Narrative:

We were taxiing for takeoff; expecting runway 22R at intersection west. Taxi clearance included several delays for other traffic and flow over the first departure fix. Taxi route was slightly different than expected; but no changes of consequence. Single-engine taxi was utilized; and during hold periods the first part of the before takeoff checklist was performed. At that time; both crew members failed to realize that we had runway 22L at west entered into the FMS. [Takeoff data] showed a flaps 10 reduced thrust takeoff; which we were configured for.as we continued taxi; we started the left engine and approaching the hold short we ran the remainder of the before takeoff checklist. ATC cleared the flight to 'lineup and wait' on 22R at west; and as I looked down during the 'verify takeoff runway' step; I then realized that 22L (and not 22R) was loaded into the FMS. The first officer (first officer) changed the takeoff runway to 22R and requested new takeoff data for that runway. As we waited for the ACARS data; we were cleared for takeoff; and we advised ATC that we needed a delay. There was no traffic waiting for departure; so ATC merely told us to 'let him know when we were rolling.' once we were lined up on the runway; I transferred control of the aircraft to the first officer and I took over the radios.when the new numbers showed up; the first officer loaded them in; and we saw v-speeds that were different; but we loaded them and verified the new V2 was set in the MCP window. Neither of us noticed that the new data was for flaps 5; and we did not wait to print and review a hard copy of the [takeoff data] before loading and accepting the data into the FMS. Satisfied that the correct numbers were good and the correct runway was loaded in the FMS; we commenced the takeoff roll.during the takeoff roll; at around 70-80 knots; the first officer realized that the takeoff data was for a flaps 5 takeoff (we were still at flaps 10). Knowing that the actual flaps setting was higher than the [takeoff data]; I decided at that instant that the hazard in this case did not warrant the hazard presented by an rejected takeoff (rejected takeoff); so I announced to the first officer to continue the takeoff. The first officer rotated normally using the flaps 5 speeds; and the takeoff was completed without further incident.once at altitude; I printed the 22R/west [takeoff data] and reviewed the differences. Compared to the other runway; V1 was 10 knots greater; vr was 9 knots greater; and V2 was 8 knots greater. Since we were already airborne; I was unable to get flaps 10 data for 22R/west.the event and the threats are clear: we loaded the wrong runway initially; and both of us failed to see it during the before takeoff checklist (oversight/complacency). I caught the error as we approached the runway; but then we failed to properly review the revised [takeoff data] and ensure we were properly configured for it. As captain; I made an erroneous assumption that the first officer had forced flaps 10 in the data request (vice letting [the computer system] choose the flaps setting); and due to complacency; we didn't run the runway change supplemental checklist or insist on reviewing the [takeoff data] (digitally or hard-copy) to verify the data and configuration settings. Since we didn't anticipate a configuration change; we didn't feel the need to re-run the entire before takeoff checklist again. Any one of these steps that I normally would have taken would have prevented what resulted in an undesired aircraft state (incorrect flap setting on takeoff). Once we realized the error; I made an immediate decision on the safest corrective action (continuing the takeoff using the flaps 5 speeds) to recover.some might argue that this was a 'no harm; no foul' event; but I disagree. I allowed myself to take shortcuts that I never allowed myself to do before. I've never taken off without reviewing the takeoff data message before. I'll admit that I hate the idea of having a computer system load my data for me; because I feel it takes me out ofthe loop; and in this case; that's exactly what happened. Nonetheless; the errors and the oversights were mine; and as captain I have to assume responsibility for them. Had the required flaps been higher vice lower; or had there been a significant difference in runway lengths; the results could have been much different.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Air Carrier Captain reported taking off without proper performance data due to a late runway change.

Narrative: We were taxiing for takeoff; expecting RWY 22R at intersection W. Taxi clearance included several delays for other traffic and flow over the first departure fix. Taxi route was slightly different than expected; but no changes of consequence. Single-engine taxi was utilized; and during hold periods the first part of the Before Takeoff Checklist was performed. At that time; both crew members failed to realize that we had RWY 22L at W entered into the FMS. [Takeoff Data] showed a Flaps 10 reduced thrust takeoff; which we were configured for.As we continued taxi; we started the left engine and approaching the hold short we ran the remainder of the Before Takeoff Checklist. ATC cleared the flight to 'Lineup and Wait' on 22R at W; and as I looked down during the 'Verify Takeoff Runway' step; I then realized that 22L (and not 22R) was loaded into the FMS. The FO (First Officer) changed the takeoff runway to 22R and requested new takeoff data for that runway. As we waited for the ACARS data; we were cleared for takeoff; and we advised ATC that we needed a delay. There was no traffic waiting for departure; so ATC merely told us to 'let him know when we were rolling.' Once we were lined up on the runway; I transferred control of the aircraft to the FO and I took over the radios.When the new numbers showed up; the FO loaded them in; and we saw V-speeds that were different; but we loaded them and verified the new V2 was set in the MCP window. Neither of us noticed that the new data was for Flaps 5; and we did NOT wait to print and review a hard copy of the [Takeoff Data] before loading and accepting the data into the FMS. Satisfied that the correct numbers were good and the correct runway was loaded in the FMS; we commenced the takeoff roll.During the takeoff roll; at around 70-80 knots; the FO realized that the takeoff data was for a Flaps 5 takeoff (we were still at Flaps 10). Knowing that the actual flaps setting was higher than the [Takeoff Data]; I decided at that instant that the hazard IN THIS CASE did not warrant the hazard presented by an RTO (Rejected Takeoff); so I announced to the FO to continue the takeoff. The FO rotated normally using the Flaps 5 speeds; and the takeoff was completed without further incident.Once at altitude; I printed the 22R/W [Takeoff Data] and reviewed the differences. Compared to the other runway; V1 was 10 knots greater; VR was 9 knots greater; and V2 was 8 knots greater. Since we were already airborne; I was unable to get Flaps 10 data for 22R/W.The event and the threats are clear: we loaded the wrong runway initially; and both of us failed to see it during the Before Takeoff Checklist (oversight/complacency). I caught the error as we approached the runway; but then we failed to properly review the revised [Takeoff Data] and ensure we were properly configured for it. As captain; I made an erroneous assumption that the FO had forced Flaps 10 in the data request (vice letting [the computer system] choose the flaps setting); and due to complacency; we didn't run the Runway Change supplemental checklist or insist on reviewing the [Takeoff Data] (digitally or hard-copy) to verify the data and configuration settings. Since we didn't anticipate a configuration change; we didn't feel the need to re-run the entire Before Takeoff Checklist again. Any one of these steps that I normally would have taken would have prevented what resulted in an Undesired Aircraft State (incorrect flap setting on takeoff). Once we realized the error; I made an immediate decision on the safest corrective action (continuing the takeoff using the Flaps 5 speeds) to recover.Some might argue that this was a 'no harm; no foul' event; but I disagree. I allowed myself to take shortcuts that I never allowed myself to do before. I've NEVER taken off without reviewing the takeoff data message before. I'll admit that I HATE the idea of having a computer system load my data for me; because I feel it takes me out ofthe loop; and in this case; that's exactly what happened. Nonetheless; the errors and the oversights were mine; and as captain I have to assume responsibility for them. Had the required flaps been higher vice lower; or had there been a significant difference in runway lengths; the results could have been much different.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.