Narrative:

The incident flight was the first flight of the duty period. The duty period followed an approximate 10 hour rest period spent at the hotel. The flight departed with the first officer acting as pilot flying; and experienced light chop with occasional moderate turbulence. The turbulence began to include light mountain wave turbulence. At no point was the turbulence of abnormal intensity. The caution light and audible chime illuminated and flaps illuminated on the CAWS panel; shortly followed by the pusher CAWS (which remained illuminated for about 30 seconds). The PIC directed the first officer (first officer) to remain in control of the aircraft while the PIC ran though the QRH procedure for flaps/pusher and the flaps QRH. The crew also confirmed the flap handle was in the 0 degree position; and confirmed actual flap position with the flap position indicator and with visual inspection from the cockpit. The QRH procedure gave no troubleshooting instructions beyond resetting tripped circuit breakers; which were not tripped in any case; and the advice to 'land as soon as practical with flaps at the failed position.' at this point; we advised ATC of our issue. We also attempted to call maintenance control on the satellite phone without success. We also determined that a landing at flaps 0 would use almost the entire 4;200 foot runway at ZZZ1 and that ZZZs 11;500 foot would be more than sufficient. We copied the ATIS; and executed the in-range checklist; and then advised approach that we intended to divert to ZZZ and asked that we not be given speed restrictions; we discussed that the PIC had more experience in flaps 0 landings and switched roles. We also decided on a 130 KIAS approach due to reported wind shear and ample runway. We then landed without incident with the flaps in the 0 degree position. After landing; we contacted [company] and maintenance control; and then successfully executed the flap warning reset procedure at the direction of maintenance control.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PC-12 Captain a flap fault in cruise led to a diversion and no flap landing.

Narrative: The incident flight was the first flight of the duty period. The duty period followed an approximate 10 hour rest period spent at the hotel. The flight departed with the First Officer acting as Pilot Flying; and experienced light chop with occasional moderate turbulence. The turbulence began to include light mountain wave turbulence. At no point was the turbulence of abnormal intensity. The caution light and audible chime illuminated and FLAPS illuminated on the CAWS panel; shortly followed by the PUSHER CAWS (which remained illuminated for about 30 seconds). The PIC directed the First Officer (FO) to remain in control of the aircraft while the PIC ran though the QRH procedure for FLAPS/PUSHER and the FLAPS QRH. The crew also confirmed the flap handle was in the 0 degree position; and confirmed actual flap position with the flap position indicator and with visual inspection from the cockpit. The QRH procedure gave no troubleshooting instructions beyond resetting tripped circuit breakers; which were not tripped in any case; and the advice to 'land as soon as practical with flaps at the failed position.' At this point; we advised ATC of our issue. We also attempted to call Maintenance Control on the satellite phone without success. We also determined that a landing at Flaps 0 would use almost the entire 4;200 foot runway at ZZZ1 and that ZZZs 11;500 foot would be more than sufficient. We copied the ATIS; and executed the In-Range checklist; and then advised Approach that we intended to divert to ZZZ and asked that we not be given speed restrictions; we discussed that the PIC had more experience in Flaps 0 landings and switched roles. We also decided on a 130 KIAS approach due to reported Wind Shear and ample runway. We then landed without incident with the flaps in the 0 degree position. After landing; we contacted [company] and Maintenance Control; and then successfully executed the flap warning reset procedure at the direction of Maintenance Control.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.