Narrative:

We had completed the unloading and loading process and were awaiting the completion of fueling to start engines. The truck had been disconnected and we had the fuel receipt in our hands in the cockpit. Unknown to us in the cockpit and outside of our sight, the fuel truck driver delayed his departure from underneath the wing between 3 and 4 engines. I surmise from conversations with persons on the ramp that he had elected to complete his paperwork before driving off from under the aircraft. We completed the checklist and asked for the air machine to be started up to being the start of the engines. The air pressure came up and we commenced the start of #3 engine on the confirmation from the ground through hand signals. We began the start of #3 engine when a second marshaller came out from underneath the aircraft and made the hand signal for engine shutdown. We had not introduced fuel to the engine and aborted the start. We found out at that point that the fuel truck was still between engines 3 and 4. The truck then drove away after a short delay and I was not able to discuss the situation with ground personnel. After the fuel truck left the engines were started and we departed west/O further incident. My concerns here are obvious. From our positions in the cockpit it is almost impossible to see a fuel truck between the engines on either side of the aircraft west/O opening the window. Even then, if the position of the veh were exactly right, the crew might not even then be able to see such a dangerous situation. The people employed by the ground handling agencies are often somewhat inexperienced. Turnover can be high and even if conscientious, they may not be aware of the limitations on what the crew can see or not see. They may not know what they can see from their vantage point in front of the cockpit. Perhaps they do not understand the potential danger caused by a fuel truck parked underneath the wing. In any case, fuel truck drivers should be instructed to move their vehs away from the aircraft as soon as fueling is complete. Perhaps we should require some sort of basic certification for ground handlers to ensure that they are aware of the basic safety needs of an aircraft during engine start and taxi in or out. The captain is responsible even in this case when misled by the ground handler and a slow to depart fuel truck. Responsible in this case, for things that are out of his sight or possible awareness. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following: reporter clarified the location of the incident. He also named the organization that supplied the ground handlers. It is a contract outfit that provides ground support for numerous supplemental carriers at numerous airports. Reporter suspects that there is a serious lack of training and experience among the employees of these companies.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: HVT IS CLEARED TO START ENGINES WHILE A FUEL TRUCK IS PARKED BETWEEN #3 AND 4 ENGINES.

Narrative: WE HAD COMPLETED THE UNLOADING AND LOADING PROCESS AND WERE AWAITING THE COMPLETION OF FUELING TO START ENGINES. THE TRUCK HAD BEEN DISCONNECTED AND WE HAD THE FUEL RECEIPT IN OUR HANDS IN THE COCKPIT. UNKNOWN TO US IN THE COCKPIT AND OUTSIDE OF OUR SIGHT, THE FUEL TRUCK DRIVER DELAYED HIS DEP FROM UNDERNEATH THE WING BTWN 3 AND 4 ENGS. I SURMISE FROM CONVERSATIONS WITH PERSONS ON THE RAMP THAT HE HAD ELECTED TO COMPLETE HIS PAPERWORK BEFORE DRIVING OFF FROM UNDER THE ACFT. WE COMPLETED THE CHKLIST AND ASKED FOR THE AIR MACHINE TO BE STARTED UP TO BEING THE START OF THE ENGS. THE AIR PRESSURE CAME UP AND WE COMMENCED THE START OF #3 ENG ON THE CONFIRMATION FROM THE GND THROUGH HAND SIGNALS. WE BEGAN THE START OF #3 ENG WHEN A SECOND MARSHALLER CAME OUT FROM UNDERNEATH THE ACFT AND MADE THE HAND SIGNAL FOR ENG SHUTDOWN. WE HAD NOT INTRODUCED FUEL TO THE ENG AND ABORTED THE START. WE FOUND OUT AT THAT POINT THAT THE FUEL TRUCK WAS STILL BTWN ENGS 3 AND 4. THE TRUCK THEN DROVE AWAY AFTER A SHORT DELAY AND I WAS NOT ABLE TO DISCUSS THE SITUATION WITH GND PERSONNEL. AFTER THE FUEL TRUCK LEFT THE ENGS WERE STARTED AND WE DEPARTED W/O FURTHER INCIDENT. MY CONCERNS HERE ARE OBVIOUS. FROM OUR POSITIONS IN THE COCKPIT IT IS ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE TO SEE A FUEL TRUCK BTWN THE ENGS ON EITHER SIDE OF THE ACFT W/O OPENING THE WINDOW. EVEN THEN, IF THE POS OF THE VEH WERE EXACTLY RIGHT, THE CREW MIGHT NOT EVEN THEN BE ABLE TO SEE SUCH A DANGEROUS SITUATION. THE PEOPLE EMPLOYED BY THE GND HANDLING AGENCIES ARE OFTEN SOMEWHAT INEXPERIENCED. TURNOVER CAN BE HIGH AND EVEN IF CONSCIENTIOUS, THEY MAY NOT BE AWARE OF THE LIMITATIONS ON WHAT THE CREW CAN SEE OR NOT SEE. THEY MAY NOT KNOW WHAT THEY CAN SEE FROM THEIR VANTAGE POINT IN FRONT OF THE COCKPIT. PERHAPS THEY DO NOT UNDERSTAND THE POTENTIAL DANGER CAUSED BY A FUEL TRUCK PARKED UNDERNEATH THE WING. IN ANY CASE, FUEL TRUCK DRIVERS SHOULD BE INSTRUCTED TO MOVE THEIR VEHS AWAY FROM THE ACFT AS SOON AS FUELING IS COMPLETE. PERHAPS WE SHOULD REQUIRE SOME SORT OF BASIC CERTIFICATION FOR GND HANDLERS TO ENSURE THAT THEY ARE AWARE OF THE BASIC SAFETY NEEDS OF AN ACFT DURING ENG START AND TAXI IN OR OUT. THE CAPT IS RESPONSIBLE EVEN IN THIS CASE WHEN MISLED BY THE GND HANDLER AND A SLOW TO DEPART FUEL TRUCK. RESPONSIBLE IN THIS CASE, FOR THINGS THAT ARE OUT OF HIS SIGHT OR POSSIBLE AWARENESS. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING: RPTR CLARIFIED THE LOCATION OF THE INCIDENT. HE ALSO NAMED THE ORGANIZATION THAT SUPPLIED THE GND HANDLERS. IT IS A CONTRACT OUTFIT THAT PROVIDES GND SUPPORT FOR NUMEROUS SUPPLEMENTAL CARRIERS AT NUMEROUS ARPTS. RPTR SUSPECTS THAT THERE IS A SERIOUS LACK OF TRNING AND EXPERIENCE AMONG THE EMPLOYEES OF THESE COMPANIES.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.