Narrative:

We were planning an ILS into ZZZ at night. The approach was properly and thoroughly briefed by the pilot flying. I was acting as pilot monitoring and performing training as a check airman. We discussed at length the threats of flying into mountainous terrain at night and how important it was to follow the IAP [instrument approach procedure]. On a downwind vector; we were asked our flight conditions to which we responded VMC. I asked the pilot flying if he had the airport environment in sight and he responded that he did. I then asked if he would like the visual approach and he said yes. We called the airport in sight and were cleared for the visual approach. Shortly thereafter; we began the base leg and began to configure the aircraft. We were approximately 3-4 miles outside the FAF with green needles selected.during this phase of flight; we were asked by tower to 'square the approach' to allow for additional spacing for landing traffic. The pilot flying did indeed keep the pattern square but failed to arm the approach. I opted to give him the chance to notice it and arm it himself. As we were in this phase; the pilot flying called for flaps 20; which I set; and looked down at the speed cards to get the proper maneuvering speed. I did not notice upon coming heads up from looking down that the pilot flying had spun up the altitude knob to a higher altitude which was above us. He had also increased his rate of descent to 1800 fpm. I was focused on the FMA [flight mode annunciator] initially as to verify that the pilot flying had armed the approach; which he had not. I was about to tell him to arm the approach when I realized the altitude pre-select had been spun up without my knowledge. Our altitude at that point was around 6;000 feet. I told him we were too low and needed to climb back up immediately. The GPWS then announced 'caution terrain'. I again told him to climb back up immediately and to turn toward the runway. The pilot flying disconnected the autopilot and began an immediate climbing turn toward the runway. We quickly returned to the proper intercept altitude of 6;800 feet and proceeded to the runway for a normal landing. During the debrief; the pilot flying explained that he had thought he was too high based upon his sight picture. Poor referencing of the ILS by pilot flying to ascertain the correct intercept altitude was a factor. Not stating an altitude entered in the pre-select was a factor. Contributing factors also include myself going heads down momentarily to light up the speed cards and find the maneuvering speed; and not seeing the change that had been put in the altitude pre-select. I should have noticed sooner we were below our safe altitude but was distracted by the pilot flying not arming the approach. During the debrief; we discussed how procedures already in place will keep us out of this situation. Better communication of what 'the captain' plans to do and verbalizing it as you are doing it. Stating all altitudes entered into the pre-select; even when on a visual approach. Proper referencing of the ILS and following it at night!! Better familiarity with terrain relating to your present position. Arming the approach sooner and not waiting until last minute to arm it. This was a big learning experience for this student and shook him up. I'm disappointed I didn't catch this and correct it sooner but was distracted with the speed cards. I've learned that keeping the speed cards in a more visible lit area would help eliminate and shorten the 'heads down' time when it's critical for me to be watching; observing and teaching.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ-900 Captain reported the First Officer flew through the final approach course and received a GPWS Terrain warning.

Narrative: We were planning an ILS into ZZZ at night. The approach was properly and thoroughly briefed by the Pilot Flying. I was acting as Pilot Monitoring and performing training as a Check Airman. We discussed at length the threats of flying into mountainous terrain at night and how important it was to follow the IAP [Instrument Approach Procedure]. On a downwind vector; we were asked our flight conditions to which we responded VMC. I asked the Pilot Flying if he had the airport environment in sight and he responded that he did. I then asked if he would like the Visual Approach and he said yes. We called the airport in sight and were cleared for the Visual Approach. Shortly thereafter; we began the base leg and began to configure the aircraft. We were approximately 3-4 miles outside the FAF with green needles selected.During this phase of flight; we were asked by Tower to 'square the approach' to allow for additional spacing for landing traffic. The Pilot Flying did indeed keep the pattern square but failed to arm the approach. I opted to give him the chance to notice it and arm it himself. As we were in this phase; the Pilot Flying called for flaps 20; which I set; and looked down at the speed cards to get the proper maneuvering speed. I did not notice upon coming heads up from looking down that the Pilot Flying had spun up the altitude knob to a higher altitude which was above us. He had also increased his rate of descent to 1800 fpm. I was focused on the FMA [Flight Mode Annunciator] initially as to verify that the Pilot Flying had armed the approach; which he had not. I was about to tell him to arm the approach when I realized the altitude pre-select had been spun up without my knowledge. Our altitude at that point was around 6;000 feet. I told him we were too low and needed to climb back up immediately. The GPWS then announced 'caution terrain'. I again told him to climb back up immediately and to turn toward the runway. The Pilot Flying disconnected the autopilot and began an immediate climbing turn toward the runway. We quickly returned to the proper intercept altitude of 6;800 feet and proceeded to the runway for a normal landing. During the debrief; the Pilot Flying explained that he had thought he was too high based upon his sight picture. Poor referencing of the ILS by Pilot Flying to ascertain the correct intercept altitude was a factor. Not stating an altitude entered in the pre-select was a factor. Contributing factors also include myself going heads down momentarily to light up the speed cards and find the maneuvering speed; and not seeing the change that had been put in the altitude pre-select. I should have noticed sooner we were below our safe altitude but was distracted by the Pilot Flying not arming the approach. During the debrief; we discussed how procedures already in place will keep us out of this situation. Better communication of what 'the Captain' plans to do and verbalizing it as you are doing it. Stating ALL altitudes entered into the pre-select; even when on a visual approach. Proper referencing of the ILS and FOLLOWING IT AT NIGHT!! Better familiarity with terrain relating to your present position. Arming the approach sooner and not waiting until last minute to arm it. This was a big learning experience for this student and shook him up. I'm disappointed I didn't catch this and correct it sooner but was distracted with the speed cards. I've learned that keeping the speed cards in a more visible lit area would help eliminate and shorten the 'heads down' time when it's critical for me to be watching; observing and teaching.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.