Narrative:

I was operating in the lbb airport traffic pattern conducting touch and go practice with a student. The winds were variable from 300 to 330 at 20 gusting to 27 KTS. The runway in use was 35L. While on downwind for runway 35L, I heard tower clear an small aircraft to land runway 26 and to hold short of runway 35L. This was the only call I heard regarding the small aircraft. After lifting off from the subsequent touch and go I saw the small aircraft in my peripheral vision approaching us on a collision course from the right. I immediately told the student 'my plane' and pulled up to a maximum climb attitude. Seconds later the small aircraft pilot reported 'going around'. I returned the aircraft to a safe flight attitude and then queried the tower as to what just happened. The tower reported he didn't know other than the small aircraft was to hold short of our runway and had to go-around due to strong x-winds. I feel that there were several contributing factors to this incident. The primary blame I feel should fall on the pilot of the small aircraft. His decision to land on runway 26 in order to shave one min off his flight time showed very poor judgement and a dereliction of safety. His decision and declaration of the go-around were both late and in violation of his clearance. The remainder of the blame should be divided between the controller and myself. The controller was extremely lax in not providing advisory warnings to our aircraft. We should have been warned when we were cleared to touch and go, when it became apparent the small aircraft was not going to adhere to his clearance, then the small aircraft declared the g-a. The small aircraft had consumed more than 7000' of runway and was airborne again when I first became aware of the conflict. This would seem to have been more than enough time for the tower to recognize the dangerous condition developing. My fault was in not keeping an eye on the small aircraft and becoming so distraction with my students actions. I think the lbb tower should not allow an aircraft to operate contrary to the current flow in such adverse conditions when the possibility is high that the aircraft may not be able to adhere to its clearance. Had we been a jet on takeoff roll I am sure lives would have been lost.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PLT INSTRUCTOR WITH STUDENT MAKING TOUCH AND GO'S AT LBB HAD NMAC WITH TRAFFIC MAKING A GO AROUND ON INTERSECTING RWY.

Narrative: I WAS OPERATING IN THE LBB ARPT TFC PATTERN CONDUCTING TOUCH AND GO PRACTICE WITH A STUDENT. THE WINDS WERE VARIABLE FROM 300 TO 330 AT 20 GUSTING TO 27 KTS. THE RWY IN USE WAS 35L. WHILE ON DOWNWIND FOR RWY 35L, I HEARD TWR CLR AN SMA TO LAND RWY 26 AND TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 35L. THIS WAS THE ONLY CALL I HEARD REGARDING THE SMA. AFTER LIFTING OFF FROM THE SUBSEQUENT TOUCH AND GO I SAW THE SMA IN MY PERIPHERAL VISION APCHING US ON A COLLISION COURSE FROM THE R. I IMMEDIATELY TOLD THE STUDENT 'MY PLANE' AND PULLED UP TO A MAX CLB ATTITUDE. SECS LATER THE SMA PLT RPTED 'GOING AROUND'. I RETURNED THE ACFT TO A SAFE FLT ATTITUDE AND THEN QUERIED THE TWR AS TO WHAT JUST HAPPENED. THE TWR RPTED HE DIDN'T KNOW OTHER THAN THE SMA WAS TO HOLD SHORT OF OUR RWY AND HAD TO GO-AROUND DUE TO STRONG X-WINDS. I FEEL THAT THERE WERE SEVERAL CONTRIBUTING FACTORS TO THIS INCIDENT. THE PRIMARY BLAME I FEEL SHOULD FALL ON THE PLT OF THE SMA. HIS DECISION TO LAND ON RWY 26 IN ORDER TO SHAVE ONE MIN OFF HIS FLT TIME SHOWED VERY POOR JUDGEMENT AND A DERELICTION OF SAFETY. HIS DECISION AND DECLARATION OF THE GO-AROUND WERE BOTH LATE AND IN VIOLATION OF HIS CLRNC. THE REMAINDER OF THE BLAME SHOULD BE DIVIDED BTWN THE CTLR AND MYSELF. THE CTLR WAS EXTREMELY LAX IN NOT PROVIDING ADVISORY WARNINGS TO OUR ACFT. WE SHOULD HAVE BEEN WARNED WHEN WE WERE CLRED TO TOUCH AND GO, WHEN IT BECAME APPARENT THE SMA WAS NOT GOING TO ADHERE TO HIS CLRNC, THEN THE SMA DECLARED THE G-A. THE SMA HAD CONSUMED MORE THAN 7000' OF RWY AND WAS AIRBORNE AGAIN WHEN I FIRST BECAME AWARE OF THE CONFLICT. THIS WOULD SEEM TO HAVE BEEN MORE THAN ENOUGH TIME FOR THE TWR TO RECOGNIZE THE DANGEROUS CONDITION DEVELOPING. MY FAULT WAS IN NOT KEEPING AN EYE ON THE SMA AND BECOMING SO DISTR WITH MY STUDENTS ACTIONS. I THINK THE LBB TWR SHOULD NOT ALLOW AN ACFT TO OPERATE CONTRARY TO THE CURRENT FLOW IN SUCH ADVERSE CONDITIONS WHEN THE POSSIBILITY IS HIGH THAT THE ACFT MAY NOT BE ABLE TO ADHERE TO ITS CLRNC. HAD WE BEEN A JET ON TKOF ROLL I AM SURE LIVES WOULD HAVE BEEN LOST.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.