Narrative:

Captain was pilot monitoring and first officer X was pilot flying. First officer Y and myself were at rest for this leg as we would be operating the [next] leg. I was asleep in the left bunk and noticed we had started a descent into almaty and had not been notified of our arrival. I got up and went to the cockpit as we were descending through 10;000 ft. First officer Y had not yet come up either as neither of us were notified of our arrival and subsequently were not briefed on the approach. I noticed that we were being vectored for a visual approach to 23L. There were rain showers in the area and scattered between us and the runway. First officer Y came to the cockpit about the time we were coming through 1500 ft to the best of my recollection. I was sitting in the second observer's seat and had my headset on but as there is no mic function in that seat; it was difficult to communicate. Both the captain and first officer X had the ILS tuned and identified but were doing a visual approach. When first officer Y came into the cockpit he noticed that we were not established on the ILS but were tuned into it and asked what kind of approach were we doing. We were approaching from the right side of the approach and about 5 miles out when I saw the runway and stated that I saw the runway and the captain acknowledged that he saw it also. However; I lost sight of it shortly after as a rain shower obscured it. The captain stated that we had until 500 ft to get established. As we were approaching 500 ft however; we were showing full deflection of the glide slope below us and still not established on the localizer. I said that we need to go around which I'm not sure if the captain heard me or not but first officer Y repeated that we need to go around at which the captain turned to first officer Y and said something to the effect that he had it under control. Then ATC suggested that we go around and comeback for an ILS. The captain told ATC that he had the visual and would continue. First officer X corrected for being high but in doing so descended rapidly through the glide slope and about that same time; ATC advised to contact tower. This was about 2 mile final. As we got closer; we received the [aural] alerts 'glideslope' 'too low' 'pull up'. On short final the captain attempted to contact tower but was still on approach frequency and as he was preoccupied trying to help stabilize the aircraft; we landed before contacting tower. The touchdown and landing rollout were otherwise uneventful but there were multiple times a go around should have been initiated and after three of us (myself; first officer Y and ATC) said to go around; the approach was continued. During breakfast this morning with the captain I discussed the events of what happened and was as diplomatic as I could be without being accusatory and wanted him to know that I and first officer Y were disappointed that we were disregarded when we said to go around. I told him that I wasn't second guessing his judgement when giving first officer X a chance to get stabilized but when it got beyond reasonable and was told by three different people to go around that we were quite disappointed. I wasn't looking for an apology but rather an acknowledgement of the go around policy in the fom which states that 'regardless of the reason for a go-around; any flight crew member can call for a go-around and the pilot flying must honor/execute a go-around.' I must say that I was a little disappointed with my conversation with the captain as he refused to acknowledge the fom and that he should have executed a go-around. I believe first officer X should also have executed the go-around but was taking direction from the captain to continue. Captain is otherwise very friendly and a pleasure to fly with but in this case; I think that he should've followed the fom or at least in retrospect acknowledged that he put us all in an uncomfortable position and would strive to make sure that wouldn't happen again.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: First Officer reported after receiving alerts from ATC; flight crew; and the EPGWS to 'Go Around'; the Captain continued the landing.

Narrative: Captain was Pilot Monitoring and First Officer X was Pilot Flying. First Officer Y and myself were at rest for this leg as we would be operating the [next] leg. I was asleep in the left bunk and noticed we had started a descent into Almaty and had not been notified of our arrival. I got up and went to the cockpit as we were descending through 10;000 ft. First Officer Y had not yet come up either as neither of us were notified of our arrival and subsequently were not briefed on the approach. I noticed that we were being vectored for a visual approach to 23L. There were rain showers in the area and scattered between us and the runway. First Officer Y came to the cockpit about the time we were coming through 1500 ft to the best of my recollection. I was sitting in the second observer's seat and had my headset on but as there is no mic function in that seat; it was difficult to communicate. Both the Captain and First Officer X had the ILS tuned and identified but were doing a visual approach. When First Officer Y came into the cockpit he noticed that we were not established on the ILS but were tuned into it and asked what kind of approach were we doing. We were approaching from the right side of the approach and about 5 miles out when I saw the runway and stated that I saw the runway and the Captain acknowledged that he saw it also. However; I lost sight of it shortly after as a rain shower obscured it. The Captain stated that we had until 500 ft to get established. As we were approaching 500 ft however; we were showing full deflection of the glide slope below us and still not established on the localizer. I said that we need to go around which I'm not sure if the Captain heard me or not but First Officer Y repeated that we need to go around at which the Captain turned to First Officer Y and said something to the effect that he had it under control. Then ATC suggested that we go around and comeback for an ILS. The Captain told ATC that he had the visual and would continue. First Officer X corrected for being high but in doing so descended rapidly through the glide slope and about that same time; ATC advised to contact Tower. This was about 2 mile final. As we got closer; we received the [aural] alerts 'glideslope' 'too low' 'pull up'. On short final the captain attempted to contact Tower but was still on approach frequency and as he was preoccupied trying to help stabilize the aircraft; we landed before contacting Tower. The touchdown and landing rollout were otherwise uneventful but there were multiple times a go around should have been initiated and after three of us (myself; First Officer Y and ATC) said to go around; the approach was continued. During breakfast this morning with the Captain I discussed the events of what happened and was as diplomatic as I could be without being accusatory and wanted him to know that I and First Officer Y were disappointed that we were disregarded when we said to go around. I told him that I wasn't second guessing his judgement when giving First Officer X a chance to get stabilized but when it got beyond reasonable and was told by three different people to go around that we were quite disappointed. I wasn't looking for an apology but rather an acknowledgement of the go around policy in the FOM which states that 'Regardless of the reason for a go-around; any flight crew member can call for a go-around and the Pilot Flying MUST honor/execute a go-around.' I must say that I was a little disappointed with my conversation with the Captain as he refused to acknowledge the FOM and that he should have executed a go-around. I believe First Officer X should also have executed the go-around but was taking direction from the Captain to continue. Captain is otherwise very friendly and a pleasure to fly with but in this case; I think that he should've followed the FOM or at least in retrospect acknowledged that he put us all in an uncomfortable position and would strive to make sure that wouldn't happen again.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.