to RWY XY. Additionally; this would put the aircraft on the ground as quickly as possible without sacrificing my radar coverage assistance. I informed them that I would like to be vectored toward [the] lake for obstacle clearance during the lower portions of the descent and that I required close monitoring because I would be entering icing conditions again. I was not positive that my pitot-static heat was operating on one or both sides; and I had remaining concerns of an ice blockage and the compounding of false information on the few remaining instruments I had available. (I was flying primarily off the wet compass; the single Garmin 430 unit and right cockpit side AI; VSI and altimeter at this time). I set up for the approach by placing a vectors-to-final ZZZ2 ILS RWY XX in the Garmin and putting the appropriate paper plates on my kneeboard. I fully briefed and set up the approach before descending.I initiated the descent and approach. We descended from VMC into IMC around 9;500 MSL. The aircraft accumulated moderate rime icing in the descent. Ice accumulated on the front window and impeded my forward view; which I had anticipated. My window deicing plate was not functioning. At approximately 3;500 MSL (approximatley 2;500 AGL); the aircraft broke out of the bases into marginal VMC. I was able to make out the field and I called for a visual approach to RWY XY. I set up for a no-light; no-flaps; landing; and executed the maneuver by side slipping as necessary to maintain runway visibility. I maintained an appropriate airspeed to compensate for the level of icing I anticipated had accumulated in the descent. I landed without incident and cleared the runway at the first available taxiway. The airport was shut down to accommodate our arrival.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.