Narrative:

Medium large transport X flight began routinely enough with a taxi clearance to runway 9L. As we neared the approach end of runway 9L, we were told to follow the air carrier widebody transport off to our right. The air carrier widebody transport aircraft was cleared for takeoff. We were then cleared onto the runway. While in position we talked about the line of thunderstorms 12-15 mi east of the airport. Our takeoff clearance eventually came, medium large transport X cleared for takeoff maintain runway heading caution wake turbulence from the departing heavy widebody transport. I looked for the departing aircraft and found it flying a non runway heading. With the current winds I felt comfortable that our runway heading would keep us clear of any wake turbulence created by the heavy widebody transport. I turned all of our landing lights on and told the first officer that he had the aircraft and we began our takeoff. The takeoff began normally with the use of a/T to takeoff power. I had just reported takeoff power set with engines running normally when the first officer questioned if that was an aircraft crossing the runway. At this point I began aborting the takeoff and watched an small transport Y commuter cross the runway approximately 100-1500' in front of us. While we were in the transition from takeoff to the aborting maneuver, I determined that with our deceleration and the commuters speed crossing the runway that the imminent danger of a collision was over. I reported to the tower that medium large transport X had aborted the takeoff because of an aircraft on the runway. Our next concern was the fear that the aircraft behind us had been cleared for takeoff. I had not heard any clearance, but my first officer stated he heard tower issue a takeoff clearance while we were still on the runway. I cleared at the next turnoff on the right side of the runway. During the time we had passed the small transport Y and while we were expediting our turnoff of the runway, the first officer reported again to the tower that we had aborted the takeoff. Once clear of the runway we ascertained that with a speed of 80 KTS and a weight between 80000 and 90000, we needed 15 mins additional time on the ground for brake cooling. We waited the allotted time and then took off takeoff tpa. I was disturbed by the fact that nothing was said to us after the incident. This had the potential of being a catastrophic accident!

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MLG ABORTED TKOF WHEN HE OBSERVED AN SMT CROSSING HIS RWY APPROX 1500' DOWN FROM DEP END.

Narrative: MLG X FLT BEGAN ROUTINELY ENOUGH WITH A TAXI CLRNC TO RWY 9L. AS WE NEARED THE APCH END OF RWY 9L, WE WERE TOLD TO FOLLOW THE ACR WDB OFF TO OUR R. THE ACR WDB ACFT WAS CLRED FOR TKOF. WE WERE THEN CLRED ONTO THE RWY. WHILE IN POS WE TALKED ABOUT THE LINE OF TSTMS 12-15 MI E OF THE ARPT. OUR TKOF CLRNC EVENTUALLY CAME, MLG X CLRED FOR TKOF MAINTAIN RWY HDG CAUTION WAKE TURB FROM THE DEPARTING HVY WDB. I LOOKED FOR THE DEPARTING ACFT AND FOUND IT FLYING A NON RWY HDG. WITH THE CURRENT WINDS I FELT COMFORTABLE THAT OUR RWY HDG WOULD KEEP US CLR OF ANY WAKE TURB CREATED BY THE HVY WDB. I TURNED ALL OF OUR LNDG LIGHTS ON AND TOLD THE F/O THAT HE HAD THE ACFT AND WE BEGAN OUR TKOF. THE TKOF BEGAN NORMALLY WITH THE USE OF A/T TO TKOF PWR. I HAD JUST RPTED TKOF PWR SET WITH ENGS RUNNING NORMALLY WHEN THE F/O QUESTIONED IF THAT WAS AN ACFT XING THE RWY. AT THIS POINT I BEGAN ABORTING THE TKOF AND WATCHED AN SMT Y COMMUTER CROSS THE RWY APPROX 100-1500' IN FRONT OF US. WHILE WE WERE IN THE TRANSITION FROM TKOF TO THE ABORTING MANEUVER, I DETERMINED THAT WITH OUR DECELERATION AND THE COMMUTERS SPD XING THE RWY THAT THE IMMINENT DANGER OF A COLLISION WAS OVER. I RPTED TO THE TWR THAT MLG X HAD ABORTED THE TKOF BECAUSE OF AN ACFT ON THE RWY. OUR NEXT CONCERN WAS THE FEAR THAT THE ACFT BEHIND US HAD BEEN CLRED FOR TKOF. I HAD NOT HEARD ANY CLRNC, BUT MY F/O STATED HE HEARD TWR ISSUE A TKOF CLRNC WHILE WE WERE STILL ON THE RWY. I CLRED AT THE NEXT TURNOFF ON THE R SIDE OF THE RWY. DURING THE TIME WE HAD PASSED THE SMT Y AND WHILE WE WERE EXPEDITING OUR TURNOFF OF THE RWY, THE F/O RPTED AGAIN TO THE TWR THAT WE HAD ABORTED THE TKOF. ONCE CLR OF THE RWY WE ASCERTAINED THAT WITH A SPD OF 80 KTS AND A WEIGHT BTWN 80000 AND 90000, WE NEEDED 15 MINS ADDITIONAL TIME ON THE GND FOR BRAKE COOLING. WE WAITED THE ALLOTTED TIME AND THEN TOOK OFF TKOF TPA. I WAS DISTURBED BY THE FACT THAT NOTHING WAS SAID TO US AFTER THE INCIDENT. THIS HAD THE POTENTIAL OF BEING A CATASTROPHIC ACCIDENT!

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.