Narrative:

Approximately 7 miles out on vectors for visual approach; assigned heading 130 with approach control; nighttime and VMC. Looking for airport so as to accept an expected visual approach. Gear down; flaps 15.I requested the first officer (first officer) ask for vectors [for the] ILS due to being my first flight into [this airport] and night time and not sure of being able to accept a visual approach with enough time to make a stabilized approach to landing. Although my first officer was more confident about accepting the visual and has the field at this point I didn't see the runway.we received and turned to heading 270 vectors for [the] ILS. I anticipated base turn vectors momentarily due to distance to field. I decide to leave present configuration as is. Shortly thereafter noise and feel resembling engine failure observed from left engine. I instructed first officer to verify left engine failure; set max power; qrc. Approach called and I responded that we are experiencing an engine issue; I asked him to standby. Seeing nearly equal torque indications on both engines but a low left propeller rpm I felt we probably had a propeller issue rather an engine failure. Left engine oil pressure light is illuminated.plane was flying well but does act and respond as if left engine failed. Configuration again left as is. Gear is down but speed above retraction speed. (150kts.). I didn't want to slow down; and I didn't want to damage gear with retraction above 150 KTS. Airspeed; approximately 160 KTS and 2;400 feet altitude. We decided to remain on vectors and have the first officer and myself focus on the approach.we agreed that this was the most expeditious and safe course of action as opposed to continuing on a downwind heading (270) for an undetermined amount of time and flying away from the airport. We stopped the checklists at the qrc. We were flying at night over the open ocean with a crippled left engine and 23 passengers on board. Getting the plane back on the ground safely was the priority.I asked the first officer to have approach keep us on vectors for ILS and to inform the flight attendant of our situation. Soon thereafter given vectors of 010 and then '070 to intercept the localizer; remain 2;400 feet until established; cleared for the approach; switch to tower; cleared to land.' at some point approach or tower asked if we would like assistance on the ground; I instructed the first officer to answer in the affirmative. Landing was uneventful and according to the flight attendant smooth. From the point of engine failure to being vectors to intercept the localizer for ILS is just a few minutes.taxi in and upon shutdown it was evident the left engine was already feathered as no change in sound or feel was observed when retarding the left condition lever to the feather position. After shutdown [ground personnel] at the scene reported a little bit of smoke from left main gear. I saw none upon my inspection. I helped direct the deplaning and ramp handlers were allowed to unload the bags.upon debriefing with the chief pilot via phone after shutdown and deplaning; he stated that while he was glad we made it safely to the airport; it was however 'more a matter of luck than anything else' that we were able to do so. He stated that remaining on downwind vectors and finishing the QRH checklist would have been the action we should have taken and he cited the possibility of a missed approach and not being configured for such as an example of why his reasoning should prevail and why we were 'lucky.'to counter I propose one could consider the possibility of a worse problem arising with the crippled left engine or a possible problem arising with the one remaining good engine. All the while heading out to sea; away from the airport on an extended downwind vector for an undetermined amount of time at night. I contend and am comfortable that my decision to remain on vectors for the ILS resulted in our plane getting on the ground much quicker without sacrificing safety. Further; amissed approach would have been highly unlikely.once more; I remain comfortable with my decision to return expeditiously to the airport; yet remain dismayed and troubled that the chief pilot would express such a negative view of our handling of this [incident] so quickly; within the short span of a five to ten minute phone call. During the same phone debriefing the chief pilot further stated that the first officer and myself would be removed from service until some as yet undetermined training took place at some time in the future. All of this before an official report is filed and only after a brief conversation. At the risk of upsetting the chief pilot I find withholding my first officer and myself from service baseless and premature at this point in time. But accept it for the time being we must.if a pilot; line or management; has experienced an engine failure at night over the ocean in an unfamiliar operational theater; then maybe they would be able to add something to this debate so early in the game. Anything short of that can only be considered a rush to judgment.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: SF-340B flight crew reported a propeller/engine failure on approach.

Narrative: Approximately 7 miles out on vectors for visual approach; assigned heading 130 with Approach Control; nighttime and VMC. Looking for airport so as to accept an expected visual approach. Gear down; Flaps 15.I requested the FO (First Officer) ask for vectors [for the] ILS due to being my first flight into [this airport] and night time and not sure of being able to accept a visual approach with enough time to make a stabilized approach to landing. Although my FO was more confident about accepting the visual and has the field at this point I didn't see the runway.We received and turned to heading 270 vectors for [the] ILS. I anticipated base turn vectors momentarily due to distance to field. I decide to leave present configuration as is. Shortly thereafter noise and feel resembling engine failure observed from left engine. I instructed FO to verify left engine failure; set max power; QRC. Approach called and I responded that we are experiencing an engine issue; I asked him to standby. Seeing nearly equal torque indications on both engines but a low left propeller rpm I felt we probably had a propeller issue rather an engine failure. Left engine oil pressure light is illuminated.Plane was flying well but does act and respond as if left engine failed. Configuration again left as is. Gear is down but speed above retraction speed. (150kts.). I didn't want to slow down; and I didn't want to damage gear with retraction above 150 KTS. Airspeed; approximately 160 KTS and 2;400 feet altitude. We decided to remain on vectors and have the First Officer and myself focus on the approach.We agreed that this was the most expeditious and safe course of action as opposed to continuing on a downwind heading (270) for an undetermined amount of time and flying away from the airport. We stopped the checklists at the QRC. We were flying at night over the open ocean with a crippled left engine and 23 passengers on board. Getting the plane back on the ground safely was the priority.I asked the FO to have Approach keep us on vectors for ILS and to inform the Flight Attendant of our situation. Soon thereafter given vectors of 010 and then '070 to intercept the LOC; remain 2;400 feet until established; cleared for the approach; switch to Tower; cleared to land.' At some point Approach or Tower asked if we would like assistance on the ground; I instructed the FO to answer in the affirmative. Landing was uneventful and according to the Flight Attendant smooth. From the point of engine failure to being vectors to intercept the LOC for ILS is just a few minutes.Taxi in and upon shutdown it was evident the left engine was already feathered as no change in sound or feel was observed when retarding the left condition lever to the feather position. After shutdown [ground personnel] at the scene reported a little bit of smoke from left main gear. I saw none upon my inspection. I helped direct the deplaning and ramp handlers were allowed to unload the bags.Upon debriefing with the Chief Pilot via phone after shutdown and deplaning; he stated that while he was glad we made it safely to the airport; it was however 'more a matter of luck than anything else' that we were able to do so. He stated that remaining on downwind vectors and finishing the QRH checklist would have been the action we should have taken and he cited the possibility of a missed approach and not being configured for such as an example of why his reasoning should prevail and why we were 'lucky.'To counter I propose one could consider the possibility of a worse problem arising with the crippled left engine or a possible problem arising with the one remaining good engine. All the while heading out to sea; away from the airport on an extended downwind vector for an undetermined amount of time at night. I contend and am comfortable that my decision to remain on vectors for the ILS resulted in our plane getting on the ground much quicker without sacrificing safety. Further; amissed approach would have been highly unlikely.Once more; I remain comfortable with my decision to return expeditiously to the airport; yet remain dismayed and troubled that the Chief Pilot would express such a negative view of our handling of this [incident] so quickly; within the short span of a five to ten minute phone call. During the same phone debriefing the Chief Pilot further stated that the FO and myself would be removed from service until some as yet undetermined training took place at some time in the future. All of this before an official report is filed and only after a brief conversation. At the risk of upsetting the Chief Pilot I find withholding my FO and myself from service baseless and premature at this point in time. But accept it for the time being we must.If a pilot; line or management; has experienced an engine failure at night over the ocean in an unfamiliar operational theater; then maybe they would be able to add something to this debate so early in the game. Anything short of that can only be considered a rush to judgment.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.